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THOUGHT EXPERIMENT I: SWITCHING THE TIME OF THE
COURT-PACKING BATTLE
For the most part, the Supreme Court's decisions in 1932 and
1933 disappointed liberals. The two swingJustices, ChiefJustice
Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen J. Roberts, seemed to
have sided more with the Court's four conservatives than with its
three liberals. Between early 1934 and early 1935, however, the
Court issued three thunderbolt decisions, all by five-to-four votes
on the liberal side and with either Hughes or Roberts writing for
the majority over the dissent of the conservative foursome: in
January 1934, Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell' severely
limited the extent to which the Contracts Clause of Article I,
'290 U.S. 398 (1934) (holding that a state statute extending the redemption
period for mortgaged property in limited circumstances did not violate the Contracts
Clause). For a discussion of Blaisdell, see infra part I.D.1.
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Section 10 of the Constitution forbids state debtor protection
legislation; in March, Nebbia v. New York2 stated in expansive terms
the power of the state to regulate prices and in narrow terms the
restraint imposed on the states by substantive due process; and in
February 1935, the Gold Clause Cases refused to allow preexisting
contractual provisions to obstruct the New Deal's daring changes
in monetary policy.$
Suppose that shortly before the Blaisdell decision-rather than
in 1937-President Franklin Roosevelt unveiled a plan to pack the
Court with six additional members, and that the debate over the
plan lasted until after the Gold Clause decisions. Would it not have
been obvious that the votes of Hughes and Roberts in these three
cases resulted from the political pressure created by the plan and,
with respect to the Gold Clause Cases, by the thumping Democratic
victory in the 1934 elections?
INTRODUCTION
If, as Lincoln said, "we cannot escape history,"4 then we
certainly cannot escape the 1930s. Despite occasional expressions
of impatience,5 scholars of the American Constitution continue to
be intrigued by, and to study with great energy, the events that
culminated in the so-called "switch in time" of 1937.6 And with
2 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (holding constitutional a regulation fixing milk prices). For
a discussion of Nebbia, see infra part I.D.2.
' The Gold Clause Cases comprise a set of four decisions: Norman v. Baltimore &
O.R.R. and United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). The
Gold Clause Cases are discussed infra part I.D.3.
" Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRMNGS 666, 688 (Roy P. Baster ed., 1946) (emphasis
omitted). I am twisting somewhat. Lincoln was looking prospectively: "We of this
Congress and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves." Id. I
am looking retrospectively.
' See e.g.,John H. Schlegel, The Line Between History and Casenote, 22 LAw & SOC'Y
REV. 969, 975 (1988) ("[T]he print spilled on Justice Roberts's 'switch in time,' a
matter of great import to frankfurterians, has... needlessly polluted our rivers and
streams.").
6 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 48-50 (1991)
(comparing "switch[es] in time" occurring as conservative responses to Reconstruction
Republicans with those occurring in reaction to New Deal Democrats); Michael
Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARv. L. REV. 620, 649-51 (1994)
(arguing, inter alia, that Roberts's account of his conduct in the' 1937 cases is not
persuasive); Barry Cushman, Rethinkingthe New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201,204-08
(1994) [hereinafter Cushman, New Deal Court] (arguing against the view that
constitutional developments of the 1930s should be regarded as a response to
political pressures, and emphasizing the legal-intellectual dimensions of the
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good reason. The climactic events of 1937, including Franklin
Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court, were part of one of
the great constitutional crises in our history.
Moreover, the crisis accompanied one of the great transfor-
mations in constitutional law, a transformation that is commonly
referred to by such terms as the "constitutional revolution of
1937. "7  The old constitutionalism that prevailed when Charles
Evans Hughes became Chief Justice in 1930 and that underlay the
crisis provides an abiding reminder of the darker side of an activist
Supreme Court-the danger that the Court, by invoking its view of
the Constitution to invalidate legislation, might thwart the funda-
mental processes of democracy. By the time Hughes retired in
1941, the framework of constitutional law that has prevailed in the
last half century had emerged. The famous footnote four of Justice
Stone's 1938 opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.' was
one of the first attempts to articulate that framework, which is
phenomenon); Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of
Commerce Doctrine From Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 106
(1992) [hereinafter Cushman, Stream of Legal Consciousness] (discussing the idea that
the shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence occurred principally in 1941-42, not
1937).
7 Morton J. Horwitz provides a significant example:
[T]he only constitutional revolution prior to the Warren Court was the New
Deal Revolution of 1937, which fundamentally altered the relationship
between the federal government and the states and between the government
and the economy. Prior to 1937, there had been great continuity in
American constitutional history. The first sharp break occurred in 1937
with the New Deal Court.
MortonJ. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit ofJustice, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
5, 5 (1993); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTrrtiON AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 223-24 (1978) (discussing the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937"); ROBERT
G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 174-79 (1960) (discussing the "1937
judicial revolution"); J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 275, 296 (1989)
(same); William W.Justice, The Two Faces ofJudicial Activism 61 CEO. WASH. L. REV.
1, 5 (1992) ("Posterity, for the most part, has endorsed the constitutional revolution
of 1937... ."); Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983
SuP. CT. REV. 83, 86 (noting that "[r]eligion had no special constitutional place until
after the constitutional revolution of 1937"). But see David E. Engdahl, What's In a
Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 IND. LJ. 457, 510 n.250
(1991) ("I was amused by the title of a 1987 AALS seminar panel, 'Was the
Revolution of 1937 a Mistake?' I should rather have asked, was the 'revolution' of
1937 a fact? It was not, as the 'revolution' came slowly by slips of reason over the
years that followed.").
8 304 US. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting, notwithstanding a general presumption
of constitutionality of legislation, "more exactingjudicial scrutiny" of certain types of
legislation, such as that restricting political processes or reflecting "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities").
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tolerant of economic and social regulation yet is generally more
protective than the old constitutionalism of the less powerful
segments of society.
Although the issues raised by the constitutional history of the
1930s are vast, one narrow riddle lies at their heart and is the focus
of this Article: Why did the Supreme Court achieve the con-
stitutional transformation, and so quickly? My conclusions are as
follows.
The predominant factor in explaining the constitutional
transformation is changes in the Court's personnel. Although the
"Nine Old Men" of the mid-1930s are often remembered as the
paradigm of a conservative Court,9 the Court of the 1920s was
actually far more conservative. In Part I of this Article, I will argue
that the Court was made substantially more liberal by Herbert
Hoover's two appointments of 1930-Hughes to replace William
Howard Taft and Roberts to replace Edward T. Sanford. These
appointments created the ideological alignment that prevailed until
after the Court-packing crisis of 1937. Under that alignment, I
contend in Part I, the Court achieved significant aspects of the
constitutional transformation well before the crisis. This Part will
pay more attention than do most accounts to decisions of the early
1930s.
After the crisis had passed, a steady stream of Roosevelt
appointees made the Court far more liberal, and thus helped
achieve some significant aspects of the transformation that, I argue
in Part III, would not have occurred with the pre-1937 Court.
Personnel changes cannot, however, account for the great
decisions of the spring of 1937, which played a critical role in
defeating Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Court. At the height of
the Court-packing battle, the Court, by identical five-to-four votes,
upheld a state minimum wage law, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), and the Social Security Act. Each of these decisions
pointed hard in the opposite direction from-and, with respect to
the first two, seemed in conflict with-decisions made by the Court,
with the same membership, only the previous year. The critical
9 See e.g., Douglas Laycock, Constitutional Theoty Matters, 65 TEx. L. REV. 767,770
(1987) (comparing constitutional theory of the civil libertarians of the Warren Court
with that of the Nine Old Men); Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?":•
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1107 (1992)
(saying that the Court's invalidation of Roosevelt's programs turned public opinion
"against the 'Nine Old Men' and their conservative vision of the Constitution").
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votes in creating the shift belonged to the two Justices in the
middle-Roberts and, to a lesser extent, Hughes. In Part II,
therefore, I focus on the great decisions of 1936 and 1937, and in
particular on the roles of Roberts and Hughes. To what extent was
their conduct in 1936 and 1937 substantively consistent? To the
extent it was not, did they have a conscientious, albeit well-timed,
change of view? If they did, to what extent was it affected by the
political environment? Or did they simply alter their votes in a
manipulative response to political pressure? Or does some other
explanation account for their conduct?
I believe I can demonstrate, to quite a high degree of confi-
dence, that Hughes's votes were not affected by political pressure.
Hughes, I believe, voted in 1937 as he would have absent the Court-
packing battle, Roosevelt's landslide reelection victory of November
1936, or public hostility to the Court's earlier conservative deci-
sions.
As to Roberts, one cannot be as confident. His 1937 votes in
the minimum wage and Social Security cases were consistent with,
though not absolutely preordained by, views he had expressed
before. His votes in the NLRA cases of 1937 are hard to square
logically with his vote the prior year in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,"0 but
Roberts's views on the scope of national powers seem to have been
in transition even before the Court-packing crisis. The evidence
does not support the view that Roberts's votes were affected by the
Court-packing battle itself. The changing political environment
may, however, have had an impact on Roberts's willingness to
confront the minimum wage issue and on his substantive views on
the scope of congressional power. It is difficult to be sure, however;
Roberts was sometimes motivated by reasoning of his own, and his
mercurial nature may be a sufficient explanation of his conduct.
The point probably transcends Roberts. Even after trying to
understand a judge's conduct across cases as best we can, some
judicial movement will likely appear to us to be a random walk. To
some extent, this may be because judges are affected by factors of
the "what the judge ate for breakfast" type that rationally should
have nothing to do with decision-making. 1 But to some extent, if
'0 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see infra part II.C.2 (discussing Roberts's conduct in Carter
Coal and the NLRA cases).
" The origins of this aphorism are uncertain, but it seems to have emerged from
the era of the Hughes Court. SeeJoseph L. Rauh,Jr., Lawyers and the Legislation of the
Early New Deal, 96 HARv. L. REV. 947, 950 (1983) (attributing similar remarks to
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the judge's mind is at all complex, his jurisprudential framework has
aspects that are difficult to detect from the outside; the judge may
be acting perfectly rationally within that framework even though we
do not understand it and cannot explain it. The consequence of
this argument may appear ironic: if we should expect a certain
amount of (apparently) random behavior as a matter of course, then
we need not resort in the first instance to a political explanation for
such behavior.
One other factor, intangible and inestimable, must be consid-
ered in accounting for the constitutional transformation of the
1930s: the passage of time, with the accompanying accumulation of
cases. The Court expanded the perimeters of congressional power
over commerce step by step. Even liberal Justices took a far more
cautious view of that power in 1935 than they did in 1941. If the
1941 Court saw further, that might have been because it was
standing on the shoulders of decisions made in 1937 and inter-
vening years.
12
In short, the picture I will present in this Article is of a less
sudden, discontinuous shift, and one less affected by immediate
political factors, than may be connoted by the phrase "constitutional
revolution of 1937." Some liberal outcomes were possible even in
the 1920s, became far more probable after 1930, and virtually
inevitable by 1941;'" other liberal outcomes that could scarcely be
Thomas Reed Powell in his constitutional law classes of the era); Charles M. Yablon,
Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 231, 236 & n.16
(1990) (searching for origins of the expression and emphasizing its reductionist use
by opponents of the Legal Realists). Remarkably, when Merlo Pusey asked Roberts
himself to account for his conduct in the minimum wage cases, Roberts's "initial,
semifacetious reply," as Pusey characterized it, was: "Who knows what causes ajudge
to decide as he does? Maybe the breakfast he had has something to do with it."
MerloJ. PuseyJstice Roberts' 1937 Turnaround, 1983 Y.B. Sup. CT. HIST. Soc'y 102,
106.
1
2 See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS (1965) (tracing
the history of the celebrated remark attributed to Newton: "If I have seen farther,
it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.").
This is the pattern of the cases involving the constitutionality of price
regulation. For example, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), a
price regulation case decided in favor of the state, was closely confined, but not
overruled, by Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 434 (1927). See infra note 40
(discussing German Alliance and Tyson &Brother). Shortly after Hughes and Roberts
joined the Court, O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251
(1931), discussed infra text accompanying notes 39-44, expanded the pricing power
further along the German Alliance line, and Nebbia v. New York, discussed infra part
I.D.2, expanded that power much further yet. Both O'Gorman and Nebbia were five-to-
four decisions. Shortly before Hughes left the Court, Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
18971994]
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imagined in 1930 became achievable by the early 1940s.1 4  The
shift may have been incremental, a repeated altering of probabili-
ties, but it was both rapid and momentous.
I. PRELUDE TO CRISIS
A. The New Court
In the spring of 1930, Felix Frankfurter summarized the prior
decade of constitutional adjudication:
Since 1920, the Court has invalidated more legislation than in fifty
years preceding. Views that were antiquated twenty-five years ago
have been resurrected in decisions nullifying minimum-wage laws
for women in industry, 5 a standard-weight-bread law to protect
buyers from short weights and honest bakers from unfair competi-
tion, 16 a law fixing the resale price of theater tickets by ticket
scalpers in New York,' laws controlling exploitation of the
unemployed by employment agencies 1 and many tax laws. 1° ...
236 (1941), discussed infra notes 415,421, relied on Nebbia in unanimously reversing
one of the restrictive Taft era decisions on price regulation. I will not try to define
"liberal" for purposes of this Article, other than to say that if an outcome seems in
accord with the outlook of Carolene Products and its footnote four-or if it is favored
by Brandeis, Stone or Cardozo, and opposed by McReynolds-it is liberal.
' I have in mind particularly the results in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), discussed infra text accompanying notes 384-88, 394, 423, 433, 444-46, and
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), discussed infra text accompanying notes 395,
445-46.
's See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (holding such a
statute to be an unconstitutional interference with liberty of contract).
16 See Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924) (holding such a
statute to violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it was neither necessary nor
effective in protecting buyers against fraud by short weights).
17 See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 429 (1927) (holding that such a
law contravened the Fourteenth Amendment because entertainments were not
"clothed with a public interest," notwithstanding that an admission fee was charged).
" See Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928) (holding unconstitutional
statutory regulation of an employment agency's fees).
'9 See, e.g., Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 210 (1930)
(ruling that a state tax on a testamentary transfer by a nondomiciliary ofbonds issued
by the state and its municipalities, but not kept within the state'sjurisdiction, violated
the Fourteenth Amendment); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes &
Assessments, 280 U.S. 338, 349 (1930) (holding violative of Commerce Clause a tax
deemed to be in part on gross receipts from interstate commerce); Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 93 (1929) (holding that when a Virginian
domiciliary transferred securities in revocable trust to a bank in Maryland where they
were held for the benefit of his minor sons, also Virginian domiciliaries, the securities
were beyond thejurisdiction of Virginia and could not be taxed by it consistently with
the Fourteenth Amendment); infra note 57 (discussing Quaker City Cab Co. v.
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Merely as a matter of arithmetic, this is an impressive mortality
rate.
20
Even as Frankfurter wrote, however, the Court was undergoing
a great change. One involved the departure of the Chief Justice
who had presided over this carnage since 1921, William Howard
Taft. Although in his first years on the Court Taft showed some
signs of the progressivism that had marked his early political
career, 21 by 1929 he was not only very conservative but, it appears,
somewhat paranoid. Although aware of his illness and declining
powers, he was determined to "stay on the Court in order to
prevent the Bolsheviki from getting control."22  At times he
expressed more hope: "We have a dissenting minority of three in
the Court. I think we can hold our six to steady the Court."21 The
difficulty, though, was that Taft feared the man in the White House
and believed new appointments would more likely strengthen the
progressive dissenters than the majority: "The truth is ... that
Hoover is a Progressive just as Stone is, and just as Brandeis is and
just as Holmes is.... My feeling with respect to the Court is that if
a number of us die, Hoover would put in some rather extreme
destroyers of the Constitution."24 And so it was essential that the
members of the prevailing bloc remain on the Court as long as
possible. In September 1929, he wrote Justice Pierce Butler:
With Van and Mac and Sutherland and you and Sanford, there will
be five to steady the boat, and while the appointment of Stone to
be Chief Justice would give a great advantage to the minority,
there would be a good deal of difficulty in working through
reversals of present positions, even if I either had to retire or were
gathered to my fathers, so that we must not give up at once.25
On February 3, 1930, near death, Taft did have to retire.
2 6
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928)).
20 ALPHEUS T. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 292-93 (1965)
(quoting Felix Frankfurter, The United States Supreme Court Molding the Constitution,
CURRENT HIST., May 1930, at 239) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes
added).
21 See, for example, his dissent in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525,562
(1923).
22 2 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 967
(1939) (quoting letter from Taft).
' MASON, supra note 20, at 294 (quoting letter from Taft).
214 Id. at 295.
25 Id. at 296-97.
2
' Actually, to be perfectly accurate, he had to resign. The difference is
significant: not until 1937 wereJustices given the privilege of retiring and retaining
1904] 1899
1900 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1891
And barely a month later, on March 8, the same day that Taft was
gathered to both his fathers and mothers, Justice Sanford-usually,
though not always, a member of Taft's majority27 -died as well.
Thus, suddenly, Taft's fears had been realized because only
four boat steadiers remained: Willis Van Devanter, James C.
McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler. The ranks of
the progressives on the Court-Louis D. Brandeis, Harlan F. Stone,
and the aged Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.-had not been depleted at
all. The conservatives still had the upper hand, but how strong that
was depended on whom Herbert Hoover nominated to replace Taft
and Sanford.
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT II SWITCHING THE TIME OF THE EARLY
PERSONNEL CHANGES
Suppose that both Taft and Sanford had lived and remained
on the Court five years longer, not departing until the spring of
1935, when Taft was seventy-seven and Sanford not quite seventy.
Would their continued presence on the Court have made a
substantial difference?
This thought experiment is rather easy to resolve, and in the
affirmative. The departure of Taft and Sanford, and their replace-
ment by President Hoover's two appointees, made constitutional law
substantially more liberal-and well before 1937.
For the Chief Justiceship, Hoover nominated Charles Evans
Hughes, former Governor of New York, Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, and Secretary of State, nearly successful Republican
presidential candidate in 1916, and one of the leading lawyers of the
era. Hughes had been a fighting progressive governor and a notably
progressive Associate Justice. 2  But to progressive Senators irate
over the Court's recent record, Hughes's roster of corporate clients
seemed to be a sure sign that he would continue in Taft's path. The
nomination encountered a surprising degree of resistance before
being approved, by a fifty-two to twenty-six vote, on February 13.
their salaries, and the consequent financial pressure keptJustice Van Devanter on tie
Court longer than he would otherwise have been. Van Devanter's retirement in 1937
greatly contributed to the defeat of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. See infra text
preceding note 411. An earlier retirement might have averted the crisis altogether.
27 Of the cases mentioned supra notes 15-19, to which Frankfurter referred in his
1930 article, Sanford dissented in Adkins (as did Taft) and Tyson, but he (as well as
Taft) formed part of the majority injay Burns, Ribnik, and all of the tax cases.
21 See Note, Governor on the Bench: Charles Evans Hughes as Associate Justice, 89
HARv. L. REv. 961, 996-97 (1976) (noting Hughes's progressiveness as governor and
as Justice).
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Hughes took the Court's center seat on February 24.
To replace Sanford, Hoover first nominated Judge John J.
Parker of North Carolina, but this time progressive opposition
prevailed, fanned by the perception that Parker was antilabor and
antiblack. The nomination was defeated on May 7 by a forty-one to
thirty-nine vote. Hoover's next nominee, Owen J. Roberts of
Pennsylvania, the former Teapot Dome prosecutor, was perceived-
incorrectly, it now appears29-as more progressive than Parker.
Roberts sailed through the Senate to a unanimous confirmation on
May 20, and he took his seat on June 2, the last day of the Court's
Term.
After the accession of Roberts, there was only one change in the
Court's personnel before the climactic cases of 1937, and it did not
significantly alter the ideological composition of the Court: In
January 1932, nearing his ninety-first birthday, Justice Holmes
resigned, and in March he was replaced by Benjamin N. Cardozo,
who like Holmes voted consistently with Brandeis and Stone in
closely divided cases.
Thus, the ideological lineup for the critical years was set by the
appointments of 1980. The bloc of four on the right-the so-called
Four Horsemen-confronted a bloc of three on the left. To prevail
in an ideologically charged case, the conservatives needed one of
the two votes of the newest Justices, but they did not need both.
Hughes's impact became apparent immediately, even before
Roberts joined the Court. In two controversial state tax cases he
joined the Four Horsemen against the liberals, 0 demonstrating a
' See Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme
Court Nominations, 95 YALE L.J. 1283, 1311-13 (1986) (arguing that Parker was
generally more reliably liberal than Roberts, and that the Court-packing crisis might
have been averted had Parker been confirmed).
o See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 594 (1930) (holding violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment a Missouri tax on testamentary transfers by an Illinois
resident to her son, also an Illinois resident, of cash deposits, promissory notes, and
federal bonds physically located in Missouri); Missouri ex rel. Mo. Ins. Co. v. Gehner,
281 U.S. 313, 322 (1930) (Hughes concurring separately, on the basis that the case
was governed by a recent precedent, in a decision holding unconstitutional a state tax
on net worth of insurance companies that allowed a deduction for legal reserves, but
reduced the deduction to take into account ownership of United States bonds).
Holmes's dissent in Baldwin included this well known statement:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the
ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down
what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions
now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those
rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason
undesirable.
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conservatism concerning the proper subjects of taxation that-
though it began to ease substantially, well before the events of 1936
and 1937 8 -continued throughout his tenure. s2  But in probably
the most significant case of the Term, Texas &New Orleans Railroad
v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks," Hughes wrote for
the Court upholding the Railway Labor Act. Rather surprisingly,
the Court was unanimous, an outcome perhaps aided by a honey-
moon effect and almost certainly by the fact that McReynolds did
not participate in the decision.
The Act, by according railroad employees the right to organize,
seemed to fly in the face of precedents guaranteeing employers a
constitutional right to demand "yellow dog" contracts from their
workers, which barred the employees as a condition of employment
from joining unions. As an Associate Justice, Hughes had dissented
from one of these cases, 4 decided under the freedom of contract
doctrine, and later he joined in overruling them. 5 But for now he
simply slipped them. The Act did not interfere with the right to
discharge employees, he insisted, but rather prohibited "the inter-
ference with the right of employees to have representatives of their
own choosing." 6  Noted a conservative commentator: "This is
hardly an adequate answer to the carrier's argument. It is difficult
281 U.S. at 595 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
" See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 205, 213-16 (1936) (upholding
a state tax on intangible property owned by a corporation that conducted its affairs
principally in the taxing state, notwithstanding that the corporation was incorporated
elsewhere); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932), discussed infra note 100
and accompanying text; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931),
discussed infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining, 309 U.S. 33, 54 (1940)
(dissenting from approval of use tax collected by state from retailers on mail order
business they conducted across state lines); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383, 387 (1939)
(dissenting from holding that New York could constitutionally tax the relinquishment
at death by a New York domiciliary of a power to revoke a trust in intangibles held
by a Colorado trustee); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S.
313, 319-21 (1939) (all the Justices but McReynolds deciding against a taxpayer
corporation with Hughes joining the conservative wing of the majority in applying,
rather than casting aside, the "business situs" doctrine).
ss 281 U.S. 548 (1930). For an extended discussion of this case, substantially in
accord with the conclusions stated here, see Barry Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and
Liberal Dilemmas: The Case of the Yellow Dog Contract, 1992 SuP. CT. REV. 261-68.
s' See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); see also Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (holding that Congress could not ban yellow dog contracts).
" See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186-87 (1941) (upholding a
provision of the NLRA banning yellow dog contracts); see also infra note 355
(discussing Texas & New Orleans Railroad).
3 Texas &N.O. R.R., 281 U.S. at 571.
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to see how [the statute] can be regarded as other than an interfer-
ence with the employer's freedom to hire and fire."" Hughes's
statement, indeed, was a totally hollow one, but it was significant
because of its unstated premise that employees had rights that took
precedence against contractual ones. Therefore, in Hughes's view,
the employer had no complaint against a law preventing him from
reaching an unjust contractual result. The decision was rightfully
characterized as "a very considerable extension of the constitutional
boundaries within which social legislation has heretofore been con-
fined." 8
B. The 1930 Term
With both Hughes and Roberts on the Court for the full 1930
Term, the Court's new orientation-delicately balanced between the
conservative and liberal blocs, but decidedly more liberal than the
earlier Court-became readily apparent. A summary statistic gives
some idea of the Court's stance. Seven times during the Term the
Court decided cases so charged ideologically that the four conserva-
tive lined up against the three liberals. In four of those cases, the
liberals prevailed, having won the support of both Hughes and
Roberts. Highlights of this first full Term of the Hughes Court are
worth reviewing in some detail, for the Court set a basic pattern
that would continue until its membership changed substantially
once again: some liberal victories, including some very significant
ones, that would have been impossible with the old Court, and some
defeats that would have been inevitable. In the 1930 Term, that
pattern was manifest in three key constitutional areas-regulation,
taxation, and civil liberties.
" Edward Berman, The Supreme Court Interprets the Railway Labor Act, 20 AM.
EcoN. REV. 619, 631 (1930).
s Id. at 639. Another immediate impact of Hughes's accession as ChiefJustice
was the virtual cessation of grants of certiorari in Federal Employers' Liability cases.
See Felix Frankfurter &James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1930) (noting that certiorari had not been
granted in a single petition after Hughes took office as ChiefJustice). Such grants,
which had been a significant source of the Court's business, were almost always on
the petition of the employer rather than of the employee. See Felix Frankfurter &
James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1928,43 HARv. L.
REV. 33, 51-53 & n.40 (1929).
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1. Regulation
The most important regulatory case of the Term was O'Gorman
& Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 9 which signaled the
new Court's attitude with respect to the constitutional validity of
price regulation. In the teeth of many cases invalidating price
regulation in various industries, New Jersey had regulated the
commissions paid by fire insurers to their agents. A challenge to
this regulation was argued before the Court in April 1930 but then
held over for reargument in the new Term, presumably because the
Justices were equally divided. Roberts now provided the critical
fifth vote for the liberals. Writing for the majority, Brandeis
concluded that the business of insurance brokerage was "so far
affected with a public interest," and the agents' commissions so
closely related to the rates paid by insureds, that the regulation was
valid.40 Brandeis found support for his argument in the fact that
agents' commissions for life insurance had long been subject to
legislative limitation-and he cited in particular New York legislation
drafted by Hughes a quarter century earlier.41 Quoting one of the
keystone opinions of the Taft Court, the decision in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital4 2 invalidating a statute that provided minimum
wages for women, the four dissenters proclaimed that "'[f]reedom
of contract is . . . the general rule and restraint the exception.'"
43
The majority, however, ignored Adkins and this supposed rule,
instead relying on the "presumption of constitutionality" favoring
legislation in general.
4 4
39 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
4o Id. at 257. The four conservative dissenters, in ajoint opinion, conceded that
under German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), a state might set the
rates for fire insurance policies themselves. See O'Gorman, 282 U.S. at 266. But, they
pointed out, the Court had declared that German Alliance "'marks the extreme limit
to which this court thus far has gone in sustaining price-fixing legislation.'" Id.
(quotingTyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 434 (1927)). The public's interest,
they said, was with insurance rates; it had "no direct, immediate interest" in agency
commissions, any more than in any other expense that an insurer might incur. Id.
at 267.
41 See 282 U.S. at 257 & n.2. For Hughes's role in drafting New York's life
insurance legislation, see, for example, MarkJ. Roe, Foundations of Corporate Finance:
The 1906 Pacification of the Insurance Industry, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 639, 657, 661-63
(1993).
42 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
43 O'Gorman, 282 U.S. at 267 (quoting Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545).
4Id. at 257-58.
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The same day O'Gorman was decided, however, Roberts provided
the fifth vote for the conservatives in another case held over from
the prior Term, United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &Pacific
Railroad.45 There, using the narrow conception of Congress's com-
merce power expressed in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,46 the
Court held a contract between the stockholders and reorganization
managers of an insolvent railroad to be beyond the reach of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.4 7  And later in the Term,
Hughes again delivered a regulatory decision that, like his Railway
Labor Act opinion the prior year, was surprising in its unanimity-
but this time on the conservative side of the line. Smith v. Cahoon
48
virtually dismantled Florida's very detailed system for regulating all
motor vehicles for hire. Hughes objected in particular that the state
had essentially demanded that private carriers constitute themselves
as common carriers.
49
2. Taxation
In contrast to the previous Term, the Court began to introduce
some flexibility into the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immu-
nity. In Educational Films Corp. of America v. Ward,5" over the
dissent of all four conservatives, the Court virtually nullified recent
holdings by the Taft Court.51 In response, Thomas Reed Powell of
Harvard Law School wrote An Imaginary Judicial Opinion,5 2 satiriz-
ing the Court's unwillingness to acknowledge its about-face.
53
45 282 U.S. 311 (1931). Hughes did not participate in this case, which pittedJohn
Lord O'Brian, for the government, against John W. Davis. See id. at 331.
46 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
47 See Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.Rt, 282 U.S. at 327-28.
48 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
49 See id. at 563 ("It is true that the statute does not in express terms demand that
a private carrier shall constitute itself a common carrier, but the statute purports to
subject all the carriers which are within the terms of its definition to the same
obligations.").
5 282 U.S. 379 (1931).
5' Ward involved a New York tax imposed on domestic corporations for the
privilege of doing business in the state, but measured by the corporation's income.
Stone held for the majority that this tax could be applied to a corporation that had
received royalty income on copyrights. See id. at 394. In contrast, the Court had held
in Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1928), that, patents being federal
instrumentalities, a state could not tax the royalties on them, and in Macallen Co. v.
Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 634 (1929), that a state franchise tax measured in part
by net income that included interest on federal bonds was likewise unconstitutional.
52 44 HARv. L. REV. 889 (1931).
" See also Willcutts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.) (allowing by
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Soon after, the Court confronted another limitation on the
state's ability to tax, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Many states, eager "to increase revenue and at the
same time lend a helping hand to the small storekeeper," 54 had
imposed a license tax meant to inhibit the growth of chain stores.
Typically, every store in the state was liable for the tax, the amount
of which rose steeply as the number of stores in the chain increased.
The public eagerly awaited55 the Court's decision in an Indiana
case, State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson.5" Contending that
the tax was unconstitutional, Sutherland had precedent on his
side,57 but one vote too few. Roberts held for the majority that
chain stores were sufficiently different from independent ones in
organization, management, and type of business transacted that the
state could reasonably treat them as different subjects of taxa-
tion.58
Liberal success in tax cases was not uniform in the 1930
Term, 59 but clearly the Hughes Court was already far more recep-
tive than was its predecessor to expansive uses of the state taxing
power.
unanimous decision a federal tax on the income derived from sale of tax-exempt state
bonds).
5 D.E. Wolf, The Supreme Court in a New Phase, 34 CuRRENT HIST. 590,591 (1931).
s See Chain Store Taxation, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1931, at 24.
283 U.S. 527 (1931).
17 See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389,402 (1928) (holding that
a Pennsylvania statute, imposing gross receipts tax on corporations operating cabs but
not on unincorporated individuals operating cabs, violated the Equal Protection
Clause; Owen J. Roberts argued for the taxpayer).
See Jackson, 283 U.S. at 541.
Continuing a line he had helped establish the prior Term, Hughes reinforced
the Court's resistance to concluding that an intangible asset could have a situs for tax
purposes in more than one state. See Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282
U.S. 1 (1931). Roberts and Stone, as well as the conservatives, joined Hughes's
opinion, Stone apparently grudgingly. See Letter from Justice Stone to Felix
Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School (Jan. 5, 1932), in 105 FRANKFURTER
PAPERS (Library of Congress) (writing that in his dissent in First National Bank of
Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932), a more extreme case in the same line, Stone
had "said my say"). In Beidler, Holmes and Brandeis explicitly noted the reluctant
nature of their acquiescence. See 282 U.S. at 10. Later in the Term, in Coolidge v.
Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931), Hughes cast one of his rare votes to the right of Roberts.
That vote helped form a five-member majority holding that Massachusetts could not,
under a statute passed after the execution of an irrevocable trust, tax the grantees'
subsequent taking of possession upon the death of the grantors. See id. at 605-06.
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3. Civil Liberties
Probably the most memorable cases of the 1930 Term, each
decided in May 1931, involved civil liberties. In one, Stromberg v.
California,6 ° all the Justices but McReynolds and Butler joined
Hughes in holding unconstitutional a portion of California's
criminal syndicalism statute that outlawed the display of a red flag
as a symbol of opposition to organized government. More signifi-
cant than the result was the methodology. Drawing on prior dicta
and intimations, the Court explicitly established that "the concep-
tion of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment embraces the right of free speech.""' Stromberg is thus
an early and important case of incorporation (a term not used by
the Hughes Court in this context) within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-and therefore of applicability against the states-of a guaran-
tee protected by the Bill of Rights. On the merits, Hughes
concluded that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.62 His
language echoed that of Brandeis's famous minority opinion in
Whitney v. California,63 and marked a decisive turning from the
subversive advocacy decisions of the 1920s, which almost uniformly
supported repressive treatment of radical speakers.
64
Two weeks later, this time over the dissent of all four conserva-
tives, Hughes wrote again for the Court in Near v. Minnesota,65 one
of the great landmarks in First Amendment jurisprudence. A
Minnesota statute allowing the prohibition as a public nuisance of
any "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper"6 6 had been
invoked against a reckless publication, innocuously named The
Saturday Press, that clearly fit within the statutory language.6 7 The
Court was unanimous that freedom of the press, like freedom of
speech, was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But Hughes
6 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
61 Id. at 368; see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 252 (1990) (arguing that the Court's precedents
did not address this proposition as clearly as Hughes suggested they did).
62 See Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369.
6 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
4 See Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST.
COMMENTARY 133, 142 (1993).
65 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
6 Id. at 701-02.
67 The Saturday Press's commentary included the observation that "Practically every
.. snake-faced gangster and embryonic yegg in the Twin Cities is aJEW." Id. at 725
n.1. For an engaging account of the background and decision of the Near case, see
FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG 123-62 (1981).
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wrote for a bare majority in holding that the injunction was an
unconstitutional "previous restraint"-that is, one imposed prior to
publication, as opposed to punishment inflicted afterwards-of that
freedom." Near was disappointing in its failure to state a persua-
sive rationale for what has come to be called prior restraint doc-
trine,69 perhaps because it was "an easy case that should have gone
the other way "under contemporary doctrine."70 But there can be
no doubt about the durability and importance of the doctrine it
established."'
On the Monday between Stromberg and Near, Roberts's vote gave
the conservatives a five-to-four victory in United States v.
Macintosh,72 which held that the government could properly deny
citizenship to an alien who promised willingness to bear arms for
the United States only if he felt that the war was morally justified.
71
Joined by the three liberals, Hughes wrote a devastating dissent.
Macintosh was a far less significant defeat for the liberals than
Stromberg and Near were victories. Certainly it did not dampen the
euphoria that liberal observers felt about the 1930 Term. Articles
extolling the "liberal Supreme Court" appeared in the popular
press.74 "Just about the biggest Washington news of the decade,"
was the Scripps-Howard chain's assessment of the Court's perceived
shift across the ideological divide;75 "the Old Guard is overthrown,"
enthused another critic.76 Even Justice Stone quietly celebrated.
6 Near, 283 U.S. at 721.
69 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theoy, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 54 & n.6 (1984) (arguing that Near puts too
much emphasis on the supposed harms caused by prior restraints in contrast to those
caused by subsequent punishment, including criminal punishment); cf. Vincent Blasi,
Toward a Theoy of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11, 12 (1981)
("[Hughes's] forceful essay on the evils of prior restraint, combined with the Court's
action invalidating an injunction, has had the effect of turning prior restraint into a
functional rather than merely a technical or historical concept .... 'Prior restraint'
has taken on a broader, some would say incoherent, meaning.").
"' Hildebrand, supra note 64, at 145. As Butler argued in dissent, "It is fanciful
to suggest similarity between the granting or enforcement of the decree authorized
by this statute to preventfurther publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory
articles and the previous restraint upon the press by licensers as referred to by
Blackstone .... " 283 U.S. at 736.
" See, e.g., Redish, supra note 69, at 53.
283 U.S. 605 (1931).
73 See id. at 623-26.
' See, e.g., Oliver McKee,Jr., A Liberal Supreme Court: The Position of ChiefJustice
Hughes, 159 OUTLOOK & INDEPENDENT 171 (1931).
7' The Supreme Court's Shift to Liberalism, LITERARY DIG., June 13, 1931, at 8, 8.
7 6Joseph P. Pollard, Our Supreme Court Goes Liberal, 86 FORUM 193, 195 (1931).
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Writing to his friend Frankfurter at Harvard, he expressed the belief
that "the mastiffs" were being subdued into a minority so quickly
77
that by the next Term "most times we will be in the majority and,
if not, the Chief will take the laboring oar."7 Frankfurter's
colleague Zechariah Chafee, perceptive as usual, sounded a more
cautious tone. Liberal antagonism to the Court "appears to be
dying down," he noted, and he predicted that "[i]n the near future
we are likely to hear less of proposals to limit its powers by
constitutional amendment or otherwise." 79 But the Court had not
touched several important areas recently; those who thought of
Hughes and Roberts as liberals were "likely to meet with some sharp
disappointment."80
C. Retrenchment?
Disappointment set in during the Court's next Term. More
often than not in cases dividing the Court along ideological lines,
the conservatives prevailed. In large part, this occurred because the
cases invoked three conservative aspects of Hughes's judicial
ideology, each of which stood in tension with his recognition of the
need to give adequate scope to governmental power and each of
which persisted beyond the crisis of 1937: his fear of confisca-
tion,"t his judicialized view of administrative law, 2 and his concern
7 Letter from Justice Stone to Felix Frankfurter (June 2, 1931), in 105 FRANK-
FURTER PAPERS, supra note 59 (attributing the "mastiffs" sobriquet to Learned Hand).
78 Letter from Justice Stone to Felix Frankfurter (June 5, 1931) in 105 FRANK-
FURTER PAPERS, supra note 59.
71 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Liberal Trends in the Supreme Court, 35 CURRENT HIST.
338, 344 (1931).
8 Id.
"' Brandeis said this about Hughes and confiscation: "He is crazy about 'confisca-
tion.' He has a mania on the subject-driven by fear and that blinds his judgment, so
that his very considerable brains are not at work." Memorandum of Conversation
with Brandeis (May 20, 1936), in 38 FRANKFURTER PAPERS (Library of Congress).
Hughes's fears about confiscation led him to resist what he regarded as
governmental efforts to tax citizens on property beyond their control or beyond the
government's ownjurisdiction; Roberts mayhave had much the same concern. Thus,
Roberts wrote for the Court, and Hughes joined the majority against the dissent of
all three liberals, in Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931), holding that a state
could not properly lay a tax on the total income of a married couple; one's tax could
not be computed by reference to another's income. See id. at 215. In the same
month that the Court decided Hoeper, confiscation was explicitly part of the rationale
for the Court's invalidation-also with the concurrence of both Hughes and Roberts,
and over the dissent of all three liberals-of an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. See Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80,96-97 (1931).
Later in the Term, the Court, once again with the concurrence of both Hughes and
Roberts, and over the dissent of the two liberals then sitting, relied heavily on Hoeper
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that governmental action not unduly interfere with freedom of
opportunity.83
to hold unconstitutional a provision of federal tax law creating a conclusive
presumption that gifts made within two years prior to death of the donor were made
in contemplation of death. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 326-28 (1932)
(stating that the provision often has the effect "of putting upon an estate the burden
of a tax measured in part by the value of property never owned by the estate or in
the remotest degree connected with the death which brought it into existence"). And
it was presumably fear of confiscation again that led both Hughes and Roberts tojoin
the majority in Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932). There, the Court held that
both the Obligation-of-Contracts Clause of Article I, § 10 of the Constitution and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded retroactive application
of the repeal of a state constitutional provision giving creditors a right of action
against directors of a corporation for moneys embezzled or misappropriated by
officers of the corporation. See 285 U.S. at 442. Cardozo, in his first opinion on the
Court, dissented, joined by the other liberals.
The resistance of Hughes and Roberts to arguably confiscatory measures soon
eased; in 1933, they joined the liberals against the conservative bloc to form a
majority that adopted precisely the point of view expressed by Holmes's dissent in
Hoeper. See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 683, 685 (1933) (Sutherland,J., dissenting)
(relying on Hoeper and Heiner, and stating that the "distinction between taxation and
confiscation must still be observed"). Hughes's opinion for the same five-member
majority in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), discussed
infra part I.D.1, seems squarely in conflict with Coombes. Even late in his tenure,
however, Hughes still seemed motivated by concern that government action might be
confiscatory in effect. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 374-83 (1939) (Butler
joining in dissent from a broad-based rejection of the doctrine that intangible assets
could be taxed in only one state).
82 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932) (holding, over the dissent of
Roberts and the two liberals then sitting, that the trialjudge acted properly in holding
a de novo hearing and disregarding an administrative finding, "where the determina-
tions of fact are fundamental or jurisdictional,' in the sense that their existence is a
condition precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme") (footnotes omitted).
Hughes eventually drew back from some of the more extreme aspects of his opinion
in Crowell. See South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251,257-58 (1940)
(limiting the scope ofjudicial review of an administrative finding); Shields v. Utah Id.
Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1938) (similar discussion); Voehl v. Indemnity Ins.
Co., 288 U.S. 162, 166 (1933) (same). But his attempt to force administrative
procedure into ajudicial mold persisted. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S.
1, 14-15 (1938) (noting the judicial-like protections required in some administrative
proceedings); Hughes Appeals to Lawyers to Seek Qualijfied Judges; Roosevelt Sees New
Spirit, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1938, at 1 (Hughes to the American Law Institute: "the
spirit which should animate [administrative] action must be the spirit of the just
judge"). For an extended analysis of this aspect of Hughes's jurisprudence, see
Richard D. Friedman, Charles Evans Hughes as ChiefJustice 1930-1941, at 99-119
(1978) (unpublished D. Phil. dissertation, Oxford University).
" Hughes frequently spoke of freedom of opportunity. See 2 MERLO J. PUSEY,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 693 (1951) (quoting a speech by Hughes given onJune 9,
1932, that spoke of constitutional limitations as "requiring a measure of freedom
of opportunity which even legislatures must respect"); Hughes Urges Bar Aid Law
Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1931, at 26 ("freedom of individual opportunity");
Secured Liberties Sought By Hughes, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1937, at 21 ("The question
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The latter concern apparently accounted for the biggest jolt of
the Term. In March 1932, both Hughes and Roberts joined in
Sutherland's opinion for a six-to-two majority in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 4 invalidating on due process grounds an Oklahoma
statute that, by forbidding any person to manufacture or distribute
ice without satisfying a licensing commission of the need for
additional supply, had the effect of creating local monopolies in the
business. Sutherland concluded that the ice industry was "as
essentially private in its nature as the business of the grocer, the
dairyman, the butcher, the baker," and therefore was not "charged
with a public use." 5 By concurring passively in this opinion,
however, Hughes and Roberts did not signal that they agreed with
the conservatives that industries falling outside of a narrow category
deemed to reflect a "public use" or "public interest" were practically
immune from state regulation. In O'Gorman, Hughes and Roberts
had already helped to undermine that doctrine,8 6 and in two years
they would be decisive in destroying it. s7 What appears to have
been significant to both Hughes and Roberts is that the statute did
not merely regulate conduct within the industry; rather, it had "the
effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to
engage in a lawful private business.""8 Hughes later professed to
have regarded New State Ice as a borderline case. 9 Whether or not
is ... whether a unified people, putting forth its great strength for national ends, will
leave appropriate scope for individual freedom. The question is not one of the
adequate power of government, designed to keep clear the highways of honest
endeavor, but how that power shall be used."). This concern with freedom of
individual opportunity might help explain Hughes's opinion in Smith v. Cahoon, 283
U.S. 553 (1931). For a brief discussion of Smith, see supra note 48 and accompanying
text. It also presumably had a good deal to do with his willingness tojoin the conser-
vatives in giving unexpected force to the "[P]rivileges or [I]mmunities" Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the right "to engage in business, to transact
any lawful business." Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 430 (1935). And, late in his
tenure, it also probably led him to resist the Court's dramatic transformation of the
law concerning state taxation of interstate commerce. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 69 (1940) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) ("[A] free
national market... is not less now than heretofore a vital concern of the national
economy.").
8 285 U.S. 262 (1932). The case was argued in the interregnum between Holmes
and Cardozo, so neither participated in the decision.
5Id. at 277.
86 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
"' See infra part I.D.2 (discussing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)).
18 New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 278. Roberts appears to have shared fully Hughes's
concern on this score. See Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936),
discussed infra note 150.
89See 2 PUSEY, supra note 83, at 698.
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he thought of it that way at the time, "the right of any person to
pursue a common calling" was so vital to him90 that in this case it
outweighed the usual legislative freedom to determine economic
policy.
The Court reinforced the appearance of retrenchment on March
13, 1933, just nine days after Franklin D. Roosevelt's inauguration
during one of the most acute crises of the Great Depression. Like
the Jackson case of 193 1,91 Louis K Liggett Co. v. Lee92 concerned
a state statute designed, through a system of graduated taxes or
fees, to inhibit the spread of chain stores. Writing for the Court,
Roberts relied heavily on Jackson to uphold most of the statute's
provisions. But he also held unconstitutionally arbitrary a novel
provision imposing heavier fees where the multiple stores of a single
chain were located in more than one county.9" All three liberals
dissented from this conclusion, Brandeis in one lengthy dissent and
Cardozo, joined by Stone, in a briefer one. Despite the heat
generated by these dissents, neither Hughes nor Roberts indicated
any inclination to draw back from Jackson. Even the disputed issue
might have been decided differently had the legislature been more
explicit about its intentions.94 And later, but well before the
climactic events of 1936 and 1937, Hughes and Roberts would join
the liberals against all the conservatives in establishing that a state
might not only tax a chain more heavily than a single store but
might "make the tax so heavy as to discourage multiplication of the
units to an extent believed to be inordinate."95
Indeed, despite the appearance of retrenchment in these years
following the Hughes Court's first full Term, the Court continued
to make significant constitutional advances in various areas. In the
field of regulation, the Court began the process of limiting its rather
aberrant decision in Smith v. Cahoon,9 6 a process that by 1935
would leave Smith an empty shell.9 7  On the perplexing and
'Joseph P. Pollard, An Unexpected Champion, 237 N. AM. REV. 351, 355 (1934).
91 283 U.S. 527 (1931); see supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
288 U.S. 517 (1933).
93 See id. at 533.
See id. at 535 (noting that the Court was loathe to attribute any particular
"motive to the present statute in the absence of legislative declaration").
11 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 100 (1935); see also Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 419 (1937) (4-3 decision) (Roberts for the Court,
allowing computation based on the total number of stores in an interstate chain).
9 283 U.S. 553 (1931); see supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also
Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 364 (1932) (upholding a statute
because it did not "attempt to compel private carriers to become public carriers").
17 See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285,
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recurrent problem of determining whether administratively fixed
utility rates were unconstitutionally confiscatory, the Court
indicated a flexibility that brought a dissent from Butler and
Sutherland."8 Albeit not steadily,99 the Court continued its as-
sault on the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, in one
decision frankly overruling one of the Taft-era precedents that had
provided a foil for Thomas Reed Powell in 1931."°
In the area of individual rights, the Court took a major step
towards incorporation against the states of the criminal justice
portions of the Bill of Rights; in the first of the Scottsboro cases
0 1
to reach the Court, Powell v. Alabama,1 2 all the Justices but Butler
and McReynolds held that the defendants had been denied due
process because they had not had effective assistance of coun-
sel. 
103
Given its racial setting, the Scottsboro litigation had a significant
civil rights aspect. The Court directly confronted civil rights issues
in Nixon v. Condon.10 In response to a Taft-era decision invalidat-
ing a Texas law barring blacks from state primaries,0 5 the state
had authorized each party to decide for itself the qualifications of
voters in its primaries. Over the protests of the Four Horsemen
that this tactic did not constitute state action, the Court nullified
this evasion. 106 The Hughes Court is properly remembered as
292 (1935) ("[T]he limits of [Smith's] holding, clear enough at the beginning, have
been brought out in sharp relief."); see also Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169, 173-75
(1933) (holding, on rather thin ground, that the exemptions involved there "differ
materially from that found to be objectionable in Smith v. Cahoon").
a See Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
9 See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (Roberts and the
three liberals dissenting from the majority opinion).
" See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932) (overruling Long v.
Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928)); supra note 31; see also Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285
U.S. 480 (1932) (three conservative dissenting votes).
101 Among the accounts of the notorious Scottsboro affair are DAN T. CARTER,
ScoTTSBORo: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1969), and a first-person
account, HAYWOOD PATTERSON & EARL CONRAD, SCOTTSBORO BOY (1950).
10 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
.0 Two of the Scottsboro cases returned to the Court in 1935, and again the
Court, this time in opinions by Hughes, held in favor of the petitioners. The Court
held in Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,589-90 (1935), that it was not barred by state
factual findings from inquiring into exclusion of blacks from jury rolls. In Patterson
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 605-07 (1935), the Court declined to treat as dispositive an
independent nonfederal ground, Patterson's lateness in filing his appeal, supporting
the state decision. Given the outcome in Norris, the Court remanded the case for
another look "in the light of the situation which has now developed." Id. at 607.
104 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
1os See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
106 The resourceful legislators' third tactic, mere silence, was more successful, as
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having made substantial progress on issues of criminal justice and
civil rights. 10 7  It is important to bear in mind that the Court
began compiling that record well before 1936."0'
D. Thunderbolts
Significant as many of the Hughes Court's cases were during the
first few years of the Court, most of them did not yet reflect the
desperateness of the nation's economic state.10 9 That changed
dramatically beginning late in 1933.
1. Blaisdell
In April, Minnesota passed a drastic Mortgage Moratorium Law
to relieve the state's hard-pressed farmers and homeowners. For the
duration of the emergency, but in no event past May 1935, this
statute authorized state courts to postpone foreclosures and to
extend redemption periods, allotting towards the suspended
mortgage at least part of the income earned during the interim on
the affected property. A challenge to such a statute under the Con-
tracts Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution was inevi-
Roberts held for a unanimous Court in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 49 (1935),
that party-ordered exclusion, without any statutory suggestion of authority, did not
constitute state action. Grovey was nearly overlooked in the glare of the Scottsboro
cases, but liberals regarded it as tragic and of far greater significance. See Black
Justice, 140 NATION 497, 497 (1935). Before Hughes retired, however, the Court's
decision in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), suggested that Grovey would
soon be overturned. See id. at 316-17 (treating a party primary as an integral part of
the electoral process established by the state). It soon was, in Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944).
107 See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & William C. Smith, The Hughes Court and the
Beginning of the End of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1101
(1992) (characterizing the Hughes Court's overall civil rights record as "a mixed
record of progress" but also arguing that "the seminal civil rights decisions of [the
Hughes] era redressed some of the most egregious instances of state-sponsored
racism").
10 Indeed, the Hughes Court began compiling that record even before the cases
described in the text. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1931)
(reversing a murder conviction because of trial court's refusal to allow inquiry into
racial prejudices of prospective jurors). And the Court consistently added to its
record, both during the crisis years, see, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936), described in RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "ScoTTsBORo" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE
SUPREME COURT AND BROWN V. MISSISSIPPI 131-36 (1986), and afterwards. See infra
note 419.
109 But note, for example, Brandeis's dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 306 (1932), dolefully assessing the deepening economic crisis as "an
emergency more serious than war."
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table, and the case of Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell"'
reached the Court for argument in November. "Few questions of
greater moment," wrote Justice Sutherland for the conservative four
when the Court decided the case in January 1934, "have been
submitted for judicial inquiry during this generation.""' Hughes
clearly agreed, and he wrote an uncharacteristically philosophical
and contemplative opinion, upholding Minnesota's statute by a bare
majority of the Court.
The result of Blaisdell was important, and so was its impact on
the Contracts Clause.' Of broader significance, though, was the
nature of the debate between Sutherland and Hughes. Placed
together, their opinions provide a stunning illustration of the old
constitutionalism on the wane and the new constitutionalism on the
rise.
113
The majority confronted the difficulty that, as Sutherland
showed, the moratorium act was precisely the type of emergency
regulation for the relief of debtors against which the framers of the
Constitution had aimed the Contracts Clause. Sutherland admitted
that constitutional clauses could bring new conditions within their
grasp. "But their meaning is changeless," he emphasized, "it is only
their application which is extensible."" 4 He found it impossible to
believe that the Clause had taken on a meaning "distinctly opposite"
to that for which it was framed." 5  "If the provisions of the
Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they
comfort," he concluded gloomily, "they may as well be aban-
doned."" 6 "My dear Sutherland," wrote Brandeis on the proofs
of his colleague's able exposition of the conservative viewpoint,
"This is one of the great opinions in American constitutional law.
no 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
. Id. at 448 (Sutheriand, J., dissenting).
n1 See, e.g., Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair
Surprise: Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV.
398, 407-13 (1993) ("The Court's holding in Blaisdell set the stage for later decisions
in which the Court engaged in wholesale balancing without regard to party reliance
or unfair surprise.").
"' But see Charles A. Bieneman, Note, Legal Interpretation and a Constitutional Case:
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2534, 2535 (1992)
(using Blaisdell, very appropriately, as a vehicle for exploring various methods of
constitutional interpretation-and arguing"that Blaisdell was wrongly decided under
any theory of interpretation").
14 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 451.
15 Id. at 448.
1 6 Id. at 483.
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Regretfully, I adhere to my error."
1 1 7
In contrast to Sutherland, Hughes emphasized that the Con-
tracts Clause could not be "read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula."118  He ridiculed as carrying "its own
refutation" the "narrow conception" that "the great clauses of the
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the
framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have
placed upon them."11 Scorning the fine distinction between
meaning and application, Hughes found a better guide in the
"memorable warning" of John Marshall-"that it is a constitution we
are expounding, . . . a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come."
120
To assure that the Constitution would endure, Hughes believed,
a necessary postulate of the legal order was that the reservation of
sovereign power be read into contracts. "The policy of protecting
contracts against impairment," he wrote, "presupposes the mainte-
nance of a government ... which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society."12 This passage most
assuredly did not, as one scholar has claimed, imply that "limitations
of the Constitution may be put aside" to serve a superior "law of...
survival." 122  Rather, by citing the "progressive recognition"
12
of his principle, Hughes was doing no more than claiming victory
in a battle he had joined nearly a quarter century before, to prevent
the Contracts Clause from vitiating the regulatory power of the
state; government must retain a reservoir of authority even over
prior contracts, or else well-drafted private arrangements, rather
than public legislation, would control.124 The requirements of the
Contracts Clause, he had previously suggested, are no more than
the usual ones of due process, 125 and now he confirmed this view
17 Interview with Francis R. Kirkham, Esq., former law clerk to Hughes (Aug. 30,
1976) (notes on file with author); Letter from Francis R. Kirkham to Paul A. Freund
(May 17, 1962) (on file with author). Mr. Kirkham recited Brandeis's comment from
memory, claiming in his letter to Freund that the wording was "about" right, but not
necessarily exact.
"8 Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 428.119 Id. at 443.
121 Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819)).
121 Id. at 435.
'22 SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 181
(1951).
12s Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435.
124 See Note, supra note 28, at 987-88 (stating that Hughes believed that "contracts
... must be made subject to law, and not vice versa").
" See Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 390 (1932) (declaring that contracts
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in more explicit language. "The question," he said, was simply
"whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the
measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."
126
But special care was required to answer that question here.
Hughes conceded force to the argument that only those contracts
that were themselves hostile to a permissible state policy might be
nullified by a later state law. Here Minnesota had not condemned
mortgages. The moratorium had been imposed for a policy com-
pletely unrelated to them and apparently one-sided-to relieve
debtors. But in fact, he declared, "the legislation was not for the
mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of
a basic interest of society." 127 This rather daring assertion crystal-
lized one of the most crucial passages of Hughes's opinion. "It is
manifest," he said,
that there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of
the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between
individual rights and public welfare. The settlement and conse-
quent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a
constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of the
activities of our people and the complexity of our economic
interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organiza-
tion of society in order to protect the very bases of individual
opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the
concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those
of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been
found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly
affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of one
party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable
means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the good
of all depends. 2 '
Hughes made this point only after receiving a suggestion from
Justice Cardozo and reading Sutherland's dissent.'2 9 He did not
"which relate to the use of the highways must be deemed to have been made in
contemplation of the regulatory authority of the state"); cf. Federal Radio Comm'n
v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 282 (1933) (holding that
"Congress did not authorize the Commission to act arbitrarily or capriciously in
making a redistribution [of broadcast licenses], but only in a reasonable manner to
attain a legitimate end.... Those who operated broadcasting stations had no right
superior to the exercise of this power of regulation.").
126 290 U.S. at 438.
"2 Id. at 445.
125 Id. at 442.
'2 See Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Justice Stone (Jan. 4, 1934), in 60
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have to be pushed, however, because the idea had been implicit in
his thinking on the Contracts Clause since his years as an Associate
Justice.' Indeed, it was central to his general concept of the
need for regulation. "Now one increasingly finds himself controlled
by a social urge," he had told his grandson's graduating class at the
Deerfield Academy the previous spring. "Economic independence
is now difficult, if not impossible, to realize. We cannot save
ourselves unless we save society. No one can go it alone."
13 '
Even under this view of an integrated public good, Hughes
believed, the Contracts Clause imposed limits, albeit open-ended
ones, on the reserved power of the state.132 The Court's construc-
tion of the Contracts Clause eventually transcended those limits.
But in several crucial aspects, Blaisdell is a strikingly modern deci-
sion, one very much of a piece with the decisions that later
expanded the reach of federal power-in its rejection of an origina-
list view of the Constitution, in its attempt to find flexibility even at
the core of the Contracts Clause, in its perception that integration
of the economy had created a broader need than before for govern-
mental regulation, in its view that private contractual arrangements
could not supersede governmental power to regulate the economy,
but rather that the needs of society to improve the public welfare
were a legitimate basis for altering those private arrangements, and
in its insistence that the validity of the statute be determined not by
categorization but by a receptive examination of the legitimacy of
its ends and the reasonableness of its means. And, it bears
emphasis, Blaisdell was achieved-under the leadership of Hughes
and with the decisive participation of Roberts-well before 1936.
HARLAN FISKE STONE PAPERS (Library of Congress) [hereinafter STONE PAPERS].
11 See Note, supra note 28, at 988-89 (contending that, as an Associate Justice,
Hughes regarded active enforcement of the Contracts Clause as an obstacle to
legitimate legislative action in the public interest).
15' 2 PUSEY, supra note 83, at 733; see also Unity to Keep Our Democratic Form Is
Hughes Theme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1939, at 45 (quoting speech by Hughes: "One
member of our body politic cannot say to another-'I have no need of thee.'").
152 The power, wrote Hughes, must not be "construed so as to destroy the
limitation" of the Contracts Clause. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439. Whether the particular
intrusion on the contract should be deemed legitimate was a very fact-laden inquiry.
Here, Hughes regarded as significant the fact that the law did not deprive the
mortgagee of all remedies, but rather ensured it some rental value during the
suspension period. Of even greater importance, the legislature had written the
statute against the background of, and limited it to, the pressing economic
emergency.
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2. Nebbia
Eight weeks after Blaisdell, on March 5, 1934, Hughes and
Roberts once again lined up with the liberals to give them a great
victory over the Four Horsemen. In response to the drastic
deflation that had beset its dairy industry, New York had set the
price of milk at nine cents per quart. Nebbia v. New YorklSS pre-
sented a challenge, under the doctrine of freedom of contract, to
this prescription. In O'Gorman, Hughes and Roberts had provided
decisive support for the liberals in rejecting a similar challenge to
another price regulation." 4 But, although Brandeis's opinion in
O'Gorman pointed briefly to the "presumption of constitutionality"
favoring legislation in general, his argument there attempted no
new synthesis; he purportedly applied and did not attempt to
reshape the doctrine, established through many cases, that a state
could regulate the price at which a commodity might be sold or a
service rendered only if the business was "affected with a public
interest." 35 Writing for the majority three weeks later in Nebbia,
Roberts used a far broader brush, putting a heavy gloss on the
doctrine by declaring that "there is no closed class or category of
businesses affected with a public interest.... The phrase 'affected
with a public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean no more
than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for
the public good."" 6 What is more, Roberts recognized broad
legislative discretion in determining whether such control was
justified. His language was not limited to the context of price
regulation but addressed the whole doctrine of substantive due
process:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in
the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose.... With the wisdom of the policy
133 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
i"' See discussion supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
135 See, e.g., Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 537
(1923) (stating that regulation is justified when the business is "clothed" with a public
interest); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 113, 126 (1876) (adopting, in the context
of determining when price regulation is valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
common law principle "that when private property is 'affected with a public interest,
it ceases to bejurisprivati only'" (quoting Lord ChiefJustice Hale, 1 Harg. Law Tracts
78 (n.d.))).
s6 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536.
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adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to
forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to
deal ....
... Price control, like any other form of regulation, is
unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence
an unwarranted interference with individual liberty.13
7
In a recent article in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Michael
Ariens belittles the importance of Nebbia.138 There are two rather
odd turns in his argument. First, he emphasizes-as "the striking
element of Roberts's opinion in Nebbia"-not its diminution of the
judicial role, but rather the fact that it reaffirmed a judicial role at
all."5 9 That is a little bit like saying that "the striking element" of
a vicious assault is that the victim did not die. Clearly the point that
Roberts was at pains to make, as suggested by the language quoted
above, was how deferential the Court should be to legislative policy
choices. And the language used by Roberts-similar to language
used by later, indisputably liberal Justices in a variety of con-
texts 140 -would be unremarkable even in a far more liberal Court.
Indeed, though Ariens regards Nebbia as "strikingly different in both
force and tone from Chief Justice Hughes's language in West Coast
Hotel,"' the midcrisis minimum wage case, both language that
Ariens quotes from West Coast Hotel and language that he does
1
37 Id. at 537, 539.
138 See Ariens, supra note 6, at 642-45.
139 Id. at 643.
140 See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 91 (1944)
(Rutledge, J.) (upholding against statutory attack an Interstate Commerce
Commission's order approving consolidation of certain motor carriers, the Court
being unable to "find anything arbitrary or unreasonable" in the Commission's key
factual finding); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (Stone,J.) (stating in the
context of procedural due process: "The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in
demanding justice from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court, there is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for
all purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence."); South
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). In Barnwell
Bros., Justice Stone noted:
In the absence of [congressional] legislation the judicial function, under the
commerce clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the
inquiry whether the state legislature in adopting regulations such as the
present has acted within its province, and whether the means of regulation
chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought.
Id. at 190.
14. Ariens, supra note 6, at 643 (citing West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937)).
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not 142 are quite similar to Nebbia's. Ariens argues that in West
Coast Hotel Hughes offered only conclusory statements to justify his
opinion that the statute satisfied the constitutional test, whereas in
Nebbia Roberts "attempted at length to explain why the New York
law was reasonable." 14 But in fact nearly all of Roberts's opinion
in Nebbia is devoted to discussion of legal generalities, leading to his
enunciation of a standard; he stated with remarkable brevity, and
with no detailed examination of the underlying facts, his conclusion
that the New York statute was reasonable.
1 44
The second odd aspect of Ariens's argument relates to his
contention that Nebbia signaled no change in the view of Hughes or
Roberts with respect to the judicial role in evaluating economic
legislation against attack based on the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 5
Factually that contention is true, but for a reason nearly opposite to
the one Ariens suggests: Nebbia did not represent a change in
opinion for Hughes or Roberts because, with respect to the
constitutional validity of price regulation, they had already lined up
with the liberals in O'Gorman,146 a case not mentioned at all by
Ariens. True, they had also joined the conservatives in New State
Ice, 14" but as I have pointed out, that was a far different case; it
did not involve price regulation at all, and it invoked other concerns
that they found persuasive.
1 48
Taken together, O'Gorman, New State Ice, and Nebbia suggest that
while Hughes and Roberts may have been more willing than the
liberals to invalidate economic legislation as arbitrary or discrimina-
tory, they were squarely in the liberal camp-as indeed Hughes had
been since his first term on the Court 4 9 --with respect to the
validity of price regulation. Two other cases discussed by Ariens,
... See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (stating that
"regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process"). West Coast Hotel is discussed infra part
II.A.
143 Ariens, supra note 6, at 643.
4 See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 530, 539 (stating that "[i]n the light of the facts the
order appears not to be unreasonable or arbitrary").
5 See Ariens, supra note 6, at 642, 644.
'" O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); see
discussion supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
147 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
341 See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.
141 See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 417-18 (1914)
(upholding, with Hughes joining the liberal majority, the regulation of rates for fire
insurance).
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but here relegated to a footnote, both involving regulation of the
New York milk industry, underscore the point."50
Nebbia, therefore, represents not a turn of direction for the
Court in economic substantive due process matters, but rather a
reaffirmation of the more liberal direction in which Hughes and
Roberts had led it. But focusing on the consistency of results is to
understate the enormous importance of Nebbia. As Professor Barry
Cushman has stated: Nebbia "effectively retired the formalist
distinction between public and private enterprise," and this makes
it "a milestone in American constitutional development."151 Its
noncategorical approach, and its emphasis on the susceptibility to
control for the public good of what had previously been deemed
private, fit easily alongside Blaisdell-and, as Cushman has empha-
sized, alongside the Court's later pronouncements on the powers of
the national government. 52  And it bears emphasis (if this is
beginning to sound like a broken record, the effect is intentional)
that the Court achieved this milestone well before 1936.
"5 In Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251,261-63 (1936), Roberts,
again writing for the Court over the dissent of the conservative four, upheld a portion
of a New York law that allowed dealers who did not have well-advertised trade names
to sell bottled milk in New York City at a slightly lower price than dealers who did.
The challenge there was based on equal protection grounds, but Roberts's opinion
and the dissent both make clear that this question was subsidiary to the due process
question in Nebbia. Roberts upheld the classification as a reasonable method of
implementing the basic price regulation approved in Nebbia without having to alter
the competitive balance between advertised and nonadvertised brands.
At the same time, in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 273-74
(1936), Roberts and Hughes both joined the conservatives to invalidate a provision
denying the price differential to new market entrants. Given that "[t]he very reason
for the differential was the belief that no one could successfully market an
unadvertised brand on an even price basis with the seller of a well advertised brand,"
wrote Roberts, this restriction was "but another way of saying the legislature deter-
mined that during the life of the law no person or corporation might enter the
business of a milk dealer in New York City." Id. at 273. As in New State Ice, but in
contrast to O'Gorman and Nebbia, the state had precluded the opportunity to enter the
market, and both Hughes and Roberts found this idea unpalatable.
Ariens also discusses one more New York milk case that appears utterly irrelevant.
In Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,527-28 (1935), the Court, unanimously
and per Cardozo, held invalid against the Commerce Clause a portion of New York's
Milk Control Act that prohibited sale in New York of milk imported from another
state unless the price paid to the producer in that other state was as high as the levels
prescribed by New York for purchasers from local producers.
" Cushman, Stream of Legal Consciousness, supra note 6, at 129-30.
152 See id. at 130, 146-54 (arguing that the "affected with public interest" doctrine
and the "stream of commerce" doctrine were often conflated, and that the latter
doctrine provided critical support for the Court's Labor Board decisions of 1937).
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3. The Gold Clause Cases
Although Blaisdel and Nebbia concerned exercises of state
power, the dramatic measures adopted by the federal government
under President Franklin Roosevelt had not yet come before the
Court. InJanuary 1935, however, with only Cardozo dissenting, the
Court held unconstitutional a provision of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933 that authorized the President to bar the
shipment in interstate commerce of "hot oil"-that is, oil produced
or withdrawn from storage in excess of state limitations. Hughes's
decision for the Court, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 5 ' was a
narrow one, based only on the perception-a perception persuasively
punctured by Cardozo-that Congress had made an uncontrolled
delegation of power to the President. Hughes expressed particular
concern that the statute did not state a standard or policy to guide
or limit him, nor did it require him to make formal findings
justifying his action. The delegation doctrine was a time bomb, but
for the time being the Court's decision, carefully confined and
nearly unanimous, did not raise much notice.
A far more closely followed litigation, because its potential
consequences were so immediate and enormous, was the Gold Clause
Cases.'54 In early 1934, Congress had struck against disastrous
deflation by devaluing the dollar substantially, from 25 8/10 grains
of gold to 15 5/21. Many contracts, however, both private and
public, had long anticipated such a change by specifying that
payment would be in a set amount of gold or in the currency
equivalent. If this "gold clause" were given effect, a debtor whose
income was in devalued dollars would have to discharge his
obligation in the equivalent of pre-1933 dollars; a debt of $100
would suddenly become one of $169, without a corresponding rise
in income. Because the clause had frequently been included in
bonds, the amounts concerned were so huge-an estimated $100
billion in obligations, about one-fourth in state and federal bonds,
were subject to the clause in 1933' 55 -that the clause threatened
to defeat the entire purpose of devaluation. Even before devalua-
tion, however, on June 5, 1933, Congress passed a resolution
153 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
" Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R. and United States v. Bankers Trust Co., 294
U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330 (1935).
"I See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY
OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLrrICS 98-99 (1941).
1994] 1923
1924 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142: 1891
declaring the gold clause void against public policy; all debts must
be discharged in currency, dollar for dollar. The vital question
remained whether this abrogation of contract rights was constitu-
tional. Until the Supreme Court gave a final answer the uncertainty
would remain "a paralyzing influence"'5 6 blocking business recov-
ery.
In January 1935, the Supreme Court heard arguments on four
cases involving gold clauses, and on February 18, after much
anxious anticipation by the public and the Administration, 157 the
Court issued its decisions in all four cases. Hughes wrote for the
Court in all of the cases. In each, the Court divided five to four,
with all the conservatives in dissent, and it denied relief to the
claimant invoking the gold clause. The announcement of the
decisions was a dramatic event. "[T]he impending moral and legal
chaos is appalling," McReynolds declared in dissent.5 ' Surprising
spectators by the harshness of his language,' 59 McReynolds closed
his oral presentation by proclaiming: "As for the Constitution, it
does not seem too much to say that it is gone. Shame and humilia-
tion are upon us nowl " 6 °
Two of the cases, decided together under the heading Norman
v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,'6 ' involved gold clauses in private
contracts. For the Justices that had constituted the majority in
Blaisdell, this was an easy case. It required "no acute analysis or
profound economic inquiry," wrote Hughes, "to disclose the
dislocation of the domestic economy" that would result if debtors
received money in one currency and owed it in a more valuable
one.'62 "Contracts, however express," he asserted, "cannot fetter
" The Gold Decision Was Doubly Agreeable, LITERARY DIG., Mar. 2, 1935, at 36, 36.
157 See, e.g., LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE
SUPREME COURT 113 (1967) (describing February 18th, the day of the decision, as
"one of high nervousness on the part of Administration officials"); JOHN M. BLUM,
FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES: YEARS OF CRISIS 1928-1938, at 130 (1959)
(describing the Treasury Department's preparation for an adverse decision); 1
HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FIRST THOUSAND
DAYS, 1933-1936, at 294 (1953) (stating that the Roosevelt Administration was
"somewhat jittery" about the gold cases).
158 Perry, 294 U.S. at 381.
... See Constitution Gone, Says McReynolds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1935, at 1.
'60 WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
THE NEW LEGALITY, 1932-1968, at 37 (1970).
161 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
"62 Id. at 315. This conclusion, however, is powerfully criticized in Kenneth W.
Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American
Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 519-21 (1983). Dam suggests that Norman was
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the constitutional authority of the Congress." 163 Moreover,
[t]o subordinate the exercise of the Federal authority to the
continuing operation of previous contracts would be to place to
this extent the regulation of interstate commerce in the hands of
private individuals and to withdraw from the control of the
Congress so much of the field as they might choose by "prophetic
discernment" to bring within the range of their agreements.'6
The question was far more difficult when the contractual debtor
was the government itself. The third case, Nortz v. United States,15 5
involved a governmental obligation, but also presented a loophole
that enabled Hughes to avoid the ultimate issues. 166 But the last
case, Perry v. United States, 1 7 involved a federal obligation-a
$10,000 bond with a gold clause-that the owner had not presented
for payment until after devaluation. Thus, if the promise of the
government to pay gold or its currency equivalent were given effect,
it seemingly could only be by paying Perry $16,931 devalued dollars.
Perry's claim therefore presented the question whether the
government's power over the moietary system entitled it to
abrogate its own promise. The Court held emphatically in the nega-
tive."68 But then the opinion took a sharp turn. Perry could only
recover for actual loss caused by the government's repudiation and,
to the astonishment of all, Hughes held that there had been none:
"Plaintiff has not shown, or attempted to show, that in relation to
buying power he has sustained any loss whatever. On the con-
trary"-an even more surprising addition-payment of the amount
motivated by the same concern that evidently motivated Hughes in the Perry case, see
infra text accompanying note 169-namely, the desire to prevent a windfall to
creditors. See id. at 520-22.
163 294 U.S. at 307.
'MId. at 310 (quoting Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 614
(1912)).
294 U.S. 317 (1935).
' Nortz had turned his gold certificates in to the Treasury after the Treasury had
ended private bullion holdings and before official devaluation, though the dollar was
already discounted on the international market. See id. at 323. Hughes held that
Nortz was entitled to receive for his certificates neither gold bullion nor the amount
of dollars that the gold would have bought on the international market; had Nortz
received gold, his only legal option would have been to return it to the Treasury for
currency at the predevaluation rate. See id.
167 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
"sJustice Stone refused to join this part of Hughes's opinion, which was
unnecessary to its result. But of course the four dissenters, as well as the remaining
members of the majority, subscribed to the proposition that the government had
acted improperly. See id. at 358.
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Perry demanded would be "an unjustified enrichment." 169 There
were no actual damages, therefore no relief. End of case.
Hughes's reasoning on damages was plainly very suspect. As
Henry Hart noted, the bondholder might have "contracted for more
than protection against injury,... for the very windfall now denied
him." 7 0 Strangely enough, though, Hughes probably conscien-
tiously believed the position he articulated: he regarded the gold
clause as a legitimate "protection against loss,"' 7 ' but he was not
inclined to give force to the terms of a contract if in the particular
case they would have produced what he considered an unfair
result.'72 In this case-with no indication that the bondholder was
dealing on international markets'7 --damages must have seemed
to him like a gambling payoff.
17 4
To what extent Hughes's concurring colleagues were persuaded
by his reasoning, or at least by his resistance to giving the creditors
a windfall, is hard to know. They may have voted with him for
other reasons-perhaps ajudgment of realpolitik that granting relief
to bondholders would cause economic chaos, perhaps (not all that
different) ajudgment of principle that the government as regulator
of the currency could legitimately relieve the government as debtor,
uniformly with private debtors, of an obligation that appeared to
threaten monetary policy.'75 In any event, the bottom line is that
169 Id. at 357-58.
170 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Gold Clause in United States Bonds, 48 HARV. L. RaV.
1057, 1079 (1935).
171 Penry, 294 U.S. at 348.
" See Friedman, supra note 82, at 72-76, 209-10; see also West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); infra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
' ' But see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939), discussed infra
note 434 and accompanying text, in which the gold clause provided for payment in
gold dollars or in fixed amounts of currency of one of several nations, and in which
Stone, joined by Hughes, McReynolds, and Butler, dissenting, would have held for
the bondholders. See id. at 260-61.
7 ' See Henry Hazlitt, If the Court Turns Thumbs Down, 140 NATION 126, 126 (1935)
(stating that, under prevailing conditions, victory for Perry "would merely throw huge
unearned profits into the laps of creditors, who would chiefly turn out to be a new
crop of speculators and gamblers"). Professor Dam offers, without necessarily
endorsing, a very insightful argument that gives this perception some intellectual
legitimacy. The gold clauses, which operated upon devaluation, had been inserted
into debt instruments as a creditor protection, albeit imperfect, against inflation:
"Devaluation is usually associated with... a more rapid rate of inflation than that of
other countries." Dam, supra note 162, at 524. The devaluation of 1934, however,
was a result of monetary policy adopted by Roosevelt to combat steep deflation; even
after the inflationary impact of his actions, prices remained substantially below 1929
levels, so "the windfall argument was not entirely baseless." Id. at 525.
"7 Hart believed a "strong-fibred explanation" for holding the government's action
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a majority of the Court allowed the government to overcome private
contractual protections to achieve a daring change in monetary
policy for the broader societal good-and, of course, the Court did
this before 1936.
4. Rumination
We can now focus more carefully on the first thought experi-
ment with which I began this Article. Suppose for the moment that
just before Blaisdell, after a period in which the Hughes Court
appeared to be retrenching, Roosevelt had proposed to pack the
Court with extra members. Suppose also that his plan occupied a
prominent place on the political stage until after the Gold Clause
decisions. During that interval, the three most significant cases
decided by the Court-Blaisdell, Nebbia, and the Gold Clause Cases-
were all liberal victories, all by five-to-four votes; the most significant
liberal loss, Panama Refining, was narrow and nearly unanimous.
I believe it would have been deemed obvious that the two swing
members of the Court, Hughes and Roberts, had changed direction
in response to the political pressure created by the Court-packing
plan and, in the case of the Gold Clause Cases, the great Democratic
victory in the congressional election of 1934. Thus, this thought
experiment provides a useful warning to avoid post hoc reasoning:
The Hughes Court was capable of surprise, even flurries of
surprises, without the intervention of any apparent external
factor.
176
E. The Confrontation Begins
As it turned out, the Gold Clause Cases were virtually the only
major victory that the Court gave the Roosevelt Administration
before 1937. I put aside here Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority;177 although the program of the TVA would have been
invalidated on broad grounds had McReynolds's solo dissent been
proper would have been possible. Hart, supra note 170, at 1099; cf ALPHEUS T.
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 392 (1956) (quoting Learned
Hand in a letter to Justice Stone: "Everybody dealing with a sovereign knows he is
dealing with a creature who can welch if he wants to welch.").
176 See Cushman, New Deal Court, supra note 6, at 259 & n.324 (noting constitution-
al reassessment and revisions that occurred before 1937 and concluding that
"[e]xternal pressure is hardly a necessary condition for substantial change in
constitutional doctrine").
177 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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the opinion of the Court, Hughes's narrowly crafted opinion turned
back the challenge without reaching basic issues.
1 78
In May 1935, the Court delivered the Administration several
important defeats. The first occurred on May 6, in Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad".9 With the avowed purpose of
improving efficiency and morale in interstate commerce, the first
New Deal Congress had passed a Railroad Retirement Act.
Requiring retirement for railroad employees at age sixty-five, the
statute set up a pension scheme financed by compulsory contribu-
tions from both the carriers and their employees. Justice Roberts,
joining the four conservatives to form a bare majority against the
Act, found a plethora of reasons why various facets of its reach-for
example, its application to employees discharged for good reason-
violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.' But even
if these unconstitutional features could be severed, Roberts wrote,
the Act was not truly a regulation of interstate commerce. Perhaps
because all four of his concurring brethren were well over sixty-five,
he questioned whether "the man of that age is inefficient or incom-
petent."' The "fostering of a contented mind" was not in itself
a proper goal for Congress, and its bearing on efficiency was so
attenuated that if it were allowed on that ground there "obviously"
would be "no limit to the field of so-called regulation."'8 2 The Act
"really and essentially related solely to the social welfare of the
worker," not to the regulation of commerce.1
83
Hughes, in a powerful dissent joined by the three liberals,
I"' Hughes's opinion held that water power incidental to construction of a dam
built for defense and navigation purposes, and the electrical energy yielded by such
water power, were property of the United States, so that the TVA could constitution-
ally dispose of such energy. See id. at 330, 338.
179 295 U.S. 330 (1935); see also Rail Pension Act Voided, LITERARY DIG., May 11,
1935, at 8.
"s This feature, said Roberts, was "arbitrary in the last degree." 295 U.S. at 349.
In addition, he thought it equally arbitrary for Congress to give a pension right for
work already done, especially to those workers covered by the Act who had actually
retired before its passage; morale did not seem likely to be improved by allowing a
pension to all employees at 65, whatever the duration of their service; nor would the
economy likely be aided by providing pension to all employees, even those younger
than 65, retiring after 30 years of service. See id. at 351-55. Moreover, the entire
pension scheme violated the Fifth Amendment by lumping all carriers into one pool
even though they stood in different circumstances in regard to the age of their
employees-a common fund was therefore merely a transfer from one railroad to
another. See id. at 355-61.
181 Id. at 364.
182 Id. at 368.
183 id.
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argued that virtually all the legislative choices were reasonable ones
consistent with the requirements of due process."8  As to the
Commerce Clause holding, Hughes thought that, on grounds of
improving efficiency either by improving morale or by avoiding
superannuation, the Act made reasonable choices. He did not rest
on efficiency arguments alone, however. He took Roberts up on his
own ground-that the plan was "an attempt for social ends to
impose by sheer fiat non-contractual incidents upon the relation of
employer and employee," and hence outside the commerce
power.18 5 Seizing with alacrity on a suggestion by justices Cardozo
and Stone,'86 Hughes pointed to the analogy of workers' compen-
sation laws. "The fundamental consideration which supports this
type of legislation," he wrote, "is that industry should take care of
its human wastage, whether that is due to accident or age."1
87
Alton represents Roberts at his most conservative, but it is hard
to draw implications from it for his conduct in the critical cases of
the following two years. Roberts's opinion demonstrated vividly
that he still perceived a substantial judicial role under the
Constitution's Due Process Clauses in response to economic legisla-
tion. But that had already been apparent, both before' and
after'89 Nebbia, and it would be so again;9" Alton did not involve
the type of issue that had been at stake in Nebbia or would be
present again in the minimum wage cases of 1936 and 1937.'
"l He did agree that the Act was arbitrary in providing allowances for employees
who had been in service within the year prior to enactment, even though they might
never be reemployed, but he also regarded this provision as clearly severable. See id.
at 389 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
z Id. at 374.
's Letter from Justice Cardozo to Chief Justice Hughes (Apr. 19, 1935), in 61
STONE PAPERS, supra note 129; see MASON, supra note 175, at 393 (quoting, in part,
Cardozo's letter to Hughes which suggested that there is no material distinction
"between compensating men who have been incapacitated by accident (though
without fault of the employer), and compensating men who have been injured by the
wear and tear of time, the slow attrition of the years").
187 295 U.S. at 384 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
" See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1932); discussion
supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text, and cases discussed supra note 81
(including Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441 (1932); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S.
312,326-328 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206,215 (193.1); and Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96-97 (1931)).
' See Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 271 (1936); supra note
150.
19 See, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 151-59 (1938) (Roberts,J., dissenting);
discussion infra notes 422, 427.
19 Those cases all involved price regulations. A compulsory pension scheme
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As to Roberts's Commerce Clause holding, because it concerned
the railroads, it did not raise the issue that was soon to be most
important-the extent to which Congress's power could reach to
matters deemed local because of their anticipated impact on
interstate commerce. Roberts's Commerce Clause discussion does
not suggest that he thought the regulation of the internal operation
of the railroads, or even their labor relations, was beyond
Congress's power. That congressional power did reach so far had
been clearly established in many cases-most notably Texas & New
Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks," 2
in which all his conservative colleagues had concurred. Probably in
none of those cases had the relationship of the regulation to the
suitable maintenance of service been so speculative as in Alton. In
any event, Roberts's stance in Alton clearly does suggest that in
1935, as in 1931 when he cast the decisive vote in United States v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 1 3 he was inclined
to stay on traditional ground in Commerce Clause analysis.
For that matter, in 1935 none of the Justices were inclined to
treat the Commerce Clause too venturesomely, as suggested by the
extraordinarily narrow view of the scope of commerce that the
Court had taken, unanimously, in recent cases under the Employers'
Liability Act.194 And, far more visibly but also unanimously, the
Court declined to take a broad view of the constitutional limits of
the commerce power when, three weeks after Alton, it unanimously
decided against the government in the "Sick Chicken" case, Schechter
Poultiy Corp. v. United States."9 5 Section 3 of the National Industri-
al Recovery Act had authorized the President, on application by a
might be considered to be a type of price regulation for labor. But Roberts did not
suggest that a compulsory pension scheme adopted as a matter of state law would be
per se illegal. It was only certain features of the Act that he believed violated due
process, not the core idea of a pension scheme itself. See Alton, 295 U.S. at 361-62.
He did believe the scheme was beyond the commerce power of Congress, but of
course that would not affect state power. See id. at 368.
192 281 U.S. 548 (1930); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
" 282 U.S. 311 (1931); see supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
194 See New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. Bezue, 284 U.S. 415,420 (1932) (holding that
an employee was not within the reach of the Act because of "[tihe length of the
period during which the locomotive [in the repair of which he was injured] was
withdrawn from service and the extent of the repairs"); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Bolle,
284 U.S. 74,80 (1931) (holding that an employee whosejob with the railway required
him to produce steam for the company's station was not engaged in interstate
commerce, the steam not being "used or intended to be used.., in the transporta-
tion of anything").
195 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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trade group, to promulgate a "code of fair competition" for a
particular industry. These codes, given the force of law, could
specify unfair trade practices, prescribe wages, hours, and other
employment conditions for the industry, and require collective
bargaining. Writing for the Court, Hughes drew on his decision in
Panama Refining to hold that this system-symbolized by the famous
Blue Eagle of the National Recovery Administration-was improper
delegation. Even Cardozo, who had dissented in Panama Refining,
agreed. Concurring separately, in an opinion joined by Stone,
Cardozo wrote that the delegation involved in section 3 "is not
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is uncon-
fined and vagrant."19 Not limited to a single act or defined by a
standard, it provided "a roving commission to inquire into evils and
upon discovery correct them.""9 If this conception should pre-
vail, Congress could transfer its entire power over commerce to the
Executive. "This," Cardozo concluded, both pungently and
accurately, "is delegation running riot."198
But neither Hughes nor Cardozo stopped with discussion of
delegation. The defendants in Schechter, slaughterhouse operators
in Brooklyn, had been convicted of violating various sections of the
Live Poultry Code, among them the wage and hours provisions; one
of the counts charged them with having sold an unfit chicken. Both
Hughes and Cardozo concluded that these activities were beyond
Congress's reach under the commerce power. That the Schechters
purchased virtually all their chickens from out of state was irrele-
vant, Hughes explained, for the interstate movement ended when
the chickens were brought to their slaughterhouses. 9 9 Since the
regulated transactions were therefore not in interstate commerce,
the question then became whether they could be fairly considered
to "affect" it.200 In deciding this question, Hughes claimed that,
though "[t]he precise line can be drawn only as individual cases
arise," "there is a necessary and well-established distinction between
direct and indirect effects." 201 And here, Hughes did not find
such a direct relationship. He rejected out of hand the macro-
economic argument that the effect of general wage stimulation on
1 Id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
197 Id.
'9 Id. at 553.
19 See id. at 543 (noting that "[n]either the slaughtering or the sales by defendants
were transactions in interstate commerce").
2oo Id. at 544.
20' Id. at 546.
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the national economy provided a sufficient nexus between the labor
provisions and interstate commerce.2 12 And Cardozo, far from
indicating disagreement, declared that on the commerce question
"little can be added to the opinion of the court."2°- Although he
asserted that "[t]he law is not indifferent to considerations of
degree," this was an argument against the code. His test was in
terms of the hard words "immediacy" and "directness": "To find
immediacy or directness here," he declared, "is to find it almost
everywhere."
204
As the unanimity suggests, Schechter was not a close case. No
doubt a later Court, perhaps not all that much later,2 °5 building
on precedent, would have been able to find a sufficient nexus
between the Schechters' activities and interstate commerce to justify
the regulation. But not in 1935. Such a nexus was not apparent
even to Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo. As Robert Jackson, an
ardent and perceptive New Dealer, later conceded, the code
provisions in question "were hardly calculated to electrify any Court
to the need of federal regulation."
20 6
The same day as Sckechter, the Supreme Court handed down its
decisions in two other cases that held much public interest. Like
Schechter, both decisions held against the Administration, and both
were unanimous. One of them, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford,2°1 written by Brandeis, held invalid a federal debtor-relief
statute, the Frazier-Lemke Act, that swept more broadly than the
statute upheld in Blaisdell. It is significant, therefore, because it
indicates that even the liberals were willing to hold redistributive
legislation unconstitutional on grounds of confiscation.
20 8
The triple blow gave May 27, 1935, the enduring name "Black
Monday." In response, Roosevelt criticized the Court publicly,
referring at a press conference to its "horse-and-buggy age"
conception of the Constitution. This comment brought a startlingly
hostile reaction, even from liberals, 20 9 and Roosevelt did not
202 See id. at 548-49.
2osId. at 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
nO4Id.
20' See infra text accompanying notes 443-46.
"6JACKSON, supra note 155, at 113.
20 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
u' The third case was Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
which is of continuing constitutional importance on the constitutional separation of
powers.
o See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-
Packing" Plan, 1966 SuP. CT. REV. 347, 358 ("Most commentators upbraided the
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follow up on it; indeed, careful to avoid raising an unnecessary
issue, he kept a virtual public silence on the Court until well after
the election of 1936.210
F. Summary and a Look Ahead
One way of summarizing the discussion above, helpful to
understanding the main themes of this Article, is to look ahead.
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT IMk SEARCHING FOR THE MYSTERY
In the spring of 1937, in a highly charged political atmos-
phere, the Supreme Court decided three crucial sets of cases, all
on the liberal side. Suppose there had been no 1936. Would 1937
have been very surprising?
I believe the answer is negative: based only on the Court's
decisions through 1935, the 1937 decisions would not have been
particularly surprising.
In the first of the great 1937 cases, West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,21 the Court upheld a minimum wage law. Based on its
decisions through 1935, that result would not only have been
unsurprising but expected: O'Gorman and Nebbia pointed strongly
in that direction.
A second set, the Social Security Cases,212 upheld the Social
Security Act by implementing a broad conception of congressional
power to tax and spend in pursuit of the general welfare. That
result, too, would not have been surprising based on the Court's
decisions through 1935. Blaisdell and the Gold Clause Cases
indicated that a majority of the Court was already willing to take a
broad view of governmental power to pursue the general welfare;
Blaisdell in particular had indicated that the Court was willing to
view the advancement of private interests as beneficial to society as
a whole.
In the third set of cases, the Labor Board cases, the Court
President severely.... Nor were all liberals pleased with Roosevelt's remarks.");
Charles P. Taft, "More Than This Would Be Revolution," SAT. EVENING POST, Apr. 10,
1937, at 18 ("The President certainly had a right to be startled at the hostile public
reaction to his 'horse-and-buggy' press conference .... ").
210 See Oswald G. Villard, Issues and Men, 143 NATION 547 (1936) (describing
Roosevelt's silence); infra note 305 (discussing the election of 1936).
21 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
212 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helveringv. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937).
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upheld application of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a
comprehensive federal regulation of labor relations, to productive
activities. The unanimous decision in Schechter would not have
made this result surprising, because the facts in Schechter were so
much less favorable to an assertion of the commerce power than
were the facts in the Labor Board cases. But the narrow view of the
commerce power that Roberts seemed to share with the conser-
vatives probably would have made mildly surprising his decision to
join his more liberal colleagues in vitiating the longstanding
doctrine that production is not commerce. The surprise would have
been no more than mild because Roberts had not yet addressed an
issue quite like the one presented by the Labor Board cases.
But of course 1936 did happen, and during that year each of the
1937 landmarks was preceded by a case pointing in the opposite
direction. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,213 with Roberts
providing the decisive vote, invalidated a state minimum wage law.
United States v. Butler,214 a Roberts opinion joined by Hughes as
well as the conservatives, invalidated a federal taxing and spending
program. And in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 215 like the Labor Board
cases involving a productive industry, the Court, with the full
concurrence of Roberts and the partial agreement of Hughes,
invalidated a statute that bore some resemblance to the NLRA.
Moreover, after the Tipaldo case, the Court endured a firestorm
of criticism. Later that year, Franklin Roosevelt, the leader and
personal embodiment of the New Deal, won a huge landslide
reelection victory. And on February 5, 1937, just sixteen days after
his second inauguration and before the Court had issued any of its
landmark 1937 decisions, Roosevelt suddenly launched a bombshell,
his plan to pack the Court. The battle over the plan raged while the
Court issued those decisions. And meanwhile, a flurry of sit-down
strikes hindered the nation's industrial recovery.
216
How, then, can we account for the Court's conduct in 1936 and
1937?
213 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
214 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
215 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
2 1 6 
SeeJAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 46
(1983) ("From September 1936 through May 1937, sitdown strikes directly involved
484,711 workers and closed plants employing 600,000 others. In March 1937 alone,
167,210 people engaged in 170 occupations of employer property." (footnotes
omitted)).
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II. SWITCHES, REAL OR APPARENT
In this Part, I examine the three switches supposedly made by
the Court in 1937; I analyze each of the 1937 landmarks together
with the 1936 case that pointed the other way. Because the key
votes in these cases were held by Hughes and Roberts, I focus on
trying to understand their conduct in particular.
I argue that Hughes's votes in 1937 were not affected by short-
term political factors-not by the reaction to the 1936 Court
decisions, not by Roosevelt's reelection, and not by the Court-
packing battle. Although the language of his opinions may
occasionally have been affected by the political crisis that was
steadily enveloping the Court, his votes were not. He voted in 1937
as his prior conduct, and indeed his later conduct, suggested he
would.
As to Roberts, it is more difficult to be confident. His votes in
the Social Security Cases are what one would expect even apart from
the immediate political environment. His behavior in the minimum
wage cases, however, is puzzling. Though political factors may help
explain his willingness to confront the issue in 1937, they are not
needed to explain how he reached the result he did, which is
consistent with his earlier conduct. It seems most likely that his
votes in the Labor Board cases represented some shift in his attitude
towards the commerce power, but to what extent, if any, that shift
depended on political factors is difficult to determine.
A. The Minimum Wage Cases
1. The Puzzle
On June 1, 1936, in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,917 a
five-member majority of the Court, composed of Roberts and the
four conservatives, invalidated a New York statute prescribing
minimum wages for women. Relying on Adkins v. Children's
Hospital,1 ' the Court held the statute to be a violation of
the freedom of contract. 19  Hughes dissented, distinguishing
Adkins."2 0 The three liberals concurred in Hughes's opinion, but
they also joined in a separate opinion by Stone arguing that Adkins
217 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
218 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
219 See 298 U.S. at 617-18.
22 See id. at 618-31.
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should be overruled.
2 21
On March 29, 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,2 22 the
Court, by a five-to-four vote, upheld a Washington statute also pre-
scribing minimum wages for women.22' This time, Roberts joined
with the liberals in an opinion by Hughes, flatly overruling
Adkins. 24 The four conservatives dissented.
225
Why did the Court change direction?
2. Hughes
One part of the puzzle, at least, is not difficult to solve; indeed,
it should not be a puzzle at all. Some observers who should know
better have spoken of Hughes's authorship of the majority opinion
in West Coast Hotel, establishing the validity of minimum wage
legislation for women, as if it represented an abandonment of his
previous views. 226 Robert Jackson had a clearer view. Present at
the government counsel table as Hughes read his opinion to a
jammed courtroom, with a double line of spectators leading all the
way outside the building, Jackson found the occasion "a moment
never to be forgotten." 227  The Chief Justice's voice, he later
recalled, "was one of triumph. He was reversing his Court, but not
himself."
228
Hughes had, of course, dissented in Tipaldo. Purportedly
' See id. at 631-36 (Stone,J., dissenting with Brandeis and Cardozo,JJ.,joining).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
22 See id. at 400.
2 See id. at 386-400.
See id. at 400-14 (Sutherland,J., dissenting with Van Devanter, McReynolds, and
Butler, JJ., joining).
M See JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 142 (1938) (calling
Hughes's opinion an "unpleasant task" taken on to ease political pressure); MASON,
supra note 175, at 456 (referring to some of Hughes's language in West Coast Hotel-
including his declaration that "the decision in the Adkins case was a departure from
the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the state of the
employer and employed"-as "a far cry from the stand he had taken a year earlier in
the Tipaldo case" and referring to the "day that the Hughes-Roberts switch won
judicial sanction for the minimum wage"). Ariens notes that Pusey discusses "the
change in position of Hughes and Roberts in West Coast Hotel andJones &Laughlin
Steel." Ariens, supra note 6, at 650 n.150 (citing MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME
COURT CRISIS 51-53 (1937)). Pusey, however, makes no suggestion that Hughes
changed his position in West Coast Hotel. Cf. 2 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY
OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE INSIDE STRUGGLE 1936-1939, at 107 (1954) (writing after
West Coast Hotel: "Hughes and Roberts ought to realize that the mob is always ready
to tear and rend at any sign of weakness.").
227JACKSON, supra note 155, at 207-08.
22 Id. at 208.
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adhering to the issue on which that case was litigated, he did not
then explicitly call for Adkins to be overruled but rather argued that
the case was distinguishable: The Adkins statute, Hughes noted in
his dissent, based the prescribed minimum wage solely on the cost
of living, without taking into account the reasonable value of the
employee's services, whereas the New York statute based the
minimum wage on both these factors. But his opinion left no doubt
that he had deep disdain for Adkins; indeed, he did not merely
distinguish Adkins but abruptly cast it aside, treating it as having no
authority at all for the case before the Court.229 And his public
disdain was confirmed by his private correspondence with Stone.
One sentence in Hughes's draft said that Adkins did not control
unless the distinction between the two statutes was immaterial.
Stone, fearing that this implied that Adkins did control if the dis-
tinction was immaterial, asked the Chief Justice to remove the
offending passage. Hughes responded that he was "quite willing"
to do so, and did.2"'
With Adkins shoved aside, Hughes's Tipaldo dissent contained a
broadside attack on the doctrine of freedom of contract. He did
not deny the existence of that freedom, but emphasized that it "is
a qualified and not an absolute right."2"' With a conspicuous cite
to Nebbia, he declared that the test of whether a statute invalidly
encroaches upon that freedom "is not artificial"; the question, he
wrote, was whether the restraint was "arbitrary and capricious"
rather than "reasonably required in order appropriately to serve the
public interest."
2 32
For Hughes, the West Coast Hotel decision the next year repre-
sented not merely the nullification of Tipaldo, but the culmination
See Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 624-25 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (contending that
Adkins was distinguishable because the statute involved there, unlike the one in
Tipaldo, did not require the prescribed wage to be reasonable, and pointing out that
Adkins was closely divided). Hughes argued further that it was impossible to know
what the result would have been absent this factor:
We have here a question of constitutional law of grave importance,
applying to the statutes of several States in a matter of profound public
interest. I think that we should deal with that question upon its merits,
without feeling that we are bound by a decision which on its facts is not
strictly in point.
Id. at 625.
230 MASON, supra note 175, at 423 (quoting Hughes as responding that he was
"quite willing to omit the sentence").
231 Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 628 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 629.
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of a long struggle against the doctrine of freedom of contract. As
an Associate Justice, writing in the employment context, he had
attempted to narrow the scope of the doctrine, 23 3 and had joined
in a dissent from a notorious application of that doctrine, also in
the employment context.2 ' As Chief Justice, he not only had
dissented in Tipaldo, but also had provided crucial votes for the
majority in O'Gorman2 5 and Nebbia.216  In West Coast Hotel, he
was able to incorporate the analysis of his Tipaldo dissent, and much
of the same language, into a majority opinion:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks
of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due pro-
cess of law .... [T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social
organization which requires the protection of law against the evils
which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people.
Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the
restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process.
237
The resemblance to both Nebbia and Blaisdell is unmistakable.
Blaisdell had reduced the Contracts Clause to a general, non-
categorical test of reasonableness; Nebbia had done the same not
only with respect to the "affected with a public interest" branch of
the doctrine of freedom of contract but, in general terms, with
respect to the entire doctrine of substantive due process; and now
West Coast Hotel, really a corollary of Nebbia, confirmed that move
with respect to freedom of contract. The similarity goes beyond
narrow doctrinal questions. Both Blaisdell and the Gold Clause Cases,
as well as the freedom of contract cases, reflected Hughes's con-
sistent refusal-dating at least as far back as his tenure as Associate
Justice2 3 -to view legal problems through a contractarian lens.
239
" See Philadelphia, B. & W. R.R. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603, 609 (1912) (broadly
applying the doctrine that if Congress has the power to impose liability in a given
area, it also has the power to enforce such liability by prohibiting contracts designed
to evade it); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911) (upholding
the power of the state to forbid railroads to contract out of statutory liability, and
declaring that freedom of contract, like any other liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, merely "implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from
reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community").
24 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27-42 (1915); see also discussion supra note
34 and accompanying text.
2' 282 U.S. 251 (1931); see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
291 U.S. 502 (1934); see supra part I.D.2.
27 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391.
21 See Note, supra note 28, at 988 n.16 9 ("Emanations of Hughes's unwillingness
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3. Roberts
I have offered the discussion above not simply to emphasize that
Hughes did not switch between Tipaldo and West Coast Hotel, which
should be obvious, but also to make two points that bear on
understanding Roberts's conduct. First, the conservative positions
that Roberts shared with Hughes-reflected most notably in their
joining with the conservatives in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 2 40 _
could coexist with opposition to the doctrine of freedom of
contract; Hughes's passionate opposition to that doctrine,
expressed before the turmoil began, was obviously conscientious.
Second, the affinity between Nebbia and both of Hughes's opinions
in the minimum wage cases was strong and obvious; by contrast,
neither Butler's opinion in Tipaldo nor Sutherland's dissent in West
Coast Hotel so much as mentioned Nebbia, and both represented the
categorical type of jurisprudence that Nebbia had assailed. One
would naturally expect the author of Nebbia to join Hughes's
opinion (if not Stone's more daring one) in the first of the
minimum wage cases as well as in the second: Nebbia's broad
endorsement of the state's power to set prices clearly implied
the state's ability to set the price of labor.
241
to accept markets and contracts as sufficient tools of social ordering pervade his
opinions.").
219 1 am using "contractarian" to describe a view relying heavily on contracts as a
dominant instrument for organizing society. The Contracts Clause forbids states to
"pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1. Hence, it applies to contracts into which the parties have already entered
at the time of the legislative intervention. The doctrine of freedom of contract
restricted the states' ability to regulate contracts prospectively. The two doctrines
thus present substantially different considerations. But Hughes's views on both
indicate an unwillingness to let private contracts take priority over public regulation
in ordering social relationships. Associated with Hughes's noncontractarian view was
a reluctance to rely heavily on markets as determining outcomes. See Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 373-74 (1933) (stating Hughes's opinion
that a large sellers' cooperative, which was given exclusive authority to set prices for
its members' output, fostered fairer competition, given the distressed circumstances
of the industry, than would prevail if each member priced its product indepen-
dently).
2- 285 U.S. 262 (1932); see also supra notes 109, 150, and notes 84-90, 147-48, 188
and accompanying text (discussing New State Ice).
21' Note in this connection that the Court in Adkins characterized the minimum
wage statute challenged there as "simply and exclusively a price-fixing law." 261 U.S.
at 554.
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a. In Tipaldo
Why did Roberts, who had not only written Nebbia but also cast
a crucial vote for the O'Gorman majority, provide the fifth vote for
Butler's Tipaldo opinion, which included a ringing endorsement of
Adkins? At least twice in later years Roberts offered explanations.
The first, and better known, explanation was embodied in a
memorandum written by Roberts in 1945 and presented by Felix
Frankfurter as part of a posthumous tribute to Roberts in the pages
of this Law Review.24 2 In 1946, Roberts also had a conversation
with Merlo Pusey, Hughes's biographer, in which he appears to have
offered a similar explanation.
243
Professor Ariens has expressed serious reservations 44 about
the existence of the Roberts memorandum revealed by Frankfurter.
I believe, though, that there is no genuine doubt that the memoran-
dum was authentic. I state my reasons for this conclusion in the
companion essay to this Article;2 45 here, I assume the memoran-
dum's authenticity.
The State, contended Roberts, did not ask that Adkins be over-
ruled, and he said at conference that he "was for taking the State of
New York at its word." 24' Rather, the State sought to distinguish
Adkins on the basis of arguments that Roberts found "disingenuous
and born of timidity."24' Rejecting them, he expressed his willing-
ness to "concur in any opinion which was based on the fact that the
State had not asked us to re-examine or overrule Adkins and that, as
we found no material difference in the facts of the two cases, we
should therefore follow the Adkins case."
248
How well does this explanation hold up? Of one thing at least
we can be quite certain. Butler's majority opinion clearly catered to
the rationale later offered by Roberts:
The Adkins case, unless distinguishable, requires affirmance of the
judgment below. The petition for the writ sought review upon the
2412 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr.Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311,314-15 (1955).
243 Pusey's notes of that conversation do not appear to have survived, see Letter
from Harvard Heath to Richard D. Friedman, Professor of Law, University of
Michigan (Feb. 15, 1994) (on file with author), but Pusey gave an accounting of the
conversation in Pusey, supra note 11, at 106-07.
244 See Ariens, supra note 6, at 645.
2145 See Richard D. Friedman, A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of the Roberts
Memorandum, or Felix the Non-Forger, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 passim (1994).
24 Frankfurter, supra note 242, at 314 (quoting Roberts's memorandum).
247 
id.
248 Id.
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ground that this case is distinguishable from that one. No
application has been made for reconsideration of the constitution-
al question there decided. The validity of the principles upon
which that decision rests is not challenged. This court confines
itself to the ground upon which the writ was asked or granted.
Here the review granted was no broader than that sought by the
petitioner. He is not entitled and does not ask to be heard upon
the question whether the Adkins case should be overruled. He
maintains that it may be distinguished on the ground that the
statutes are vitally dissimilar.
249
Apparently in response to Stone's dissent,2' ° Butler eventually
included language making clear his own adherence to Adkins in
principle. The next year, in West Coast Hotel, all four conservatives
relied squarely on Adkins. Thus, Butler would have had no reason
to incorporate into his opinion the limiting language just quoted
unless, as Roberts claimed in the memorandum, it was the price of
getting Roberts's vote.
But why would Roberts go along with the conservatives? One
possibility is that his motivation was just as he later described it-
that he found the cases indistinguishable and was unwilling to
overrule Adkins absent a request by the State, the petitioner in the
case. Certainly Roberts may have had conscientious reasons for not
joining Hughes in distinguishing away Adkins on the basis of
differences in the statutory standards for prescribing a minimum
wage. As Butler's majority opinion in Tipaldo pointed out, the
"dominant issue" in Adkins was the basic question of state power to
set minimum wages for women; 1 the perceived defect in the
standard for setting that wage was merely "an additional ground of
subordinate consequence."25 2 What is more, Roberts may well
have been offended by the nature of the State's argument on the
basis of the different standards.
The New York Court of Appeals had concluded, with support
2'49 Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 604-05 (footnote and citations omitted); see also id. at 614
("To distinguish this from the Adkins case, petitioner refers to changes in conditions
that have come since that decision ... ).
i' See Frankfurter, supra note 242, at 315 (quoting Roberts's memorandum as fol-
lows: "[A]fter [Stone's] dissent had been circulated [Butler] added matter to [the]
opinion, seeking to sustain the Adkins case in principle."). Stone apparently
announced his intention to write his own dissent only after Butler and Hughes
circulated the initial drafts of their opinions. See MASON, supra note 175, at 423.
251 See 298 U.S. at 614.
252 Id.; see also Adkins, 261 U.S. at 554 (viewing the state's setting of a minimum
wage as a "price-fixing law" impairing freedom of contract).
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from Adkins, that inclusion of the cost of living standard, even
alongside the value of services standard, rendered the statute
unconstitutionally vague. Apparently afraid the Supreme Court
would agree, New York contended that its highest court had
misconstrued the statute. The State contended that the cost of living
served only to trigger the statute's machinery, the actual wage being
based solely on the value of services. 253  No matter how soundly
this argument may have construed the statutory language, it was
obviously futile-"untenable," Butler called it-in the teeth of the
Court of Appeals's decision.
New York's attempts to deal with Adkins went beyond the
statutory language, however. The State argued strenuously that the
social context in which New York passed its statute in 1933
differentiated the case from Adkins.25" Adoption of this argument
might, of course, have had the same effect as overruling Adkins as
a matter of principle-but not necessarily. It would make future
cases extremely dependent upon the social context, with Adkins
presumably retaining vitality after the country emerged from the
Depression.
As Roberts's later memorandum suggested, New York presented
this argument in a timid way. The "Questions Presented" in the
petition for certiorari in Tipaldo did not argue for overruling
Adkins.256  And, in briefing the case
2 57 and at argument, 258
New York and amici favoring the statute made the social context
argument in the guise of asking for Adkins to be distinguished,
rather than overruled. The petition for certiorari did suggest
explicitly that "reconsideration" of Adkins might be appropri-
ate259 -a rather significant embarrassment to Roberts's account.
The State's brief on the merits might be construed to have made the
same suggestion, in a far more roundabout manner.260 But the
253 See 298 U.S. at 608-09.
254 d. at 613.
255 Cf id. at 635 (Stone, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the social contexts).
25 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Motion to Advance at 4-5, Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (No. 838).
257 See Appellant's Brief on the Law at 32-49, Tipaldo (No. 838).
s See The Argument of the Minimum Wage Case, 3 U.S.L.W. 858, 858 (1936).
25 In Point 6 of the petition, under "Reasons for Allowing This Writ," the State
contended: "The circumstances prevailing under which the New York law was
enacted call for a reconsideration of the Adkins case in the light of the New York act
and conditions aimed to be remedied thereby." Petition for Writ of Certiorari and
Motion to Advance at 9, Tipaldo (No. 838).
o Seizing on the statement in Adkins that "[n]o real test of the economic value
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essence of the argument was always that the asserted differences in
social contexts made a different result appropriate.
This argument was hardly overwhelming. For one thing, as
Butler pointed out, New York had not limited the effectiveness of
its statute to any emergency period; rather, the statute reflected "a
permanent policy."26 1  Moreover, notwithstanding the Adkins
court's complacence, 262 the low compensation paid to many
working women was already a grievous problem in 1918 when
Congress passed the statute considered in that case.26' Roberts's
memorandum says that he "could find nothing in the record to
substantiate the alleged distinction." 21 The State did not make
the argument that Nebbia suggests would have been more appeal-
ing-that Adkins was wrongly decided.
Thus, it is plausible that Roberts found Adkins and Tipaldo to be
materially indistinguishable. An intellectually honest defense might
also be constructed for the view that the nature of the State's
arguments made it inappropriate to overrule Adkins. This defense
is more than a little rickety but, as Professor Bobbitt has pointed
out, it appears to square well with Roberts's general doctrinal
approach. 65 Nevertheless, one would not expect scruples on this
score to cause a Justice to vote against the statute unless doing so
satisfied some other interest or need. 66
of the law can be had during periods of maximum employment, when general causes
keep wages up to or above the minimum," 261 U.S. at 560, the State argued: "In the
Adkins case, the Supreme Court considered the time not yet ripe for a consideration
of the economic valuation of the Minimum Wage Law .... The time for an
evaluation of the Minimum Wage Law, as indicated by this Court, has come."
Appellant's Brief on the Law at 44-45, Tipaldo (No. 838).
261 298 U.S. at 615.
262 See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
263 See H.R. REP. No. 571, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1918) ("Investigation has shown
that a substantial proportion of wage-earning girls and women in this country receive
less than a living wage.").
264 Frankfurter, supra note 242, at 314.
26' See PHILIP BOBBITrT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 41 (1982).
2Justice Stone declared:
I know of no rule or practice by which the arguments advanced in sup-
port of an application for certiorari restrict our choice between conflicting
precedents in deciding a question of constitutional law which the petition,
if granted, requires us to answer. Here the question which the petition
specifically presents is whether the New York statute contravenes the Four-
teenth Amendment.... Unless we are now to construe and apply the
Fourteenth Amendment without regard to our decisions since the Adkins
case, we could not rightly avoid its reconsideration even if it were not asked.
We should follow our decision in the Nebbia case ....
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I believe the key to finding that interest or need may lie in what
might be called Roberts's own judicial timidity. This quality, quite
distinct from personal timidity, manifested itself in various ways.
Senior on the Court at this time only to Cardozo, Roberts did his
best not to stick out. He hardly spoke out during argument; he
asked fewer questions than any other Justice.267  Never during
Hughes's entire tenure as Chief Justice did Roberts write a concur-
ring opinion.2 11 Indeed, on only two occasions during that period
did he silently concur in the result without joining the majority
opinion, and both of those silent concurrences occurred in unusual
circumstances that emphasize his caution. 269  Shortly before his
298 U.S. at 636 (Stone, J., dissenting). As Edward Purcell has recently commented,
"[t]o show that a doctrinal passageway existed ... is not to show why [a particular
Justice] chose to walk through it." Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional
Change, 80 VA. L. REV. 277, 280 (1994).
267 Thus far, I have found twelve separate transcripts of arguments to the Hughes
Court. According to the transcripts, Roberts was utterly silent in all these cases but
one, in which he asked two questions. Cardozo, the mostjuniorJustice and the next
quietest, asked 12 questions in three cases. Van Devanter, whose troubles writing for
the Court were well known, was also on the silent side, asking 15 questions in three
cases. All the others were far more active questioners. Hughes asked 154 questions
in 11 arguments, McReynolds 169 in seven arguments, Brandeis 131 in five
arguments, Sutherland 147 in eight arguments, Butler 222 in six arguments, and
Stone 76 in five arguments. For simplicity, any judicial interruption is counted as a
question. Both Brandeis and Butler asked the majority oftheir questions in Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
26 I do not count his opinion in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453
(1932), the noted entrapment case. Although denominated as a "separate opinion,"
this was really a dissent, as it disagreed with the resolution of the case; the Court
remanded for further proceedings, presumably a new trial, but Roberts contended
that the defendant should be discharged. See id. at 459.
269 In the first of these cases, St.Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
38 (1936), decided just over a month before Tipaldo, Hughes wrote the majority
opinion, Brandeis wrote a separate concurrence, and Stone and Cardozo wrote
another concurring opinion. In another administrative law case dealing with similar
issues, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), decided during the interregnum
between Holmes and Cardozo, Roberts and Stone hadjoined Brandeis's dissent from
Hughes's opinion for the Court. It seems likely, therefore, that Roberts was more
sympathetic with the liberal concurrers in St.Joseph than with Hughes, who on matters
of administrative law tended to be quite rigid. Roberts's silent notation of his
concurrence in the result therefore appears to reflect his desire to avoid unnecessary
conflict.
The second case was Helvering v. Wood, 309 U.S. 344 (1940), a tax case. That
case was closely related to another case decided the same day, Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940), in which Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
McReynolds. It is easy enough to see why Roberts, having written a dissent in the
first case, would decline to join in the second majority opinion-and yet he still did
not feel the need to state the reasons for his concurrence.
Like all theJustices, Roberts occasionally dissented. During his first seven terms
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retirement, Roberts even expressed his keen sense of his own
mediocrity.
270
These manifestations ofjudicial timidity suggest an explanation
for Roberts's pronounced tendency to avoid decisions on constitu-
tional matters whenever possible. This was a tendency he shared
with the liberals. Indeed, this was one of the few areas in which
Roberts sympathized with the liberals far more than Hughes did.
Roberts joined with Cardozo and Stone in Brandeis's concurrence
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,21 a classical expression
of "passive virtues,"2 72 and in the middle of the Court-packing
crisis he joined with the liberals again in voting to avoid deci-
sion. 27  The liberals, of course, were anything but timid. Their
desire to avoid decision stemmed from a sense that, in their eyes,
an activist Court was far more likely to do harm than good.
Roberts's desire to avoid decision did not reflect ideology in the
same way, for plainly his substantive views were more receptive than
those of the liberals to judicial activism. Rather, alongside this
substantive ideology stood Roberts's desire not to stick out his
neck-or the Court's-further than necessary for deciding the case.
Indeed, when later asked about one of the boldest, most liberal
on the Court, however, he dissented less frequently than any other Justice but
Hughes, and he hardly ever dissented alone. This does not tell us much. The
position that Roberts and Hughes held near the ideological center of the Court helps
explain the relative infrequency of their dissents; the position of Hughes-who was
anything but timid-as ChiefJustice may be an extra factor explaining the relative
infrequency of his dissents. With the passage of time, as Roberts became both more
senior and more isolated on the right wing of the Court, he dissented more
frequently-and less timidly. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1945)
(Roberts complaining in dissent that "the instant decision, overruling that announced
nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a
restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only"); infra note 438 (quoting
from Roberts's dissents in 1940 that objected to what he perceived as judicial
legislation).
270 See Letter fromJustice Roberts to Justice Frankfurter (Oct. 12, 1944) ("I have
no illusions about my judicial career. But one can only do what one can. Who am
I to revile the good God that he did not make me a Marshall, a Taney, a Bradley, a
Holmes, a Brandeis or a Cardozo.") (quoted in Frankfurter, supra note 242, at 312,
and John W. Chambers, The Big Switch: Justice Roberts and the Minimum-Wage Cases,
10 LAB. HIsT. 44, 69 n.105 (1969)).
1 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936); see also discussion supra notes 177-78 and
accompanying text.
27 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962)
(describing the ways the judiciary can insulate itself from the political fray).
27" See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639-40 (1937) (noting, in Cardozo's
opinion for the majority, that Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts would hold that
the petitioner lacked standing, but proceeding to the merits anyway because the
majority concluded otherwise); see also infra text accompanying notes 340-43.
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statements he ever made for the Court, Roberts responded that he
"often wonder[ed] why the hell I did it just to please the Chief."274
Just two weeks before Tipaldo, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 275 the
conservatives had cropped an opinion in a highly unpersuasive
manner to pick up the vote of Roberts by avoiding the decision of
an issue that, if confronted, would probably have split him from
them.2 76 Much the same thing may have happened in Tipaldo.
Based on his interview with Roberts, Pusey portrays Roberts as
being very unhappy with the necessity of deciding the issue of the
minimum wage in the context of New York's arguments.
2 77
Perhaps Roberts hesitated to draw even the simple corollary from
Nebbia that if a state had the general power to set prices for goods
and services, including such services as agency fees, it could set the
price for labor. Perhaps he had lingering constitutional concerns
about the statute's applicability to women but not to men. Given
Roberts's prior record, it is hard to believe he would not have
overcome these doubts in favor of the constitutionality of the
statute if he had deemed himself required to confront them. But
Roberts, apparently finding that the path of least resistance avoided
these issues, insisted the Court's opinion be based on the proposi-
tion that the State had not challenged the authority of Adkins. And,
naturally, as Roberts later came to regret, that path did not call for
him to write a separate opinion stating the grounds for his concur-
rence,278 or even to protest when Butler, in response to Stone,
included a defense of Adkins.
In short, to what extent Roberts's conduct in Tipaldo was
intellectually honest and to what extent it was simply a manipulative
means of issue avoidance is difficult to say. The answer is probably
different at different levels of consciousness. In any event, Roberts
clearly did not intend that conduct to be an endorsement of Adkins.
' See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
2'75 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see also discussion infra part III.C.
276 In an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the majority held that the labor
provisions of the statute there being considered were unconstitutional and (ignoring
a clear statutory directive) inseverable from the marketing provisions. See id. at 312.
The entire statutory scheme therefore fell, without necessity to examine the
constitutionality of the marketing provisions. See id. at 316. Given Nebbia, it seems
very unlikely that Roberts would have voted to invalidate those provisions which
regulated the price of coal sold interstate.
' See Pusey, supra note 11, at 106.
27' In his memorandum, Roberts said that this would have been his "proper
course." Frankfurter, supra note 242, at 315.
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b. Between Tipaldo and West Coast Hotel
Tipaldo prompted a furious reaction. Few could understand
what The New Republic called the "Liberty to Starve."279 The
firestorm spread far beyond the liberal camp. Even the Republican
press vigorously criticized the Court's decision.2 ' During the
Republican Party convention the following week, the GOP adopted
a platform defending the Court against attack, but urging legis-
lation, including minimum wage laws, to protect women and
children laborers, and pointedly adding its belief that such laws
were "within the Constitution as it now stands."21  Alf Landon,
soon to be the Republican presidential nominee, sent the conven-
tion a telegram explicitly endorsing this plank and even more
pointedly adding that, if necessary, he would favor a constitutional
amendment authorizing minimum wage legislation. "This obliga-
tion," he said, "we cannot escape."
28 2
When the Court returned from recess in October 1936, it
rejected a petition, filed over the summer, for rehearing
Tipaldo."' The petition, supported by several states, made the
Court's basis for avoidance in Tipaldo look silly because it empha-
sized the breadth of the social argument made by New York and the
narrowness of the Court's decision. The petition did not add
anything new, however, and whether Roberts's adherence to that
basis for avoidance was conscientious or not, the petition was
unlikely to change his mind. By this time, Roberts may well have
come to regret his vote, 28 4 but a change of course on rehearing
likely appeared to him, consciously or not, as particularly awkward.
Then, as now, the Court hardly ever voted to rehear a case; the
Justices made up their minds and, under Hughes's brisk, efficiency-
minded leadership, moved on. Besides, at the same time the Court
had before it another case that promised to present squarely the
question of whether Adkins should be overruled.
Shortly before the decision in Tipaldo, the Washington Supreme
Court had upheld a statute prescribing minimum wages for
Editorial, Liberty to Starve, 87 NEW REPUBLIC 116 (1936).284See, e.g., Editorial, An Unfortunate Decision, WASH. POST, June 2, 1936, at 8.
281 NATIoNAL PARTY PLATFORMS: 1840-1968, at 367 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald B.
Johnson eds., 1970).
28 Landon Telegram on Platform, WASH. POsT, June 12, 1936, at 1.
28 299 U.S. 619 (1936).
284 See infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
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women.28 5 During the summer of 1936, the employer, West Coast
Hotel Co., filed an appeal and in its jurisdictional statement cast the
constitutional issue in very broad terms.28  As it began its new
Term in October, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdic-
tion. 2 7 Professor Ariens contends that, because the Washington
court had upheld the statute, Roberts's vote to take the case
signaled an intention to strike the statute down.2' This conten-
tion is not persuasive. Given the resolution in state court, the case
came up on appeal rather than, as Ariens says, 289 by certiorari,
and in light of Tipaldo it would have been ludicrous to reject
jurisdiction on the ground that the case did not present a substan-
tial federal question. If in October a majority of the Court believed
that West Coast Hotel was, or was likely to be, controlled by its
decision in Tipaldo, then presumably the Court would not have held
full briefing and oral argument. Rather, it would have been sensible
either to reverse summarily in light of the earlier case (if the Court
were really sure), or to remand the case to the lower court for
further proceedings. Both these procedures were employed on
numerous occasions by the Hughes Court.211 Plainly, though,
there was not a majority of the Court in favor of such summary
treatment. The defector from the Tipaldo majority must have been
Roberts. Indeed, Roberts's memorandum asserts that the four
conservatives, but not he, would have disposed of the case summari-
ly in the employer's favor at the October conference.
291
According to the memorandum, Roberts's reason for voting to
hear the case was that now "the authority of Adkins was definitely
assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and overrule it."
292
2 See Parrish v. West Coast Hotel Co., 55 P.2d 1083 (Wash. 1936).
286 See 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90-91 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper
eds., 1975) [hereinafter 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS].
287 See 57 S. Ct. 40, 40 (1936).
288 See Ariens, supra note 6, at 641.
289 See id.
o See, e.g., Helvering v. Stevens, 297 U.S. 693, 693 (1936) (granting certiorari and
summarily reversing on the authority of a recent Supreme Court decision); Helvering
v. Stokes, 296 U.S. 551, 551 (1935) (same); see also New York City v. Goldstein, 299
U.S. 522, 522 (1936) (granting certiorari and summarily remanding for further
proceedings in light of a recent Supreme Court decision); Burnet v. J. Rogers
Flannery & Co., 286 U.S. 524, 524-25 (1932) (same).
"' See Frankfurter, supra note 242, at 315 (quoting Roberts's memorandum to the
effect that upon Roberts's vote not to dispose of the case summarily, Roberts heard
one Justice ask another: "What is the matter with Roberts?").
m Id.
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This is an intriguing misstatement. Roberts did not accurately recall
the procedural posture of the case. The employer, not the State or
the employee, brought the appeal, and at this time the Court had no
papers from defenders of the statute. It later turned out-again an
embarrassment to Roberts's defense-that those defenders did not
ask for Adkins to be overruled. But at the time the Court voted to
take the case in October, he had no way of knowing that.
In September, the Republicans won a decisive victory in Maine's
state election.29 In November, Landon beat Roosevelt in Maine and
also in Vermont-but Roosevelt won the remaining forty-six states.
And in December, the Court heard arguments in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish.
c. In West Coast Hotel
OnJanuary 20, 1937, Roosevelt was reinaugurated. On February
5, he began the Court-packing battle, and on March 29, the Court
issued its opinion upholding Washington's minimum wage law
for women, explicitly overruling Adkins.2 94 Those were the most
apparent facts. But a fuller chronology of the decision is quite
certain; it is confirmed by, but not dependent on, Roberts's
memorandum. The Court heard arguments in West Coast Hotel on
December 16 and 17, 1936.295 The Hughes Court virtually always
discussed cases in conference the Saturday after argument.2 6 At
the time the Court heard arguments and conferred on West Coast
Hotel, Justice Stone was very ill and unable to participate in the
Court's work. On December 19, the Court voted in a four-to-four
tie, with Roberts joining Hughes, Brandeis, and Cardozo against the
conservatives. Knowing full well Stone's opinion (and no doubt
eager to take advantage of his vote), Hughes held the case over
rather than allow affirmance of the lower court's decision by an
equal division. After Stone returned to work in February, establish-
293 See Maine Vote Elates Republicans Here, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1936, at 9.
'4 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
2' See id. at 379.
' See Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief
Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5, 17 (1949) ("After argument, a case was always
discussed and voted upon at the noon conference the following Saturday."); In
Memory of Charles Evans Hughes, PROC. BAR & OFFICERS SUP. CT. U.S. 122 (1950)
(quoting from a prior memorial address by Roberts: "If the Saturday in question fell
in an argument week, the agenda for the conference might contain a half dozen
jurisdictional statements on appeal, twenty to thirty petitions for certiorari, a few
miscellaneous motions, and ten or fifteen cases which had been argued that week.").
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ing a majority in favor of upholding the statute, Hughes assigned
the opinion to himself, and the Court handed down its decision
rather promptly.
2 97
Roberts's vote on the merits in West Coast Hotel thus preceded
the unveiling of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan by about six
weeks. 298 Although the timing thus eliminates one potential
explanation for that vote, it does not eliminate the mystery
surrounding the vote. Indeed, the mystery is deepened by a factor
misstated in Roberts's memorandum. Contrary to his assertion, and
rather surprisingly in light of the Court's protestation in Tipaldo,
neither the State nor Parrish, the employee, asked that Adkins be
overruled in West Coast Hotel. Indeed, their failure to request an
overruling is far clearer than that of New York's in Tipaldo. Rather,
they contended on narrow and dubious grounds that Adkins was
distinguishable.
299
Why, then, was Roberts willing in December to join in overrul-
ing Adkins when he had not been seven months earlier? Once
again, a conscientious argument can be constructed. Recall that
Butler's opinion in Tipaldo had emphasized the Court's unwilling-
ness to go beyond the grounds sought by the petitioner for
certiorari. That principle, dubious as it was in Tipaldo, certainly
would not apply in West Coast Hotel, in which the party relying on
Adkins was seeking relief from the Supreme Court, rather than
defending the state court decision, and doing so by mandatory
appeal rather than by certiorari. Even if the statute remained totally
undefended before the Supreme Court, Roberts might feel
compelled to consider all arguments favoring the constitutionality
of the statute before disturbing the highest state court's decision to
uphold the statute. And indeed, Hughes included in his West Coast
Hotel opinion a paragraph, evidently written for Roberts's bene-
297 See CHARLES EvANS HUGHES, in THE AUTOBIOGRAPHIcAL NOTES OF CHARLES
EvANs HUGHES 311-12 (DavidJ. Danelski &Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973); Frankfurt-
er, supra note 242, at 315. If a majority at the December conference had favored
invalidating the statute, the case would have been assigned and presumably issued
well before March 29, 1937. The Hughes Court was quite quick.
ms See HUGHES, supra note 297, at 312 (stating that the "President's proposal had
not the slightest effect on our decision").
' In their brief, counsel for Parrish made the seemingly immaterial argument
that in Adkins and Tipaldo the higher courts of the District of Columbia and New
York, respectively, had disapproved the statutes. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 382.
At argument, counsel for Washington relied on the proposition that a hotel was a
"business affected with a public interest"-a factor not likely to distinguish Adkins in
the minds of any member of the Nebbia majority. U.S.L.W., Dec. 22, 1936, at 2, 32.
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fit, °° justifying the decision to confront the issue of overruling
Adkins and emphasizing the fact that the Washington Supreme
Court had upheld the statute in the face of Adkins."'1
Once again, however, the argument is sufficiently frail-at least
when attempting to stand alongside the arguments that would justify
not confronting the question of overruling Adkins in Tipaldo-that it
appears likely Roberts was more disposed to confront Adkins in West
Coast Hotel than in Tipaldo.0 2 Assuming so, why?
Part of the reason may be that Roberts felt he had been burned
by what happened in Tipaldo; he had agreed to concur to a limited
opinion and had wound up signing on to an opinion that went
further than he intended, making him sound hostile to legislation
that he would approve constitutionally."03 Undoubtedly, Roberts
was glad to be on the more popular side in West Coast Hotel, the side
that squared with his views on the merits."0 4 That does not mean
that the extraordinarily harsh public reaction to Tipaldo was either
I Hughes had a well-known tendency to distinguish cases on very thin grounds
rather than overrule them. Se4 e.g, MASON, supra note 175, at 796 n.t (quoting Stone
as saying- "It is really pretty appalling the way in which Hughes differentiated the
decision in the Ashton case. .. ." (citations omitted)); OWENJ. ROBERTS, THE COURT
AND THE CONsTrrUTION 18 (1951) (contending that Hughes's opinion for the Court
in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), discussed infra text
accompanying note 412, "labored valiantly... to distinguish earlier cases"); Paul A.
Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as ChiefJustice, 81 HARv. L. REV. 4, 35 (1967) ("He
thoroughly disliked the overruling of a precedent, but his gift for differentiation
fostered the controlled evolution of doctrine."); F.D.G. Ribble, The Constitutional
Doctrines of ChiefJustice Hughes, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1210 (1941) (stating that
Hughes had "a consummate skill in distinguishing adverse or apparently adverse
cases"). Despite his clear antipathy for Adkins, Hughes had demonstrated this
tendency most recently in Tipaldo itself; no doubt, he would have been willing to do
so again in West Coast Hotel.
501 See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 389-90.
0 That likelihood is increased by the fact that the year after West Coast Hotel, in
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Roberts joined, without any apparent
compunction, in overruling a long-established precedent that counsel had sought only
to distinguish. See Purcell, supra note 266, at 289.
" Edward Purcell, in an essay published while this one was in draft, has raised a
similar possibility using similar language. See Purcell, supra note 266, at 289-90
(suggesting the possibility that "Roberts felt so badly burned by the criticism that his
'switch' had sparked that he decided he would not again allow such a technical
consideration as a narrowly framed appeal to block a major ruling otherwise desirable
on the merits"). In my view, Roberts's sense of having been "burned" may have
arisen not only from public criticism of the result in Tipaldo, but also from his
recognition that the majority there had run roughshod over his technical scruples.
s Pusey reports that Roberts "made clear to me that he was relieved to have the
issue brought promptly before the Court once more in a posture that made
consideration of its fundamental merits imperative." Pusey, supra note 11, at 106.
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a necessary or sufficient cause of his vote in West Coast Hotel. It is
impossible, though, to deny the impact that reaction might have had
on Roberts. However much he had taken his narrow stand on
principle, its consequence was to avoid decision. He could not help
but realize that this stand had created the perception, if not the
reality, that the Court was gratuitously compounding the misery of
the Depression.
There is no reason to believe that the presidential election had
any significant impact on Roberts's vote. The public reaction to
Tipaldo was apparent in June, long before the election. With
Landon's acceptance message and the Republican platform, no
formal balloting was necessary to inform Roberts how unpopular his
vote in Tipaldo was. Moreover, although Republican campaigners
tried to scare voters about what Roosevelt would do to the Court in
his second term-by the appointments process or otherwise-the
Democrats did their best to avoid making the Court an issue. 
0 5
Finally, the conference in October, when Roberts apparently first
cast his lot with the liberals on the minimum wage by refusing to
provide a fifth vote for summary disposition, had preceded the
Roosevelt landslide.
In short, to the extent that a political explanation is needed to
account for Roberts's move from Tipaldo to Adkins, it may be found
in the reaction to Tipaldo itself, rather than in the election of 1936
or in the Court-packing battle of 1937. The short-term political
factors seem likely to have affected Roberts only in inducing him to
confront the issue whether Adkins should be overruled, not in
leading him to believe a minimum wage law was constitutional; his
prior conduct, in Nebbia and other cases, makes this the result one
... See Cushman, New Deal Court, supra note 6, at 231 ("Roosevelt assiduously
avoided raising either the Constitution or the Court as an issue in his campaign.").
Professor Cushman presents an extended and effective argument against the
proposition that the election of 1936 had a significant impact on the Court's 1937
decisions. See id. at 230-36. Misquoting Alsop and Catledge, supra note 226, at 18,
Professor Bobbitt says that the vote in West Coast Hotel "followed by a month and a
half the election and the President's public declaration that Tipaldo was 'the final
irritant.'" BOBBrrr, supra note 265, at 40. In fact, Roosevelt's only public comment
about Tipaldo was brief and enigmatic. He said that the "no-man's land" between
state and national power was becoming more sharply defined, and when asked what
he intended to do about it smilingly refused to say. 310 An Hour Minimum Pay of
New York Laundresses National Issue by Court Decision, LrrERARY DIG., June 13, 1936,
at 6, 6. Alsop and Catledge, highly perceptive commentators, took the view that the
Court itself was not a significant issue in the campaign. See ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra
note 226, at 19 (noting that "[Roosevelt] wanted the issue in the election to be
himself and not the justices").
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would most likely expect him to reach.
The "beginning of wisdom" in attempting to understand Roberts
is to avoid the assumption that, absent political pressure, he would
act in a way that most observers would regard as consistent. He
surprised even his colleagues and perhaps even himself,"6 and
followed his own strange, sometimes unfathomable light.
B. The "General Welfare" Cases
1. The Puzzle
In United States v. Butler,3 °7 decided in January 1936, the Court
held invalid central provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1933. Aiming to restore farm prices hard hit by the Depression
to the levels they had occupied between 1909 and 1914, the Act
operated simply and boldly. The government, through the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), reduced production
for market by renting cultivable land, by purchasing surpluses, and
by making straight-out benefit payments to farmers in return for
agreements not to produce. The funds to operate this program for
any particular commodity were raised by a tax on the processors of
that commodity. In court, the Administration justified the Act on
the basis not of the Commerce Clause, but of the clause authorizing
Congress "to lay and collect taxes .... to pay the debts and provide
for the ... general Welfare of the United States."308
Roberts, writing for the Court in an opinion joined by Hughes
as well as the conservative foursome, rejected this argument. The
statute's taxes and appropriations, he held, were "but means to an
unconstitutional end."309 The federal government had no authori-
ty to regulate agriculture, and participation in the AAA program
could not truly be considered voluntary-the threatened loss of
0 According to Roberts's memorandum, when he voted against summary
disposition in West Coast Hotel, one of the conservatives asked another, "What is the
matter with Roberts?" Frankfurter, supra note 242, at 315. Roberts told Pusey that,
when he sought out Hughes to tell him that he wouldjoin the liberal side in that case,
Hughes almost hugged him. See Pusey, supra note 11, at 105. Leonard Baker reports
that Hughes confessed to Stone that he had difficulty following Roberts's reasoning,
and that Stone was also incredulous. See BAKER, supra note 157, at 176. Roberts
himself, apparently not fully injest, suggested that the "what I had for breakfast" type
of explanation might have some force in explaining his conduct in the minimum wage
cases. See supra note 11.
7 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
308 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
"9 Butler, 297 U.S. at 68.
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benefits strongarmed farmers into participation. Wrote Roberts,
"This is coercion by economic pressure. The asserted power of
choice is illusory."-"' Even if the program of benefits were not
coercive, moreover, it would still be unconstitutional; since
Congress could not enforce its commands on the farmer directly, it
could not "indirectly accomplish these ends by taxing and spending
to purchase compliance."3 " Stone, joined by the other two lib-
erals, wrote a bitter and forceful dissent, contending both that the
Act could not be deemed coercive and that what the Court
condemned as "purchased regulation" was merely the appropriate
imposition of conditions on a public expenditure.
12
On May 24, 1937, the Court decided in favor of the Adminis-
tration in two cases involving the Social Security Act. One,
Helvering v. Davis,313 held valid under the same General Welfare
Clause the payment of old age benefits under the Act. Only
McReynolds and Butler, insisting that charitable works were beyond
the scope of federal power, dissented from Cardozo's beautifully
written opinion.
They were joined, however, by the other two conservatives in
Steward Machine Co. v. Davi,3 14 in which the Court upheld the
Social Security Act's more intricate unemployment relief program.
Title IX of the Act levied a tax on employers but credited up to
ninety percent of it for amounts contributed instead to qualifying
state unemployment funds. Such contributions were paid over to
a trust fund maintained by the Secretary of Treasury and were
withdrawn by the states for unemployment compensation. The aim
of this scheme was to encourage the states to set up their own
unemployment programs without fear of placing themselves at a
competitive disadvantage against other states that chose to do
nothing. 15 Naturally, the constitutional challenge to the scheme
was based on Butler's strictures against use of the General Welfare
Clause for a regulatory purpose.
Why did the Court appear to change course?
-"o Id. at 71.
31 Id. at 74.
312 Id. at 83 (Stone, J., dissenting).
313 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
314301 U.S. 548 (1937).
315 SeeJACKSON, supra note 155, at 225-26 (noting that the tax "was really a plan
to enable the state to set up its own system without fear of competition from states
which chose to do nothing").
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2. Contradiction Denied
Professor Ariens contends that the Social Security Cases "dis-
tinguished into oblivion" Roberts's opinion in Butler. 16 At least in
general terms, however, this is not so. On the contrary, although
Butler held against the particular exercise of power challenged there,
the opinion initially offered a remarkable dictum that provided the
basis for Cardozo's opinions in the later cases.
The true meaning of the General Welfare Clause had never been
definitively resolved. Madison had contended that Congress could
tax and spend only in the exercise of other powers granted it;"17 on
the other hand, Hamilton, seconded by the later writings of Joseph
Story, had contended that the grant was of a distinct substantive
power limited only by the conception of "the General Welfare."
318
In Butler, Roberts emphatically endorsed the Hamilton-Story inter-
pretation. Why, given that the Court held against the particular
exercise of power in the case, did Roberts include this statement?
The answer is found in the note of a later conversation, scrawled by
Felix Frankfurter on the appropriate page in his copy of the United
States Reports: "FF. I hope you now realize what a door you
opened in your-shall I say-much discussed Butler decision as to
scope of 'general welfare.' O.J.R. I do realize, and often wonder
why the hell I did it just to please the Chief." 9
The Chief's determination to write his view of the taxing and
spending power into law grew out of work he had done while at the
bar. In writing an opinion letter favoring the legality of loans issued
under the authority of the Federal Farm Loan Act, 2' and then
arguing the matter successfully to the Court, 21 he had presented
316 Ariens, supra note 6, at 651.
31' See Amicus Brief on Behalf of the National Association of Cotton Manufact-
urers at 74-161, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), reprinted in 30 LANDMARK
BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS, supra note 286, at 766-853 (giving, with extensive citation, an
extended argument supporting the Madisonian interpretation of the General Welfare
Clause).
' See Brief for the United States at 135-72, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936), reprinted in 30 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS, supra note 286, at 288-325
(giving, with extensive citation, an extended argument supporting the Hamilton-Story
interpretation of the General Welfare Clause).
319 The Report is now in the possession of Professor Andrew Kaufman of Harvard
Law School. See Ariens, supra note 6, at 649 n.147.
3
20 See CHARLES E. HUGHES, FEDERAL LAND BANK BONDS: OPINION OF FORMER
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE CHARLES E. HUGHES CONFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF THE
ABOvE BONDS AND THEIR EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION 13-23 (1917).
-21 See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (argument of
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the Hamilton-Story view; 2 2 if some passages in the government's
Butler brief seemed familiar to him, it may have been because they
had been drawn from his own work. 23
Roberts's reluctance to establish Hughes's longstanding views as
law may have been attributable in part to his distaste for making un-
necessary decisions,3 24 and in part to a less than complete state of
conviction. But the bottom line is that, by January 1936-well before
Roosevelt's landslide reelection-Roberts had come around, however
tentatively, to the broad view of a fundamental national power.
Reviewing Butler in later years, Hughes declared that the general
welfare dictum was its "most significant and important ruling."
325
From a political standpoint this self-serving claim could not have
been more wrong; politically, the most significant part of the
opinion was the evisceration of the AAA. From a constitutional
standpoint, Hughes's claim was right. The next year, in Helvering v.
Davis,"2 6 Cardozo cited Roberts's dictum and reasserted that the
broad interpretation of the Constitution's General Welfare Clause
was the correct one. "We will not resurrect the contest," he
declared, "It is now settled by decision." 27 And in Steward Ma-
chine Co. v. Davis, he wrote, with a citation to both Butler and
Helvering v. Davis, "It is too late today for the argument to be heard
with tolerance that in a crisis so extreme the use of the moneys of
the nation to relieve the unemployed and their dependents is a use
for any purpose narrower than the promotion of the general wel-
fare."
3 28
At the broadest level of generality, then, Butler was not contra-
dictory to, but rather in the same line as, the Social Security Cases.
We must, however, look beneath that level. Did the cases in fact
implement different understandings of the General Welfare Clause?
In attempting to answer this question, one fact immediately
leaps out: four Justices from the Butler majority-not only Hughes
Mr. Hughes). The Court affirmed the validity of the statute without addressing the
scope of the General Welfare Clause. See id. at 192-93.
s2 See 1 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EvANS HUGHES 387 (1951) (describing
Hughes's advocacy of the Hamilton-Story view in connection with the dispute over the
farm bonds).
323 See DREw PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 288-89 (1936)
(noting that Solicitor General Reed used part of Hughes's Smith brief).
324 See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
32- HUGHES, supra note 297, at 309.
326 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
327 Id. at 640.
328 Steward, 301 U.S. at 586-87.
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and Roberts, but also Van Devanter and Sutherland, the more
moderate pair of the conservative four-subscribed to Cardozo's
analysis of federal power in the Social Security Cases. In Helvering,
rejecting the argument that the old age benefits distributed under
the Social Security Act were too particular to be part of the "general
welfare," 29 even Van Devanter and Sutherland joined Cardozo in
repeating a theme that Hughes had stressed most strikingly in
Blaisdell:... the "nation-wide calamity" had shown "the solidarity
of interests" of all of the people, in this case in preventing fear of
the poor house "when journey's end is near."33 1 And in Steward,
Sutherland and Van Devanter explicitly stated their agreement with
most of Cardozo's argument, joining their more intransigent
colleagues in dissent only because they were troubled by what they
perceived as the abdication of state administrative powers required
by the deposit of funds in the Federal Treasury.
33 2
In no other cases-certainly not in the minimum wage or NLRB
cases-had Van Devanter or Sutherland either trimmed their views
in response to liberal political pressure or shown any alteration in
329 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641.
SS See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text. Hughes had also stressed the
same themes in his opinions in Tipaldo and West Coast Hotel. See supra part II.A.2.
331 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641.
332 See 301 U.S. at 609-10 (Sutherland, J., dissenting with Van Devanter, J.,
joining). The same day, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,
527 (1937), the Court, by a five-to-four vote, upheld Alabama's unemployment
insurance law. As in Steward, Sutherland and Van Devanter, now joined also by
Butler, dissented only on narrow grounds. They expressed easy agreement that
unemployment relief was an objective within the constitutional power of the state,
and dissented only on the basis that the statute pooled all employers. See id. at 527-28
(Sutherland, J., dissenting). The problem would have been "comparatively simple,"
id. at 527, for the legislature to avoid, wrote Sutherland for the trio, pointing to a
Wisconsin plan that they regarded as "so fair, reasonable and just as to make plain
its constitutional validity." Id. at 531.
The outcome in Carmichael was no surprise; the prior November-after the
election but before the Court-packing battle-when Stone was ill, the Court had
upheld, by a four-to-four vote and without opinions, a New York statute materially
similar to Alabama's. See W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515, 515
(1936). That three of the conservativeJusticesjoined in concluding that a state could
constitutionally require employers to make payments for unemployment insur-
ance-the main issue at stake in these cases-disposes of any contention that Roberts's
similar conclusion was a response to political pressure, or even that it was inconsistent
with his opinion in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad, 295 U.S. 330 (1935),
discussed supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text. In Alton, Roberts had
considered pooling unacceptable. See id. at 360. It could well be, though, that he
regarded pooling as more appropriate with respect to unemployment insur-
ance-because insurance is by nature the pooling of risk-than with respect to
pensions, a form of employee compensation.
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those views. It is virtually impossible to understand their votes in
the Social Security Cases as anything but a conscientious reflection of
their beliefs, consistent with their belief in the result of Butler. And
if Van Devanter and Sutherland conscientiously believed in both the
result in Butler and the application to the Social Security Cases of
Butler's "general welfare" discussion, there is no reason to believe
that Hughes and Roberts did not.
Moreover, it is rather easy to reconstruct straightforward views
that might have underlay the four Justices' views of the "general
welfare" issues in both Butler and the Social Security Cases. In Butler,
the majority held that the benefit payments made to producers in
return for agreement to limit production were coercive. Stone
responded, "Threat of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of
economic coercion. 333 In general, as the majority perceived, that
approach does not help discern coercion of farmers acting in a com-
petitive market: if one farmer's neighbors accept a governmental
benefit lowering their marginal cost of production, he may well feel
coerced into accepting such a benefit as well."3 4 In this case, in
fact, the farmers were not coerced: the governmental benefits were
designed to raise the marginal cost of production, and a farmer
could well decide, free of coercion, either to accept the benefits or
to plant his full acreage and take advantage of the price rise caused
by the governmental program. That point may seem rather elemen-
tary to us now, but there is no reason to believe that the Butler
majority perceived it.
In Helvering, by contrast, the payments were clearly not coercive:
they were simple, unconditional benefit payments made to aged
persons. In Steward, the tax credit for employers who contributed
to qualifying unemployment plans adopted by the state was asser-
tedly coercive of the state, but Cardozo had a ready response: the
statutory scheme aimed to encourage the states to set up their own
unemployment programs without fear of placing themselves at a
competitive disadvantage against other states that chose to do
nothing.335  It appeared that, far from being coerced, the state
"chose to have relief administered under laws of her own making,
sss Butler, 297 U.S. at 81 (Stone, J., dissenting).
s See id. at 71 (Roberts,J.) ("The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits
is the power to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower elects not to accept the
benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to
undersell him. The result may well be financial ruin.").
sss SeeJACKSON, supra note 155, at 225-26; see also supra text accompanying note
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by agents of her own selection, instead of under federal laws,
administered by federal officers, with all the ensuing evils, at least
to many minds, of federal patronage and power."33 6 Whether that
argument is persuasive or not, it was at least colorable; it was of a
different nature from the arguments over coercion in Butler, and
nothing in Butler suggested that it was fallacious.
Similar considerations apply to the issue of whether the
payments, even if not coercive, amounted to "purchased regula-
tion." In Butler, the majority's affirmative answer aroused the ire of
Stone, who asserted that under the majority view all sorts of
conditional expenditures-for example, conditioning a grant to a
rural school on a requirement that certain standards be main-
tained-would be unconstitutional 37  Surely, though, the Butler
majority might have perceived a distinction-whether ultimately
persuasive or not is an interesting question, but not the question
material here-between the statutory scheme of the AAA and the
type of conditions cited by Stone.
In Butler, the government did not attempt to restrict the
recipient's use of the payments; the only benefit to the government
from the expenditure was an agreement by the recipient to restrict
its activities in a way that, by hypothesis, the government could not
compel.338 At least arguably, these restrictions stand on a weaker
ground than conditions placed on an otherwise valid governmental
expenditure and designed to ensure that funds are paid only to
intended recipients, or only when they are needed, that the
recipient uses the funds for their intended purpose, or that the
government is purchasing what it wants to. In Helvering, the expen-
ditures were unconditional payments to the aged. In Steward, a state
paying unemployment benefits would limit calls on the national
Treasury; imposing requirements on the state's unemployment plan
336 Steward, 301 U.S. at 590. Note the Court's unanimous approval, earlier the
same year, of another form of federal-state cooperation in Kentucky Whip & Collar
Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad, 299 U.S. 334, 352 (1937), which held that Congress,
in an attempt"to aid the enforcement of valid state laws," constitutionally prohibited
the transportation of goods made by convict labor into any state where the goods
were intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of its laws.
337 See 297 U.S. at 85-86 (Stone, J., dissenting).
" The government did not argue in Butler that the statute was proper under the
commerce power. In Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1939), decided after
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court held the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, a statute passed to replace the one invalidated
in Butler, valid under the commerce power. See discussion infra notes 424-26 and
accompanying text.
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as a condition of giving a tax credit to employers who contributed
to a state plan was therefore a reasonable effort to determine "that
the law leading to the credit is in truth what it professes to be.""3 9
These arguments are, of course, not conclusive; ultimately, they
may not be persuasive, or even withstand close scrutiny. But clearly
there were colorable arguments that might have accounted for the
move made by fourJustices-two of the Court's conservatives as well
as its two swing members-between Butler and the Social Security
Cases. There is no basis for concluding that Hughes and Roberts
switched in response to political factors.
An additional factor counts against that hypothesis with respect
to Roberts: had the Court acted in accordance with his procedural
vote in Helvering, the result would have been-according to Assistant
Attorney General Robert Jackson, who argued part of the case for
the government-not a victory but a "grave disaster to the Adminis-
tration." 4 ' In light of the enormous amount of tax revenue
involved, the government thought it essential to secure an early
decision, and had taken the unusual step of expediting a case in
which originally it had not even been involved. 4 1 Before the
Supreme Court, as Cardozo noted, the government made an
"earnest request" that the Court reach the merits. 42 Had Roberts
and the liberals had their way, however, the Court would not have
done so, but would have decided that the case was not proper for
judicial consideration. 43
C. The Commerce Clause Cases
1. The Puzzle
On May 18, 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,344 Roberts joined
the four conservatives in holding unconstitutional the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935.14' The Act imposed a heavy sales
tax on bituminous coal, but rebated ninety percent of it for those
operators accepting a code to be formulated from statutory
specifications by a National Bituminous Coal Commission. Among
"' Steward, 301 U.S. at 593.
-"'JACKSON, supra note 155, at 229.
34, See id. at 228-30.
342 Helvering, 301 U.S. at 639.
141 See id.; see also supra note 273.
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Pub. L. No. 402, § 3, 49 Stat. 991, 993-94 (1935).
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the code's labor provisions were to be guarantees of the right to
organize and bargain collectively.346 One section of the statutory
outline, Part III(g), allowed representatives of specified percentages
of the operators and miners to negotiate wage and hour standards
binding on all code members. 47 The majority, per Sutherland,
held that these provisions were unconstitutional as a regulation of
mining, which, like other productive activities, had long been held
to be a local activity rather than part of interstate commerce.
348
Sutherland called Part III(g) a "most obnoxious form" of legislative
delegation; regulatory power was not even given to an impartial
governmental body but to private parties competing with each other
subject to the regulation.
3 49
Hughes dissented. He agreed with the majority that Part III(g)
was unconstitutional on various grounds, including that it went
beyond any proper regulation of commerce.350  He concluded,
however, that the tax could be upheld on the basis of other pro-
visions of the Code, setting the price of bituminous coal sold in
interstate commerce.3 51 The three liberals, in an opinion by
Cardozo, also dissented, but more simply. Like Hughes, they
regarded the marketing provisions as clearly severable, and they
voted to uphold the tax on the basis of those provisions without
reaching the validity of the labor provisions.
352
On April 12, 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
353
by a five-to-four margin, the Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).354 The NLRA compelled employer recogni-
tion of, and collective bargaining with, employee-selected unions
and established the National Labor Relations Board to prevent
employers from committing a broad range of unfair labor practices.
Both in Jones & Laughlin and in its companion cases, the Court-in
opinions by Hughes joined by Roberts as well as the three liberals-
held that the Act could validly be applied to labor relations in
productive industries bearing a close and substantial impact on
interstate commerce.
3 55
346 See § 4, 49 Stat. at 1001 (Part III(a) of statutory outline of the code).
W See § 4, 49 Stat. at 1002.
348 See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 302 ("Mining is not interstate commerce, but, like
manufacturing, is a local business subject to local regulation and taxation." (quoting
Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 178 (1922))); see also infra note 393.
39 Id. at 311.
" See id. at 318-19 (Hughes, C.J., writing separately).
-15 See id. at 323-24.
312 See id. at 324 (Cardozo, J., dissenting with Brandeis and Stone, JJ., joining).
353 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
s Act ofJuly 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 151).
s Apart from the commerce power issue, the NLRA was challenged on due
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Why did the Court appear to change course?
2. Hughes
Hughes's treatment of the Commerce Clause in Carter does not
sit easily alongside his monumental opinion in Jones & Laughlin.
The two may be logically reconcilable, 56 but I believe that, to the
extent they are not, Carter is the aberration. Jones & Laughlin
clearly represents Hughes's deeply held views.
The texts of the two opinions strongly suggest these conclusions.
Hughes began his separate opinion in Carter with two paragraphs
that discussed the general law of the Commerce Clause but hardly
touched on the facts of the particular case. 57 This passage did
not climax with a holding-a paragraph later, Hughes expressed in
one brief conclusory sentence his conclusion that Part III(g) went
beyond Congress's commerce power-but with a sentence in effect
declaring that the public should get off the backs of the Court:
If the people desire to give Congress the power to regulate
industries within the State, and the relations of employers and
employees in those industries, they are at liberty to declare their
will in the appropriate manner, but it is not for the Court to
amend the Constitution by judicial decision.35 8
Given the brevity of Hughes's discussion of the Commerce Clause
in the context of the labor provisions, the even greater brevity of his
conclusion on that score, and the fact that the discussion was
altogether unnecessary in light of the result that he reached, I
suspect that this public advertisement provided the motivation for
the substantive discussion rather than vice versa. "He is deeply
unhappy," Brandeis said to Frankfurter of Hughes two days after the
process grounds as an arbitrary interference with employers' ability to conduct their
businesses in an orderly manner. In light of Texas &New Orleans Railroad, discussed
supra text accompanying notes 33-38, and Nebbia, discussed supra part I.D.2, there was
little doubt that a majority of the Court would reject this argument. And it did, see
301 U.S. at 45, leaving it clear that the old cases protecting "yellow dog" contracts
were now empty shells. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing
yellow dog contracts). Hughes's discussion on this point is interesting for its
elaboration of what he regarded as a "fundamental right" of employees to organize
and select representatives, 301 U.S. at 33, a right he regarded as "correlative" to
employers' rights to conduct their business. Id. at 43-44. For a useful discussion of
this aspect of the Labor Board cases, see Cushman, supra note 33, at 278-92.
" See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
s'7 See Carter, 298 U.S. at 317-18.
3s8 298 U.S. at 318.
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Carter decision, "He has no control over the Court." 59 It appears
likely that Hughes, fearful of an approaching confrontation, was
attempting to deflect criticism from the Court."6
Now compare Hughes's Commerce Clause discussion in his Jones
& Laughlin opinion, an opinion that Fred Rodell accurately called
"magisterial." 6' Hughes could be cagey and picky when it suited
his purpose.3 62 But now he roared. Joseph Alsop and Turner
Catledge reported that Hughes made the oral delivery of his
opinion "magnificently, giving its every phrase an overtone of
infallibility which made the whole business sound like a rehearsal
for the last judgment." 63  Similarly, Thomas Emerson, then a
lawyer for the NLRB, later remembered the delivery as "an amazing
performance," staking out vast doctrines as if they were mere
restatements of elementary principles of black-letter law.s64 This
was no mincing attempt to achieve an unpleasant result under
political pressure.
"It is a familiar principle," Hughes declared, "that acts which
directly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its
free flow, are within the reach of the congressional power.... It is
the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the
criterion."365 Moreover, he used flexible language to describe the
scope of this doctrine and to show its reach to productive indus-
tries:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
... Memorandum of Conversation with Brandeis (May 20, 1936), in 38 FRANK-
FURTER PAPERS (Library of Congress).
'" Compare Hughes's statement in Carter on the role of the Court with Roberts's
statements in Butler that it is "a misconception" that the Court assumes "a power to
overrule or control the action of the people's representatives," and that all the Court
can do is to "announce its considered judgment" as to whether a challenged statute
"squares with" the Constitution. 297 U.S. at 62. Roberts included another key
passage in his Butler opinion "just to please the Chief," see supra text accompanying
note 319, and perhaps he did in this one as well. Note also Hughes's statement in
Schechter that it was "not the province of the Court to consider the economic
advantages or disadvantages ofa. .. centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the
Federal Constitution does not provide for it." Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 549 (1935).
s61 FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM
1790 TO 1955, at 250 (1955).
... See supra note 300.
s ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 226, at 146.
4 Reminiscences of Thomas I. Emerson, in Columbia University Oral History
Collection 475 (n.d.) (unpublished) (notes on file with author).
'Jones &'Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 31-32 (citations omitted).
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interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control....
The close and intimate effect which brings the subject within
the reach of federal power may be due to activities in relation to
productive industry although the industry when separately viewed
is local."'
In this case, Hughes found application of the doctrine clear:
In view of respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle to say that the
effect [of a labor stoppage] would be indirect or remote. It is
obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic.
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national
life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in
an intellectual vacuum.... When industries organize themselves
on a national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce
the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained
that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field
into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect
interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of
industrial war? 6'
These passages are not surprising in light of Hughes's prior
record on the Commerce Clause. His opinion as an Associate
Justice in the Shreveport Rate Cases, 6' had foreshadowed the steel
case by establishing that Congress's power extends to intrastate
transactions that bear "a close and substantial relation to interstate
traffic. " "'b Shreveport involved transportation, of course, but in a
real senseJnes &Laughlin merely stated a corollary-one the Court
had previously refused to draw-that productive industries could
bear such a close relation to interstate commerce.
As ChiefJustice, Hughes had already indicated the connection.
"The interests of producers and consumers are interlinked," he
wrote in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States.3 7 ° "When industry
is grievously hurt, when producing concerns fail, when unemploy-
ment mounts and communities dependent upon profitable
production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry." 71 Nor
*' Id. at 37-38 (citations omitted).
367 Id. at 41.
- 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
m9 Id. at 351.
370 288 U.S. 344, 372 (1932).
371 Id.
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was there anything new about Hughes's perception, which he
claimed experience had "abundantly demonstrated," that "often an
essential condition of industrial peace" was the protection of
employees' rights of organization and representation.3 72 He had
made similar statements, shortly afterjoining the Court, in the Texas
& New Orleans case, upholding the Railway Labor Act.37 3 And in
his bold dissent in Alton, 74 he had emphasized not only the
plenary nature of Congress's power over commerce, 75 but also
"the importance of conditions of employment" and "fair treatment"
of employees "in conserving the peace and good order which are
essential to the maintenance of the service without disastrous
interruptions."376
Hughes had also written looking the other way in Schechter,8 "
but Schechter was a far different case; the entire Court had agreed
with the substance of his Commerce Clause discussion there. Apart
from the odd opinion in Carter, Hughes's prior career pointed
strongly to the result he achieved inJones & Laughlin.
Now observe how Hughes treated both Carter and Jones &
Laughlin in subsequent cases. In Jones & Laughlin itself, had
Hughes wished to achieve a pro-Administration result for political
purposes while preserving Carter, he could have done so. Colorable,
albeit perhaps rather flimsy, grounds of distinction were avail-
able,378 and even if he did not believe they were he could have
made a conclusory declaration that the cases were distinguishable-
as in fact he did with respect to Schechter.37 9 Instead, all he said
was that in Carter "the Court was of the opinion that the provisions
of the statute relating to production were invalid upon several
grounds,"3 80 as if the Court had not meant what it said because it
said other things as well."'1 This feeble explanation was an in-
s"Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 42.
373 See 281 U.S. at 570; discussion supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
"" See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
375 See 295 U.S. at 375-76 (Hughes, CJ., dissenting).
376 Id. at 376.
'7 See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
-78 See infra note 393 (discussing possible grounds for distinguishing Jones &
Laughlin from Carter).
.19 SeeJones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 40 (purporting to distinguish Schechter from
Jones & Laughlin on the ground that the labor practice in Schechter was so remotely
related to interstate commerce as to be beyond the federal power).
380 Id. at 41.
"' Even in conference, Hughes-to the surprise of Cardozo-apparently found no
need to distinguish Carter. See Interview with Joseph L. Rauh, Esq. (Aug. 17, 1976)
(notes on file with author). Mr. Rauh was law clerk to Justice Cardozo when the
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triguing misstatement of the Court's position in Carter. Sutherland
had clearly held all the labor provisions invalid under the Com-
merce Clause and added arguments based on delegation and due
process for Part III(g) alone; for much of the case then, the
commerce ruling was essential and not merely alternative. Only in
the separate opinion of Hughes, in fact, was the Commerce Clause
merely an alternative basis of decision-and there because, as with
the delegation and due process arguments, he limited its application
to Part II(g).8 2
Jones &Laughlin's cavalier treatment sapped the life from Carter.
Four years later, Hughes joined in administering the coup de grace.
During those four years, Hughes wrote a series of opinions
demonstrating that the advanced ground staked out by Jones &?
Laughlin was not a temporary outpost to be abandoned once the
battle was over."'8 He did not write an opinion in United States v.
Darby,3"4 the celebrated case upholding the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 as applied to employees engaged in manufacturing. But
his conduct in that case confirms his attitudes towards Carter and
Jones & Laughlin. Darby pushed the idea of a "close and substantial"
relation to interstate commerce to new limits, and at conference
Hughes expressed misgivings as to whether it should be pushed so
far, at least in a criminal statute that he regarded as badly draft-
ed."'8 Thus, when the case came to a vote, he passed. But he
expressed no misgivings about the "close and substantial" test itself;
indeed, he restated it at conference."8 6 After Stone circulated his
Court decidedJones & Laughlin.
382See 298 U.S. at 318,322-23. The point seems always to have been overlooked:
unlike the Court, Hughes gave no clear opinion on the validity of any of the labor
provisions except for this one, where other available grounds weakened the impact
of his commerce decision. On the other labor provisions, which would stand or fall
on the Commerce Clause alone, Hughes very simply slipped the question.
's See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 18 (1939) (upholding the Tobacco Inspection
Act of 1935); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,238 (1938) (upholding
the NLRA as applied to a utility that sold power intrastate only); Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 464 (1938) (barely acknowledging the existence
of Carter and elaborating on the "well-established principle" ofJones &' Laughlin).
s 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
See 51 Douglas Papers (Dec. 21, 1940) (Library of Congress) (conference notes
for United States v. Darby Lumber Co.) [hereinafter Douglas Darby Papers]; 64 Murphy
Papers (Jan. 4, 1941) (misdatedJan. 4, 1940) (Bentley Historical Library, University
of Michigan) (conferences notes for case numbers 82 and 330) [hereinafter Murphy
Darby Papers]. The date on the Douglas notes was typed apparently in advance of
conference, the date on the Murphy notes, therefore, appears to be more reliable,
apart from the obvious slip as to the year.
"' See 51 Douglas Darby Papers, supra note 385; 64 Murphy Darby Papers, supra
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opinion for the majority, Hughes wrote to him, again expressing
doubts about the outcome on the grounds that the scope of the
statute was disturbingly vague for application in a criminal case. He
had no doubts, though, about Stone's broad discussion of the
commerce power. On the contrary, he began his letter by saying,
"You have written a strong opinion, again setting forth with suitable
elaboration the general principles which we have held should govern
the exercise of the commerce power."387 Stone's elaboration
included the declaration that, so far as Carter was inconsistent with
the conclusions he expressed, it had already been "limited in
principle" by later cases, especially those under the NLRA beginning
with Jones & Laughlin."'
Overall, then, I believe the evidence strongly supports Hughes's
insistence that Jones & Laughlin represented no change in his
concept of the commerce power." 9 Neither sit-down strike, nor
landslide election, nor Court plan was necessary to persuade him.
3. Roberts
Most of Hughes's prior record, I have argued, pointed in the
direction of his opinion in Jones & Laughlin. By contrast, most of
Roberts's prior record suggested that he would join the conserva-
tives in that case. In 1931, Roberts had given the conservatives a
fifth vote in United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railroad,"'0 which drew on a restrictive view of the extent to which
the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to reach matters that
were not themselves interstate commerce. Two years later, in Texas
& Pacific Railway v. United States,39' he again gave the conserva-
tives the decisive vote in a decision that, although purportedly
construing the Interstate Commerce Act rather than the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, severely restricted the Interstate
note 385.
'" Letter from ChiefJustice Hughes tojustice Stone (Jan. 27,1941), in 66 STONE
PAPERS, supra note 129. On the proofs of a companion opinion, Opp Cotton Mills,
Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941), Hughes marked, "Very careful and satis-
factory." Letter from ChiefJustice Hughes, supra. Opp was a civil case.
's Darby, 312 U.S. at 123.
"s'See also HUGHES, supra note 297, at 312 ("I wrote the opinions for the Court
in theJnes &Laughlin case, and other cases sustaining the N.L.R.A. These opinions
were in no sense a departure from the views I had long held and expressed."); 2
PUSEY, supra note 83, at 771 (claiming confidential testimony from otherJustices).
"g 282 U.S. 31 (1931); see also discussion supra note 45 and accompanying text.
"' 289 U.S. 627 (1933).
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Commerce Commission's power to protect local ports against
discrimination by carriers. His very right-wing opinion in Alton,
though for the most part concerning issues different from those
involved inJones &Laughlin, suggested hostility to a broad exercise
of the commerce power. And, of course, Roberts joined the
majority in Carter.1
9 2
It may be that even Carter is logically reconcilable with Roberts's
vote in Jones & Laughlin."'3 But the steel case does appear to
"- Note alsoAshtonv. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1,298 U.S.
513 (1936), a case that involved the bankruptcy rather than the commerce power, in
which Roberts's decisive vote for the conservatives may reflect some hostility on his
part to novel exercises of national power. After the crisis, in United States v. Bekins,
304 U.S. 27 (1938), Roberts joined in Hughes's opinion for the majority, essentially
nullifying Ashton.
"' The government attempted inJones &'Laughlin to distinguish Carter on several
grounds. Its principal argument was that the purpose of the statute involved in
Carter, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, was to stabilize the coal
mining industry by regulation of prices and wages, whereas the principal purpose of
the NLRA was to control strikes that had the intent or necessary effect of interfering
with commerce. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 88-89, NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936), reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS &
ARGUMENTS, supra note 286, at 291-92; Oral Argument on Behalf of the National
Labor Relations Board, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1936),
reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS, supra note 286, at 460. Professor
Freund regarded this argument as plausible, at least to a person of Hughes's cast of
mind: "[T]he setting of wages and hours for coal miners may not have seemed to be
as intimately related to the protection of commerce from the stoppages incident to
strikes as is a comprehensive guarantee of collective bargaining." Freund, supra note
300, at 34. "A mind that could find [very thin] distinctions congenial and compelling
would hardly need the threat of Court-packing" to draw this distinction. Id. at 36.
The distinction is weak at both ends, however. On the one hand, in addition to
the regulation of wages and hours in Part III(g), the Coal Conservation Act included
in Part III(a) a guarantee of the rights to organize and bargain collectively that was
a precursor of the more broadly applicable guarantee established by the NLRA. See
supra text accompanying note 346. Although Hughes's opinion in Carter appears to
have assailed only Part III(g), the majority opinion was not so limited. See supra notes
348, 382 and accompanying text. The government was therefore forced inJones &
Laughlin into the strained argument that the guarantee of collective bargaining in
Part III(a) of the Coal Conservation Act had been merely a subordinate part of the
statutory scheme intended to effectuate the main purpose expressed partially in Part
III(g). See Brief, supra, at 88-89, reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS,
supra note 286, at 291-92. And on the other hand, Solicitor General Stanley Reed's
argument inJones & Laughlin that the NLRA was directed at "the flow of interstate
commerce itself and the carrying on of these great enterprises," and "not the labor
relations in and of themselves" should probably be greeted with some skepticism.
Oral Argument, supra, reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS, supra note
286, at 460.
The government also argued in Jones & Laughlin that the Coal Conservation Act
applied to the whole industry, without providing any mechanism for determining in
which enterprises there was a sufficient nexus to commerce to justify application of
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represent a sharp break in his general attitude on the commerce
power. Like Hughes, he joined the liberal side in the subsequent
the statute. See Brief, supra, at 89-90, reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS,
supra note 286, at 292-93. But nothing in Carter suggested that such a mechanism
might save the statute, or that any coal mining company might present a better basis
for constitutional application of the statute than did the ones involved in the case.
Finally, the government argued that as applied toJones @'Laughlin the NLRA was
"concerned with activities which occur under circumstances closely related to a flow
of commerce, and which directly affect that flow." Brief, supra, at 90, reprinted in 33
LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS, supra note 286, at 293. The government
emphasized the vast interstate movement of raw materials to Jones & Laughlin's plant
in Alquippa, Pa., and the vast movement out in the form of iron and steel products.
See Brief, supra, at 92, reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS, supra note
286, at 295. And, to strike a contrast, the government pointed to the Court's
declaration in Carter that in Schechter the flow had ceased, whereas in Carter it had not
begun. See id. Professor Cushman believes that this argument could well have led
to success for the government without distorting the Court's precedent. See
Cushman, Stream of Legal Consciousness, supra note 6, at 150 ("The Government had
prepared for the Court a rationale with an impeccable pedigree; ... had it wished to
do so, the Court could easily have reached the same result with the current of
commerce theory.... ."). I regard this argument as substantially weaker, in light of
Carter and earlier cases, than Professor Cushman does.
The doctrine of the "current" (or "flow" or "stream") of commerce, first adopted
by the Supreme Court in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), allowed
local transactions to be brought within the reach of Congress's commerce power
when they were part of a continuous movement in interstate commerce. See Swift,
196 U.S. at 398-99 ("When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one state... [to]
another,... with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock
yards and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing
is a current of commerce.. . ."). But the Court had long drawn a sharp distinction
between manufacture and commerce. See Carter, 298 U.S. at 299 ("'No distinction is
more popular to the common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and
political literature, than that between manufacture and commerce. Manufacture is
transformation-the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form or use. The
functions of commerce are different.'" (quoting Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20
(1899))); see also supra note 348 and accompanying text. And as interpreted by Carter,
Swift and its progeny "nowhere suggested ... that the interstate commerce power
extended to the growth or production of the things which, after production, entered
the flow." Carter, 298 U.S. at 305. For support, the Carter Court pointed to
Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwest Railway in which the Court, concluding
that intrastate shipments of rough lumber to a mill were not part of interstate
commerce, had emphasized that the lumber did not leave the mill "until it had been
subjected to a manufacturing process that materially changed its character, utility, and
value." Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134, 151 (1919).
One measure of the difficulties confronting the "current of commerce" doctrine
inJones &Laughlin is that the government gave the doctrine a subsidiary position in
its brief. See Brief, supra, at 90-92, reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS & ARGUMENTS,
supra note 286, at 293-95. And another measure is that the Court explicitly declined
to use the doctrine, instead resting its result on a broader based theory of protecting
interstate commerce against obstructions, whatever the source. SeeJones 'Laughlin,
301 U.S. at 36-37.
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line of cases-but unlike Hughes, with no apparent misgivings in
Darby."' He continued on that side, after Hughes's retirement, in
the remarkable case of Wickard v. Filburn.395 And after his retire-
ment, he even referred to Jones & Laughlin as virtually overruling
Carter."'6 Thus, even if a fine distinction between Carter and Jones
& Laughlin is possible, Roberts's prior and subsequent record
suggests that some broader factor accounts for his votes. One
obvious candidate is the hypothesis that Roberts voted with the
liberals in Jones & Laughlin and its companions for manipulative
reasons, to help defeat the Court-packing plan. For several reasons,
this manipulation hypothesis is unpersuasive.
First, Roberts's consistency on the liberal side of Commerce
Clause cases even after the crisis of 1937 had passed-though he
remained notably conservative in other areas39 7--suggests that he
did not put on a temporary liberal mask for political reasons.
Second, it was by no means obvious at the time that giving the
Administration a victory in the NLRB cases would afford the Court
any substantial protection against packing. The immediate reaction
of many observers, as reported by the redoubtable Turner Catledge,
was that the decisions would have little impact at all on the
battle.39 8
Indeed, it appeared that the decisions might increase, rather
than decrease, the probability that the Court would be subjected to
some packing. To the extent that the decisions appeared to be a
reaction to political pressure, they weakened the Court's prestige
"4 See 51 Douglas Darby Papers, supra note 385; 64 Murphy Darby Papers, supra
note 385.
395 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding that the commerce power authorizes the
regulation of wheat grown for private consumption).
396 See ROBERTS, supra note 300, at 51-53.
" See infra text accompanying note 412; infra notes 427-41 and accompanying
text. In every one of the postcrisis cases cited infra notes 427-30, 432, and 436-41,
Roberts dissented on the conservative side. See also Cushman, New Deal Court, supra
note 6, at 235-36 (noting various areas in which Roberts remained conservative even
after the 1937 crisis).
" See Turner Catledge, Split on Court Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at I (stating
that "[m]any observers seemed to think tonight that the Wagner decisions had
brought little change to the status of the court reorganization plan"). Immediately
after the decision in West Coast Hotel, the equally redoubtable Arthur Krock expressed
uncertainty about which side of the Court-packing battle it aided. See Arthur Krock,
Flexibility of Constitution Conceded by High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1937, at 22.
("Argument has just begun on the question whether the Supreme Court's reversal of
itself in the women's minimum wage case today is a point for or against the
President's judiciary proposals.").
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and therefore weakened the strongest argument against packing-the
need to keep the Court free of outside political manipulation.
3
9
Moreover, the decisions appeared to give Roosevelt a graceful
opportunity to make an Aikenesque declaration of victory40 and
work out a compromise that, without much further struggle, would
yield two, rather than six, extra Justices.0 1 Whether or not such
an outcome would have been a victory for Roosevelt, it certainly
would have been a defeat for the Court. Roosevelt, of course,
spurned the opportunity-but the point is that the political effect of
the NLRB decisions was not easily predictable in advance.0 2
Third, even if Roberts had confidence that a victory for the
Administration would help sink the Court-packing plan, granting a
total victory was almost certainly unnecessary. I do not base this
proposition primarily on Professor Cushman's argument that by this
time the packing proposal was already in deep trouble;0 3 the
possibilities that Roosevelt had even then for compromise and the
subsequent history of the plan 404 suggest that the plan, in one
399 After West Coast Hotel, Harold Ickes had written that "on the whole, the effect
will be to weaken the prestige of the Court in public estimation because when it was
under fire, the Court ran to cover." 2 ICKES, supra note 226, at 107. Forgetting the
ChiefJustice's record on the minimum wage issue, he added, "Hughes and Roberts
ought to realize that the mob is always ready to tear and rend at any sign of
weakness." Id.
I suspect that if Roosevelt's assault on the Court were to have any impact on
Hughes and Roberts at all, it would be to stiffen, rather than dissolve, their resistance
to liberal arguments, in part to avoid giving an appearance of weakness. See A.F.C.,
Backstage in Washington, 158 OUTLOOK 170 (1931) (predicting that criticism would
stiffen Hughes). In this connection, it is significant that Hughes briefly held up
delivery of West Coast Hotel so that it would not appear to be a sign of weakness
forced by political attack. See 2 PUSEY, supra note 83, at 757.
4 George Aiken, a Republican senator from Vermont, suggested in 1966 that
President Johnson should "'declare the United States the winner [of the Vietnam
War] and begin de-escalation.'" Albin Krebs, George Aiken, Longtime Senator and
G.O.P. Maverick, Dies at 92, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1984, at B10.
"0 Joseph Robinson, the Senate majority leader, told a Roosevelt representative
that "if the President wants to compromise I can get him a couple of extra justices
tomorrow. What he ought to do is say he's won, which he has, agree to compromise
to make the thing sure, and wind the whole business up." ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra
note 226, at 153. Robinson's judgment as to the feasibility of such a compromise
appears to have been sound. See id. at 152.
0 I do not deny that in fact the NLRB decisions substantially weakened
Roosevelt's case for the six-addition plan. As SenatorJames Byrnes of South Carolina
put it, "Why run for a train after you've caught it?" Id. But the actual impact could
only be known in light of Roosevelt's response.
40 See Cushman, New Deal Court, supra note 6, at 210-20.
4 See William E. Leuchtenburg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second
Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673, 673-74 (noting that "by early June of 1937 [not April,
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form or another, still had plenty of life. Nevertheless, after the
great liberal victory two weeks earlier on the minimum wage-the
issue that by far had most aroused the public-a less than complete
victory in the NLRB cases would have been sufficient to suggest a
significant change of direction making the immediate addition of
new Justices unnecessary. For example, the Court might have held
for the NLRB in its cases against Jones & Laughlin and the giant
Fruehauf Trailer Company," 5 but held against the Board in its
case against the smaller Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Compa-
ny.406 Such a result would greatly weaken any argument that the
Court was trying to scuttle the New Deal; at the same time, it would
make the future development of the commerce power the equiva-
lent of trench warfare, in which each case must be fought carefully
over its particular facts and the conservatives might have opportuni-
ties for victory. Roberts, however, joined not only in Hughes's
sweeping opinion in Jones & Laughlin, but also in his opinions in the
companion cases, which applied jones & Laughlin conclusorily.
417
Finally, the manipulation hypothesis gains no support from any
other votes of Roberts. He had cast his vote in West Coast Hotel
before the Court-packing battle began, and his votes in the Social
Security Cases, as I have argued, reflected no change of view. The
NLRB votes were not part of a manipulative pattern, and this
suggests that they were not manipulative at all.
when the Court decided the NLRB cases, but after the critical events of May]
Roosevelt appeared to be thoroughly whipped," but in early summer he brought out
a modified plan and "came very close to putting it through").
" See NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 53-57 (1937) (upholding the
validity of the Board's jurisdiction over the nation's largest manufacturer of
commercial trailers, which maintained branch sales offices in twelve different states
and had distributors and dealers throughout the country).
I See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 72-75 (1937)
(upholding the validity of the Board's jurisdiction over a manufacturer of men's
clothing, which apparently was not a major factor in the industry, had one sales office
in a state other than that of its factory, and had sales volume approximately half that
of Fruehauf's); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 263 (1982) (characterizing
Friedman-Harry Marks as a small or medium-sized company with a small volume of
interstate commerce in relation to that of the industry as a whole, and insignificant
in relation to the nation's aggregate industry); Arthur Krock, Five Cases Decided, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1937, at I (reporting that "far narrower rulings had been expected").
407 Note also that on the same day as the other NLRB cases, Roberts issued the
opinion for the Court in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 129-30 (1937),
which-again over the dissent of the four conservatives, in this case based on the First
Amendment-held that the NLRA could validly be applied to editorial employees of
the Associated Press. Roberts briefly incorporated the holdings ofJones &Laughlin
into his opinion. See id. at 133.
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I conclude that Roberts's votes in the NLRB case probably
reflected a change-but a legitimate change-in his views. That is
not surprising. Roberts, no less than otherJustices, was persuadable
and capable of growth; he had previously changed his mind on
other matters, in relatively short order and free of significant
political pressure."" Certainly, as Professor Cushman has argued,
the integrative view of the public good expressed in Hughes's
opinion in Jones & Laughlin resonated with the views that Roberts
had expressed three years earlier in the due process context, in
Nebbia.4"9 His adoption in Butler, under persuasion from Hughes,
of the Hamilton-Story conception of the taxing and spending power
suggests that, in January 1936, his views on the general question of
the scope of national powers were already in transformation. To
some extent his apparent resistance to Hughes's persuasive efforts,
and to a greater extent his vote in Carter, demonstrate that the
transformation was far from complete.
Thus, it is plausible that Roberts would have voted as he did in
the NLRB cases even if no new external factors had operated at all.
That, of course, does not prove that such factors did not play a role.
For the reasons I have suggested above, I doubt that the Court-
packing battle had any substantial impact on Roberts's votes, at least
at a level close to his consciousness; for many of the reasons
argued by Professor Cushman, I doubt that the 1936 election did
either.410 The storm of sit-down strikes may well have had some
4 Note that Roberts wrote the conservative majority opinion in Hoeper v. Tax
Comm'n., 284 U.S. 206 (1931), see discussion supra note 81, barring computation of
one's tax by reference to another's income, but two years later cast a decisive vote in
favor of a directly contradictory liberal opinion in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670
(1933). Similarly, in Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932), see discussion supra note
81, he joined the conservative majority in a Contracts Clause opinion that does not
square easily with his decisive vote for the liberals two years later in Blaisdell, see
discussion supra part I.D.1.
I See Cushman, Stream of Legal Consciousness, supra note 6, at 130 ("Nebbia made
it possible to conceptualize what had previously been considered purely private
enterprises as businesses affected with a public interest. This in turn made it possible
to locate such business activities in a current of commerce subject to federal
control."); id. at 148-49 (Jones &' Laughlin's "deformalization of the direct/indirect
distinction... mirrored Nebbia's deformalization of the public/private distinction").
I would put less emphasis than Cushman does on the "current" metaphor, given
Hughes's express unwillingness to rely on it inJones & Laughlin. See 301 U.S. at 36
("The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and
obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential
part of a 'flow' of interstate or foreign commerce."); discussion supra note 393.
41o See Cushman, New Deal Court, supra note 6, at 230 (noting that the Court
"clearly did not follow the election returns of 1934," a great Democratic victory, or
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impact in persuading him that a national solution to labor problems
was necessary, but it is impossible to be sure.
III. CONSOLIDATION
The Court-packing battle was still blazing when the Court ended
its Term on June 1, 1937. Several factors had greatly weakened the
chances that Congress would pass Roosevelt's original plan: the
Court's liberal decisions, the prospect of Van Devanter's retirement,
which he announced on May 18, and the adverse vote of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, made the same day. Several weeks
later, the majority of the Committee issued a harsh negative report
on the bill. Even so, some form of packing bill likely would have
passed the Senate had Majority Leader Joseph Robinson not
suddenly died on July 14.411 After that, the President's forces
quickly unraveled, and Congress soon passed a judicial reform bill
that left the Supreme Court untouched. When theJustices returned
to the bench on October 4, the Court-packing battle was past, and
Hugo Black replaced Van Devanter. The Hughes Court would not
again be under severe political pressure-and for the time being the
liberals needed only one vote from the moderates, not both, to
prevail.
Thus, in December 1937, Hughes, joined by the four liberals,
wrote for the Court in a case that Roberts, in a dissent joined by the
conservatives, said overruled "a century of precedents" on the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.4 12  And yet the
those of 1938, a resounding Republican victory after which the Court, with Hughes
and Roosevelt in the majority, continued to support the constitutionality of New Deal
regulations of commerce, and that Alf Landon of Kansas, the only Republican
governor to survive the 1934 election, supported, at least in principle, many
important New Deal programs).
41 Robinson commanded the loyalty of many of his colleagues, and he hoped for
a seat on the Court, a prospect that would be much more likely if the Court's
membership were expanded-especially because Roosevelt was thought reluctant to
name Robinson to the Court unless he were accompanied by more liberal nominees.
See BAKER, supra note 157, at 255; see also Leuchtenburg, supra note 404, at 687
(quoting HiramJohnson, a leading opponent of the plan, to the effect that not until
shortly after Robinson's death did opponents have the votes sufficient to defeat the
plan); Turner Catledge, Court Bill Is Killed, 70 to 20, as Senate Galleries Cheer; Lower
Court Change Likely, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1937, at 1, 2 (reporting that the opponents
of Court-packing acknowledged after the defeat of the plan that, because of
Robinson's "personal force among his colleagues," they were beaten right up to the
moment of his death).
4 12 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
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conservatives could still prevail if both Hughes and Roberts joined
them." 3  Even that degree of power was fleeting, however. In
January 1938, Sutherland retired. Roosevelt promptly named his
Solicitor General, Stanley Reed, to fill the vacancy. Now the liberals
were in control. Butler's death in November 1939, and his
replacement early the next year by the Attorney General, Frank
Murphy, further consolidated their hold.
In the meantime, Felix Frankfurter replaced Cardozo, who had
died, and William 0. Douglas replaced Brandeis, who had retired.
These two changes did not dramatically alter the ideological
orientation of the Court in the near term. They did mean, however,
that, even before McReynolds and then Hughes retired in 1941,
Roosevelt appointees constituted a majority of the Court. Thus,
even if all the remaining members of the crisis-era Court voted
together, they could be outnumbered by their junior brethren.
414
"You are on the side of the angels," Hughes ribbed Stone at
conference in April 1941, "and there are more angels on this court
than there used to be."41 5 And Harvard's Thomas Reed Powell
began watching his clock on decision days "lest he be overruled
before his lecture was done."
416
4 s See Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 44 (1937) (holding, against the
Commissioner and over the conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals, that a payment
by a corporation to its employees in recognition of past services was, as a matter of
statutory construction, a gift not subject to income tax).
414 See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543, 553
(1940) (holding, in favor of the government, that the Interstate Commerce
Commission was not statutorily authorized to establish requirements regarding motor
carrier employees whose duties did not affect safety of operation; and concluding,
over the dissent of the four seniorJustices, that even when the "plain meaning" of a
statute does not produce absurd results, but only an unreasonable one plainly at
variance with legislative policy, the purpose, rather than the literal words of the
statute, should be followed); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561 (1940)
(holding that, in light of previous suspensions of a reenlistment allowance, a proviso
in an appropriations act prohibiting appropriations in two fiscal years for reenlist.
ment allowances should be construed to continue suspension of the allowance-thus
accomplishing by judicial construction what congressional rules forbade, the
enactment of substantive legislation via an appropriations bill).
415 64 Murphy Darby Papers, supra note 385 (1940 Term) (conference memo-
randum for case number 671). Hughes's comment did not suggest any disagreement
with the Court's resolution of that particular case, Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941). Indeed, according to the same memorandum, Hughes began discussion of
Olsen by noting that the lower court "made the mistake of following our discussion
in the Ribnik case." 64 Murphy Darby Papers, supra; see also discussion infra note 421
(summarizing Olsen). These renditions of Hughes's comments include some
prepositions and articles that Murphy's memorandum omitted.
416 Walton Hamilton & George Braden, The Supreme Court Today, NEW REPUBLIC,
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During the four postcrisis years of Hughes's Chief Justiceship,
as before the crisis,417 the Court-with the full participation of
Hughes and Roberts-made major strides in the areas of civil lib-
erties,41 civil rights,4 19 and criminal justice rights.
420
As to the economic powers of government, the newJustices led
a virtually uninterrupted liberal victory parade. The Court rapidly
consolidated its receptive attitude towards economic regulation
against due process objections. Nebbia played a somewhat larger
and more visible role in this consolidation than did West Coast
Hotel-not surprisingly, given that West Coast Hotel was essentially an
application of Nebbia.42t Though not willing to go quite so far as
Aug. 5, 1940, at 178, 178.
417 See supra part I.B.3; supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text; see also De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937) (holding unconstitutional a conviction
for participating in the conduct of a meeting, otherwise lawful, held under the
auspices of the Communist Party); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,240-
41,251 (1936) (holding unconstitutionial a state license tax on newspapers and other
publications that sold advertising and had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies
per week).
418 With respect to free expression, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. Commission for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Butsee Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
Cox appears still to be good law; Gobitis was overruled in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
... See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). Gaines was a major stepping stone on the path to Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Mitchell was a celebrated case involving
a railroad's discrimination against the sole black member of Congress.
0 See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,239-40 (1940) (holding, notwithstanding
a state court jury's conclusion that defendants' confessions were voluntary, that the
surrounding circumstances, calculated to fill the defendants with terror, made
conviction of the defendants based on such confessions unconstitutional);Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 US. 458, 468-69 (1938) (reversing the lower court's decision, in a habeas
corpus case, that the defendant had waived his right to counsel).
421 See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940)
(establishing the power of Congress to set the price of bituminous coal sold in
interstate commerce). Sunshine Coal cited Nebbia and its progeny prominently, see id.
at 394, but West Coast Hotel not at all. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941),
overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), and establishing the power of a
state to limit the fees charged by employment agencies, gave more prominence to
Nebbia than to West Coast Hotel. See Olsen, 313 U.S. at 244-46. United States v. Rock
Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939), relied heavily on Nebbia-as would be
expected given that Rock Royal, like Nebbia, involved the regulation of milk prices-
but noted West Coast Hotel only in a string citation. See Rock Royal, 307 U.S. at 549,
570-71. Correspondingly, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (involving hour
and wage labor standards), cited its most direct precedent, West Coast Hotel, rather
than Nebbia, in its very brief due process discussion. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 125.
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the liberals in eliminating due process as a substantive constraint
against arbitrariness in economic regulation, Hughes and Roberts
never suggested any inclination to draw back from either Nebbia or
West Coast Hotel 422
Similarly, Hughes and Roberts stood byJones &Laughlin, in one
case after another joining the liberals in upholding the reach of
Congress's commerce power into local matters.4 2' Hughes's reluc-
tance to join Darby does not indicate an inclination to confineJones
& Laughlin, which his own postcrisis opinions had treated expan-
sively. Not only did Darby pose for him a serious problem-the
vagueness of the statute for criminal prosecution-absent from Jones
& Laughlin, but Darby plainly required a far wider stretch of the
concept of a "close and substantial" effect on interstate commerce.
Congress's aggressiveness in capitalizing on the Court's new
receptivity to exercises of the commerce power rendered the
spending power under the General Welfare Clause virtually
redundant. Mulford v. Smith42 4 demonstrates the point. There,
the Court, in an opinion by Roberts and over the dissent of the
remaining conservatives, upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
Interestingly, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), cited
neither Nebbia nor West Coast Hotel, but relied almost totally on older cases in
upholding a federal statute against due process attack.
"' In all the cases except Rock Royal, cited supra note 421, Hughes and Roberts
joined the liberals. In both Sunshine Coal and Rock Royal, the remaining conservatives
dissented. In Carolene Products, McReynolds dissented while Butler concurred on
narrow grounds, maintaining that if the statutory provisions at issue were "construed
to exclude from interstate commerce wholesome food products that demonstrably are
neither injurious to health nor calculated to deceive," they would be "repugnant to
the Fifth Amendment." 304 U.S. at 155. By the time of the decisions in Darby and
Olsen, none of the conservative foursome remained on the Court.
Rock Royal concerned an order that regulated the price that milk handlers had to
pay for milk that they marketed in the area in which it was produced, but left
unregulated the price of milk marketed outside that area. See 307 U.S. at 558-59.
Dissenting from an opinion upholding this order, Roberts, with the concurrence of
Hughes, McReynolds, and Butler, contended that"it inevitably intends to destroy the
business of smaller handlers by placing them at the mercy of their larger competi-
tors." Id. at 587. Roberts concluded that the order was not statutorily authorized,
but that if it was it violated the due process guarantee. See id. The extent to which
Hughes joined in this opinion is somewhat ambiguous; he may have concluded that
the order was not statutorily authorized without concluding that it would violate due
process. See id. (noting that Hughes joined in Roberts's opinion "so far as it relates
to the invalidity of the order on the ground stated"); see also infra notes 428, 429
(discussing Roberts's dissent in Rock Royal and a companion case).
42s See cases cited supra note 383; see also infra text accompanying notes 424-26
(discussing Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939)).
424 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
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1938, a statute passed to replace the one that the Court had
invalidated in Butler.425 The Act provided a mechanism for setting
quotas, enforced by stiff penalties, for the amounts that a farm
might market of five basic agricultural commodities. The govern-
ment fought and won the case on the basis of the commerce
power-a ground that it had not dared argue in defense of the
earlier statute. Thus, the Mulford result suggested that the Butler-
Social Security Cases line would have a rather slight impact on the
Court's post-1937 jurisprudence; the virtually boundless develop-
ment of the commerce power makes essentially moot the question
whether Congress can use the taxing and spending power to coerce
or purchase compliance with a regulatory scheme that it could not
impose by straightforward regulation. Indeed, to whatever extent
the broad concept of the General Welfare Clause has mattered in
the Court's postcrisis decisions, the adoption of that concept in
Butler has been at least as important as its implementation in the
Social Security Cases.
4 26
I have argued that Hughes and Roberts remained faithful after
the crisis to the principles of the great cases decided during the
crisis. But, as before the crisis, they were not entirely in the liberal
camp.
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT IV. SWITCHING THE TIME OF THE
LATE PERSONNEL CHANGES
Suppose Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland, instead of
retiring in 1937 and 1938, respectively, had remained on the Court
until their deaths. Suppose also that Justice Butler, instead of
dying in 1939, lived and served on the Court until March 1941.
425 The statute was already amended several times before the Mulford decision.
See 307 U.S. at 41 n.1.
4
1 See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950) (citing
Butler as having declared, for the first time in an opinion of the Court, that
Congress's power under the General Welfare Clause is separate and distinct from the
later enumerated powers, and adding-without any elaboration or reference to
Steward-that "[i]f any doubt of this power remained, it was laid to rest the following
year in Helveringv. Davis"). Professor Tribe argues that the Court's summary affirm-
ance, 435 U.S. 962 (1978), of North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp.
532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), demonstrates its "disregard for Butler." LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 322 n.9 (2d ed. 1988). I disagree. The condition
placed there on a federal grant of aid seems perfectly compatible with Butler. See
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936) ("We are not here concerned with a
conditional appropriation of money, nor with a provision that if certain conditions
are not complied with the appropriation shall no longer be available.").
SWITCHING TIME: THE HUGHES COURT
Would we talk very much about the Constitutional Revolution of
1937?
As suggested by this question, the course of decisions over the
remaining years of the Hughes Court would have been very
different had the liberals not been fortified by new members. In
several areas, significant liberal victories would have been defeats.
During these years, for example, the Court dismantled several
constitutional barriers, including ones of due process and equal
protection, to the taxing power. Had the Court's membership
remained unchanged, however, and the departing Justices' votes
remained true to form, the Court would have fortified those
barriers.42' 7 Similarly, the Court would have shown that vitality
remained both to the doctrine against excessive delegation4 2 and
to the due process restraint on legislation deemed arbitrary4 29 or
confiscatory;4.. indeed, Stone's decision in United States v. Carolene
41 With respect to intergovernmental tax immunity, see McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940);James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S.
134 (1937); Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186 (1937). With respect to
the business situs doctrine, see Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v.
Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939). With respect to other aspects of due process as it relates
to extraterritoriality, see, for example, Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359
(1941); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940). With respect to
retroactivity, due process and equal protection, see Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134
(1938). See also Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940) (overruling in part
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), and upholding against due process, equal
protection, and privileges and immunities attacks a tax differentially imposed on
deposits in banks inside and outside the state); cf. Whitney v. State Tax Comm'n, 309
U.S. 530, 537-42 (1940) (with McReynolds-the sole remaining member of the Four
Horsemen-not participating and Roberts dissenting alone, virtually overruling Binney
v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936), and upholding against due process and equal protection
attack inclusion in a decedent's estate for tax purposes of property never owned by
her but appointed by her will under a limited power that could only be exercised in
favor of four of her children, in such proportions as she might choose).4'2 See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 307 U.S. 588,603 (1939) (Roberts,
J., dissenting with McReynolds and Butler, JJ., joining) (finding an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of Agriculture, from a decision
upholding an order by the Secretary under the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937); see also United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 583
(1939) (Roberts, J., dissenting with McReynolds and Butler, JJ., joining) (noting
without elaboration, because the matter was not pressed, his view that an order
similar to that in Hood was unconstitutional delegation).
429 See United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). This
aspect of Rock Royal is discussed supra note 422.43o See Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570,574-77 (1941)
(upholding against an attack based on confiscation, endorsed in dissent by Hughes,
McReynolds, and Roberts, an oil proration order that, with respect to most wells,
allocated production on a flat per-well basis); Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols
197919941
1980 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1891
Products Co.4" would have been for a plurality rather than for the
majority. Notwithstanding the Court's generally expansive treat-
ment of the commerce power, the unchanged Court would have set
forth a restrained view of the scope of Congress's power over
navigation; 432 more importantly, given Hughes's doubts, the Court
may very well have decided Darby against the government. 43 A
new gold clause case would have been decided in favor of parties
seeking protection from one type of gold clause, thus dealing a
significant defeat to the government's monetary policy. 43 4 Numer-
ous conservative lower court decisions on constitutional matters
would have been left standing by an equally divided Court.4 5 And
in a wide variety of nonconstitutional contexts-most prominently
in taxation,41' but also in administrative law,
437 labor law, 48 s
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting with Hughes, C.J., and
McReynolds, J., joining) (same); cf. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec.
Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940) (procedures for challenging rate-setting order).
431 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
431 See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 409 (1940)
(holding, over Roberts's dissent,joined by McReynolds with Hughes not participating,
that "[iln determining the navigable character [of a river] it is proper to consider the
feasibility of interstate use after reasonable improvements which might be made").
411 If Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds (who retired two days
before the Court issued Darby) had all been on the Court, they and Hughes might
have formed a majority against the government.
4 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247,259 (1939) (construing, with
Stone joined by Hughes, McReynolds, and Butler, dissenting, a congressional
resolution to nullify a bondholder's right, pursuant to the terms of the bonds, to
demand payment in Dutch guilders at a prescribed rate ). The government appeared
as amicus in Henwood on the prevailing side. See id. at 248-49; see also supra note 173
(discussing Henwood).
41 Perhaps most notably, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), would
have affirmed by an equally divided vote the decision of the Court of Appeals that
"upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in absence of a local
statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is." Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937); see also Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S.
405, 424 (1938) (holding that salaries of state employees performing functions that
are not indispensable functions of state government are not immune from federal
taxes); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938) (overruling
precedents and holding that lessees of state-owned land may be subjected to a
nondiscriminatory tax on income derived from that land);Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 469 (1938), discussed supra note 420.
" See, e.g., Cary v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 441 (1941); Estate of Keller v.
Commissioner, 312 U.S. 543 (1941); Helvering v. Campbell, 313 U.S. 15 (1941);
Helvering v. Gambrill, 313 U.S. 11 (1941); Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531
(1941); Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941); Maguire v. Commissioner, 313
U.S. 1 (1941); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311
U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); White v. United States, 305
U.S. 281 (1938).
"" See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 198 (1939) (emphasizing the
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antitrust,4 9  and banking,40  among others4 1-the Court's
decisions would have had a far more conservative cast.
In short, that the spring of 1937 appears to have been a great
constitutional watershed is attributable in significant part to the
personnel changes that followed immediately. Those changes
guaranteed that over the next several years the Court would be
uniformly receptive to economic regulation. The contrast with the
prior few years, with its substantial mix of liberal and conservative
decisions, was clear; the contrast with the decades-long era preced-
ing the Hughes Court could not have been more stark. Had all the
Justices remained on the bench until Hughes's retirement, the
substantial number of conservative victories would have yielded a
contrast significantly less clear.
Moreover, of great importance, those conservative victories
would have stood alongside the 1937 landmarks. That in itself
suggests that those landmarks were not as revolutionary as is
need for cooperation between courts and agencies, and holding, over the dissent of
Butler, joined by McReynolds and Roberts, that funds previously paid into district
court, pendingjudicial review of an administrative rate-setting order subsequently set
aside on procedural grounds, should be retained by the court pending a further and
valid administrative determination of reasonable rates).
'" See American Fed'n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). In his dissent in Hutcheson,
Roberts said, "I venture to say that no court has ever undertaken so radically to
legislate where Congress has refused so to do." 312 U.S. at 245. Judicial legislation
was a favorite theme of Roberts's during this period. See, e.g, Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331, 338 (1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The decision of the court
disregards the fundamental principle that legislation is not the function of the
judiciary but of Congress.").
4 9 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 232 (1939) (holding,
over the dissent of Roberts, joined by McReynolds and Butler, that the evidence
supported an inference that film distributors agreed among themselves in violation
of the Sherman Act to impose restrictions on subsequent-run exhibitors).
' See Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1940) (implementing, over the
dissent of Roberts, joined by McReynolds, a broad view of the power of a bank
receiver to recover on a note that was part of an illegal transaction in which the
bank's officers participated); Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517,524-25
(1940) (holding, in favor of the Administration and over the dissent of Roberts,
joined by Hughes and McReynolds, that a national bank, though without authority to
pledge its assets as security for private deposits, could do so as security for deposits
made by a government corporation, notwithstanding dubious statutory authorization).
441 See SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 460 (1940)
(holding, inter alia, that a bankruptcy proceeding should have been held under
procedure allowing SEC intervention); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
310 U.S. 534 (1940) (Interstate Commerce Act); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S.
554 (1940), discussed supra note 414.
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generally supposed. Another thought experiment may help further
in gauging their significance.
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT . ELIMINATING THE MYSTERY
If there had been no 1936 or 1937, how different would the
course of decisions afterwards have been?
The answer suggested by the above analysis of the years after
1937 is: Far less different than is commonly thought. Apart from
their importance in upholding the Social Security Act itself, the
Social Security Cases had a rather slight impact. West Coast Hotel was
significant principally because it restored Nebbia to its proper place
after the oddity of Tipaldo. Alone among the three, Jones &
Laughlin had broad and enduring significance, for it represented a
substantial turning in the Court's -attitude towards the commerce
power. Jones & Laughlin was of monumental importance. But
revolutionary? I do not believe the term fits well.442
In short, the impact of the 1937 cases is significantly less than
has generally been supposed.
CONCLUSION
I have told a messy story. Many different factors account for the
constitutional transformation of the 1930s. The accession of
Hughes and Roberts advanced constitutional law substantially before
the spring of 1937; the accession of the Roosevelt appointees
advanced it afterwards. Personnel changes account for much of the
story.
Those changes cannot be a complete explanation, however. To
understand the strange course of the Court's crucial decisions in
1936 and 1937, we must attempt to understand the minds of its
swing members, and particularly of Roberts. I believe that Hughes
acted consistently across cases; to some extent, too-with respect to
both the General Welfare Clause and the substance of the due
process issues-I believe Roberts's conduct was consistent as well.
On the Commerce Clause, though, I suspect Roberts had a
442 See Cushman, Stream of Legal Consciousness, supra note 6, at 156 ("Had it not
been for the dramatic political events surrounding the Court's decisions, it would
have been difficult to contend that there was anything very revolutionary in the
opinions."). But see Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in
the Law: Selections from the Oral Histoiy of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854,
872-73 (1993) ("I thinkJones &'Laughlin was a revolution, a constitutional revolution."
(quoting Herbert Wechsler)).
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conscientious change of mind, at least the substance of which, if not
the timing, can be understood independent of political factors. His
willingness to confront the validity of the minimum wage laws in
1937, after straining to avoid the question in 1936, was likely
attributable in part to the furious reaction to the 1936 decision. To
some extent, though, Roberts might be impenetrable: he may have
been motivated by factors that cannot be discerned by others, and
that perhaps even he did not recognize, and this may have infused
his conduct with a strong element of apparent randomness.
Finally, consider the element of time and precedent.
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT VI: SWITCHING THE TIME OF DECISIONS
Justices Stone and Roberts were part of the unanimous Court
that held against Congress's exercise of the commerce power in
Schechter in 1935,44s and part of the unanimous Courts that held
in favor of the exercise of that power in 1941 and 1942 in
Darby4" and Wickard v. Filburm .445  Suppose that Darby and
Wickard had come before the Court in 1935, and that Schechter had
come before the Court in 1942. Which way would the Court have
gone in these cases? And which way would Justices Stone and
Roberts have voted?
Had Darby and Wickard come before the Court in 1935, it seems
certain that a majority of the Court, including Roberts, would have
voted against the government. But it also seems probable that
Stone would have voted the same way, as he did in Schechter, at least
Wickard, and arguably Darby, pressed the commerce power further
than did the government's arguments in Schechter. By the same
token, if the Court had decided Schechter in 1942, it seems virtually
certain that the entire Court-including Roberts and Stone, the two
remaining members of the Court that actually decided Schechter-
would have voted for the government; five years after Jones &9
Laughlin, and especially given Wickard and Darby, the macroeconom-
ic arguments made by the government in Schechter would not have
appeared particularly startling.
446
So it seems likely that Stone, as well as Roberts, broadened his
view of the commerce power between Schechter and Darby. Political
44 See supra text accompanying notes 195-206; see also supra text accompanying
note 194 (noting the narrow view of commerce taken by an unanimous Court in the
Federal Employers' Liability Act cases of the early 1930s).
414 See supra text accompanying notes 384-88, 394, 423, 433.44
1 See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
44See 295 U.S. at 548-49; discussion supra text accompanying note 202.
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explanations are not necessary to account for Stone's switch. And
neither are they to account for Roberts's. Time, as the newsreels of
the era pointed out, marches on. Cases pile up. And sometimes
people even change their minds.
